176 Ga. 391 | Ga. | 1933
S. EL Ader, doing business as Ader Coach Lines, instituted a petition against the City of Albany, its mayor and chief of police, seeking injunction to prevent the enforcement of a certain ordinance of the City of Albany affecting the operation of motor-carriers for hire over the streets of that city, adopted March 22, 1932. To this petition demurrers, plea, and answer were filed by the defendants. In the petition it is alleged that Ader Coach Lines is a licensed motor-carrier for the State of Georgia, under the provisions of the act of the General Assembly approved August 27, 1931 (Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 199-213), holding three certificates of public convenience and necessity from Albany to Columbus and from Albany to Thomasville; that petitioner has complied with the rules of the Georgia Public Service Commission, has paid all taxes and licenses required of it under what is known as Class A certificate, etc.; that petitioner is required to observe certain schedules, and if required to meet the exactions of the ordinance in question, it will interfere with public convenience and necessity. The judge upon the hearing passed an order overruling the demurrers and granting an interlocutory injunction. To that judgment the defendants excepted.
The ordinance of the City of Albany, to restrain the enforcement of which the petition was brought, is entitled, “An ordinance to provide for the regulation of motor-carriers operating in and through the City of Albany, Georgia; the routing of said motor-carriers; the levying of a street-tax on such motor-carriers, for the purpose of maintenance, repairs, and upkeep of the streets of the City of Albany; to provide a penalty for the violation of this ordi
It is contended in the petition that the ordinance is invalid, null and void, particularly upon the ground that it is in conflict with and in contravention of the express' provisions of section’ 18 of the act of the General Assembly of this State, regulating common carriers and prescribing conditions and regulations under which common carriers by motor-vehicles are permitted to operate upon the highways of this State, etc., which act is cited as the “motor common-carriers'act of 1931” (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 199-213). Section
We are of the opinion that the taxing provisions of the ordinance in question, in so far as they apply to plaintiff, are illegal and void, as contended, because in violation of that portion of the motor common-carriers act of 1931 quoted above. In City of Waycross v. Bell, 169 Ga. 57 (149 S. E. 641), involving an attack by motor carriers on the 1928 general tax ordinance of the City of Waycross, fixing a municipal tax upon motor carriers, it was said in part: “ Construed in the light of .the foregoing rulings, it is evident that the General Assembly intended to relieve those engaged in the specified business or occupation from ‘municipal license tax/ and thereby the-municipality was forbidden to impose either a license fee or license or occupation tax upon the business of the defendants in error; and that portion of the tax ordinance of the municipality attempting to impose a- tax upon the businesses exempted from municipal taxation by the General Assembly was ineffectual and invalid. The ordinance of the municipality must yield to the higher authority of the legislature of the State.” And we. think that it-is evident
In the demurrer to the petition section 18 of the act of August 27, 1931, is itself attacked on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void. This is the contention of the City of Albany. The court is of the opinion that it is not unconstitutional upon any of the grounds taken in the demurrer. One ground is that it violates article 3, section 7, paragraph 8, of the constitution of this State (Code, § 6-137), which declares that “No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.” Section 18 is not subject to this criticism, and is not rendered subject to it by the provision which declares that “No subdivision of this State, including cities, municipalities, villages, townships, or counties, shall levy any excise, license, or occupation tax of any nature on said equipment, or the right to operate said equipment or any incidents of said motor-carrier business, or on a motor common carrier.” This provision is germane to the general purpose of the act as indicated by its caption, and does not introduce a new subject-matter. The caption is as follows: “An act to prescribe conditions and regulations under which common carriers by motor-vehicles are permitted to operate upon highways in this State, to regulate the business of common carriers for hire by motor-vehicles operated over the highways of this State, and the use of vehicles therein; to define motor common carriers” to give the Georgia Public Service Commission jurisdiction and regulatory powers over said carriers and said business and vehicles used in said business; to authorize railroad companies to operate motor-vehicles on the high
A reading of this caption will show that the part of section 18 quoted above is germane to the general purpose as indicated by the title of this act. In the very beginning of the caption the act is defined as one to prescribe conditions and regulations under which common carriers by motor-vehicles are permitted to operate upon the highways in this State, to regulate the business of common carriers for hire by motor-vehicles operated over the highways of this State, and the use of vehicles therein, etc. A reading of this part of the caption seems to us to demonstrate that the alleged objectionable matter in section 18 is not variant from the general purpose of the act, and is not matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof. “This clause of the constitution ‘does not require that the title should contain a synopsis of the law, but that the act should contain no matter variant from the title/ Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21 [50 Am. D. 306], The general object of the law is all that need be indicated by the -title. To go further and require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be enumerated in the title would go beyond the purpose of the authors of this clause. . None of the decisions made by our courts ever went further than to require that it would be sufficient ‘if the title was descriptive generally of the purpose of the act, and that it was not necessary that it should particularize the several provisions contained in the body of the act/ All that was essential to its validity was that it should not contain matter ‘different from what is expressed in the title/” Howell v.
The rulings stated in the third and fourth headnotes require no elaboration. The foregoing rulings are controlling in both of the cases. The court did not err in granting the injunction. Judgment affirmed.