27 N.Y.S. 848 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1894
This action was prosecuted by the plaintiff to
recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the negligence of the defendant in the construction and operation of its trolley for the propulsion of its railroad cars, by reason of which the plain
But if the jury had found that the current which caused the injur; proceeded or was diverted from the defendant’s trolley or •cross or span wires, still the plaintiff could not predicate the right of recovery upon that fact alone, unless there was some evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the construction or maintenance of its line. The right of the defendant to use electricity as a motive power or energy upon the single-trolley plan is not- denied, and, unless by its negligent use the plaintiff was injured, it cannot complain; and I find no evidence in this case that its use in this instance was not in the manner in which it
In Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. 228, Spencer, C. J., in discussing this principle, uses this language:
“In actions of tort it is necessary to show that the particular damages in respect to which plaintiff proceeds must be the legal and natural consequence of the wrongful act imputed to the defendant.”
In Selleck v. J. Langdon & Co., 55 Hun, 26, 8 N. Y. Supp. 573, the court uses this language:
“In an action for an injury the court cannot go back of the proximate cause, and, as between other causes preceding that, select one rather than the other upon which to permit a recovery;” citing, in support of that doctrine, Selleck v. Railway Co., 58 Mich. 195, 24 N. W. 774; Daniels v. Ballentine, 23 Ohio St. 532; McClary v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44; Henry v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 288; Ryan v. Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. 210.
Wharton, in his work on Negligence, (section 73,) says:
“Negligence is the judicial cause of an injury where it consists of such an act or omission on the part of a responsible human being as, in ordinary and natural sequence, immediately results in such injury.”
In Lowery v. Telegraph Co., 60 N. Y. 198, Andrews, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, in commenting upon this rule says:
“The law does not undertake to hold a person who is chargeable with a breach of duty towards another with all the possible consequences of his wrong*851 fui act. It, in general, takes cognizance only of those consequences which are the natural and probable result of the wrong complained of, and which, in the language of Pollock, C. B., in Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240, may reasonably be expected to result, under ordinary circumstances, from the misconduct. Every injury is preceded by circumstances, if any one of which liad been wanting the injury would not have happened. In some sense, therefore, each is a cause of the injury; but to fasten a legal responsibility for the injury upon every person whose wrongful act, however remote therefrom, had contributed to bring about a situation or condition which made the injury possible, would be an impracticable rule, and one which, if enforced, would in most cases inflict a punishment wholly disproportionate to the wrong.”
In Selleck v. J. Langdon & Co., 55 Hun, 26, 8 N. Y. Supp. 573, the plaintiff sought to recover for an injury sustained by the falling of a platform on which he was employed to work, occasioned by the prop on which the platform rested being knocked out by vehicles visiting the platform to remove coal; and the court, in reversing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, after reviewing the authorities upon this question, uses this language:
“From these various authorities it may be stated, as the true and guiding rule, that unless the wrong and damage are known to be usually in consequence,—the damage, according to the ordinary course of events, following from the wrong,—they will not support an action."
In Allen v. Telegraph Co., 21 Hun, 22, the plaintiff sought to recover for injury from the falling of a telegraph pole which was knocked down by being run against by a runaway team, although the pole was at the time somewhat decayed; and Talcott, J., after an exhaustive review of the authorities, sums up his opinion in the following words:
“If, therefore, the proximate cause of the breaking of the pole, whereby the accident to the plaintiff was occasioned, was the collision with Ohubb’s team we do not think the defendant was liable for the consequences of the accident.”
Applying the principle of these decisions to the evidence in the case at bar as it appears in the record, we do not think it was error for the learned trial judge to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. We have examined the exceptions taken by the plaintiff to the rulings of the trial judge in the receipt and rejection of evidence, and see no error for which this judgment should be reversed. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
PUTNAM, J., concurs. HERRICK, J., not acting.