CITY OF ABERDEEN, Respondent v. MEIDINGER, Appellant
File No. 11525
Supreme Court of South Dakota
September 25, 1975
233 N.W.2d 331
All the Justices concur.
Tom E. Eastman, Nelson & Eastman, Fargo, N. D., Rory King, Aberdeen, for defendant and appellant.
DUNN, Chief Justice.
The defendant, William Meidinger, was convicted on July 2, 1974, in the Municipal Court of Aberdeen, South Dakota, of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 1164, Section 701.3, making it unlawful to operate a junkyard without a permit. Specifically, he was accused by the City of placing junked cars on his property which is located north of Aberdeen. The property in question was outside of, but within three miles of the city limits of Aberdeen, and thus the City had jurisdiction to zone the property and enforce its zoning regulations under
Defendant argues that the state statute under which he was sentenced does not comport with
“In cities where a municipal court functions, the governing body shall have the power to provide for the punishment of each violation of an ordinance, resolution, or regulation by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding six months or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
This statute provided the sentencing maximums for cities which had municipal courts. The sentencing provisions for cities and towns not having municipal courts are found in
Defendant argues that
There can be no doubt that the statute did set up classifications among persons in the state. It allowed municipalities with municipal courts to impose greater penalties for municipal ordinance violations than those municipalities which did not have municipal courts because they could not meet the population requirement imposed by
Thus, this is not “legislative recognition of the differing desires and needs of the people” which formed a rational basis for inequality in State v. Beene, 1972, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794. Nor does it respond to a need for legislation in certain localities of the state as does the statute requiring livestock ownership
The inequality created by
“Equal protection of the law requires that the rights of every person must be governed by the same rule of law under similar circumstances and, in the administration of criminal justice, the imposition of different punishments or different degrees of punishment upon one than is imposed upon all for like offenses is a denial of such right.” 82 S.D. at 516, 149 N.W.2d at 510.
The extent of punishment for the violation of a municipal ordinance should be based upon the culpability of the individual defendant rather than upon whether the municipality had a municipal court or tried its cases in the district county court.
This statute also fails the second part of the test. We can find no rational relationship between the distinctions created by
With the advent of the district county court, which was available for the trial of municipal ordinance violations in so-called “second-class” cities, the last semblance of rational relationship to a legislative purpose disappeared. Prior to that time such cases were tried in justice of the peace or police magistrate courts with jurisdiction limited to the trial of cases where the penalty did not exceed thirty days in jail and/or a one hundred dollar fine.
In finding
In so holding, we reverse the conviction of the defendant. He was tried in municipal court in Aberdeen, and the maximum punishment for violation of Ordinance No. 1164, Section 701.3, was governed by
As we are overruling Ex parte Webster, supra, which had been the law in South Dakota since 1924, this holding is prospective only, and does not apply to cases handled by the municipal or magistrate courts previous to the date of this decision.
In view of this decision on constitutional grounds, the remaining assignments of error are not considered in this opinion. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the magistrate court of Aberdeen for the purpose of dismissal.
WINANS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur specially.
I would reverse the conviction on the ground that defendant was entitled to a jury trial based on our decision in City of Brookings v. Roberts, 88 S.D. 623, 226 N.W.2d 380. I would hold that our decision in the Roberts case is retroactive to the extent that it applies to all cases raising the issue of the right to jury trial for violation of a municipal ordinance in which the appeal had been perfected prior to our decision in Roberts. See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308.
I take this position for three reasons: First, in his letters to the Chief Justice, dated April 29 and May 8, 1975, which are part of the Clerk‘s official file in this case, the Assistant City Attorney in effect confessed error on the part of the City on the issue of jury trial and agreed that the conviction should be reversed on that issue alone. That is why the City did not file a brief in response to defendant‘s brief.
Second, I think it has been our longstanding policy not to reach constitutional questions if there is any legitimate way to dispose of a case on any other grounds. See, e. g., Aberdeen Ed. Assn. v. Aberdeen Bd. of Education, 88 S.D. 127, 215 N.W.2d 837; House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam Drug Co., 83 S.D. 320, 159 N.W.2d 210.
Third, I cannot agree that
Even though I do not think it is necessary to reach the issue, I think there was clearly a rational basis upon which the legislature decided to grant enhanced penalty powers to cities having municipal courts.
Because it is not necessary to do so in order to resolve this case, I would not wander into the morass of the equal protection argument. Let us grapple with that question only when there is no alternative ground upon which to dispose of a case.
I am authorized to state that Justice COLER joins in this special concurrence.
WINANS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur specially.