178 Ga. 379 | Ga. | 1934
Lead Opinion
Oglethorpe University filed its petition against City of Atlanta, seeking an injunction against a prosecution of said university or its agents by the City of Atlanta or its agents for and on account of a business license which the city claims the university was under obligation to pay to the city. The university alleged that it was an incorporated college of learning under the laws of the State, without capital stock, and conducting a broadcasting station from a point in the City of Atlanta, as a part of its educational work; that a license had been issued to the university by the Federal Eadio Commission to operate its broadcasting at a point in the city; that the university uses the broadcasting station to extend university training beyond the campus, and religious teaching at appropriate times; that this did not require the use of the instruments of the station at all times, and therefore that commercial broadcasting was possible, and that this was undertaken by the university, charging compensation therefor. The petitioner also alleged that it was an agency of the Federal Government and transmits educational, religious, and commercial broadcasting to points without the State of Georgia. It does not know what proportion, but alleges that this was done, and that therefore it was engaged in interstate commerce. The petition sets out the charter power of the city to tax occupations and businesses, and following this an ordinance which requires persons operating businesses to register their place of business; and following these general an
The city filed a demurrer, and an answer wherein certain of the allegations of the petition were admitted and others denied. It denied that the broadcasting station was a mere incident to the educational work of the university, and alleged that the station in question, WJTL, was operating as any other broadcasting station. It alleged that charges were made for services rendered, and so far as this broadcasting station was concerned, when the charter of the plaintiff was amended, to authorize it to operate this broadcasting station, this broadcasting station was described as a “business” to be carried on by the university. The city denied that the broadcasting station was maintained for educational and benevolent purposes, but alleged that broadcasting was to be carried on as a business; that the local station operated by the university makes contracts for broadcasting various products of various businesses; that all the transmission by WJTL was done through the Atlanta station and through the transmitter located there. The city denied that this was in any sense interstate commerce, but insisted that the business was subject to tax just like any other business.
After hearing evidence the court granted the injunction as prayed, and the city excepted.
We are of the opinion that the court erred in granting this injunction. The city’s contention that this broadcasting station
There was evidence to show that the income was $500 to $700 per month; also evidence to show that the station was operated at a loss. There was also testimony to show that by far the greater portion of the time was given to educational and free programs. There was evidence to show that the primary business of the station was educational. Brinkmoeller testified further: “The primary business of this station is educational; about 95 per cent, of time is given to educational and free programs. As to what percentage of the total expense of the station the $500 to $700 returned from commercial programs covers, the gross expenses of the station are about $2,000 per month. These students, who are announcers and engineers, get a partial scholarship; anybody that works on the station gets a partial scholarship. That is partially for the purpose of educating them in radio work. They have organized a radio school out there, and by giving a partial scholarship they are helping them go through school, and giving them actual experience in radio station and radio transmission work.” There was other testimony showing the amounts received from the business, and evidence showing that a large part of the time was devoted to educational purposes. But in view of all this evidence, giving full force and effect to the testimony of Brinkmoeller, we think that the broadcasting station and its activities amounted to a business. It received business just as other broadcasting stations would do. It might refuse
It is claimed by the petitioner that its broadcasting business is interstate, in that some of its messages may go beyond the State line. Even if it is true that some of its messages do go beyond the State lines, that does not make it interstate business, especially as there is nothing in the evidence to show that it has received or will receive messages to be transmitted beyond the State lines into other States. But even if it did receive such contracts, its business is certainly almost altogether intrastate; and its income is derived almost entirely, if not altogether, from what might be called intrastate business. In Smith v. Clark, 122 Ga. 528 (50 S. E. 480), the petitioner claimed to be free from a license charge, on the ground that he was engaged in interstate commerce; but it was said in that decision: Smith, as an agent of a packing-house, was engaged at the same time in two classes of business, one taxable and the other non-taxable. The State statute could not operate to impose a tax upon him for the interstate business, and the interstate clause of the constitution of the United States did not operate to relieve him from liability for tax on the intrastate business. On this branch of the case, allegations of the petition were substantially the same as those passed upon in Kehrer v. Stewart, 117 Ga. 969 [44 S. E. 854], 25 Sup. Ct. R. 403. It affirmatively appears that meats stored in the warehouse in Augusta were sold in large quantities to customers in Georgia. This was intrastate business, and when he engaged
The ruling made in the third headnote requires no elaboration.
Judgment reversed.
Rehearing
ON MOTION EOR REHEARING.
The motion for rehearing is denied, but the trial judge is directed to pass such order as may be necessary to preserve the status until final judgment in the trial court.