120 Iowa 259 | Iowa | 1903
The appellant, having its principal place of business in Cedar Eapids, Iowa, owns and operates an electric street railway between the cities of Cedar Eapids and Marion; a part of its line and appurtenances being within the corporate limits of the latter city. By one of its officers, appellant listed that part of the property within the jurisdiction of Marion for taxation. By the plan adopted, instead of valuing the property in a single item, as a railroad, or fractional part of a railroad, it was listed as follows:
Track, etc. $ 4,712 00
Total actual value of personal.8,652 00
“ “ “ “ real estate. 2,848 00
“ “ “ “ all property. $11,212 00
Net.taxable “ “ “ “...•. 2,803 00
The value $4,712, placed on “track, etc.,” was based on a schedule itemizing the rails, bars, spikes, ties, frogs, poles, brackets, insulators, crossbars, and other materials entering into the' construction of the road and trolley system, giving their estimated value, new (including
I. Appellee raises an objection to the jurisdiction of the district court to try the appeal from the board, of review, because of failure of the company to have a tran-
II. Section 1343 of the Code undertakes to direct the manner of assessing waterworks, gasworks, electric light and power plants, and street railways — property which to
This statute is construed by the appellant as requiring the assessor to list its property within his jurisdiction,, not
If the owner of a traction engine,- when called upon for the assessment of his property, should demand that, instead of valuing it at what it is fairly worth as an engine, the assessor must consider it as if dissected into frame, boiler, cylinder, piston, wheels, shafts, rods, and bolts, with a depreciation of from one-half to three-fourths for age and wear, we think that it would not be unjust to characterize the demand as unreasonable, and the basis of valuation absurd. Is the proposition any less unreasonable when applied to a street railway? In such structure the materials have become the correlated and appropriate parts of a single, income-producing concern, having a value of its own by reason of its organization and use, which may be much more or much less than the original value of the materials entering into its construction. And this is true without any reference to the franchise, which is another and different consideration. It is to be admitted that, if the statute clearly provided for the basis of assessment for which the appellant coptends, the courts would have no choice but to interpret it accordingly; but, when the language of an act is doubtful or ambiguous, that construction should be given it which most nearly conforms to reason and justice. The legislature will not be presumed bo have intended that which is unreasonable or absurd.
To give the statute the construction desired by appellant, counsel quotes therefrom as follows: ‘ ‘The lands, buildings, machinery, poles, wires, overhead construction,tracks, and fixtures * * * such portions of said plant sha 11 be assessed separately.” By the use of the hiatus marked by asterisks in the quotation, the “portions” which are to be taxed separately are made to refer to the separate items first mentioned; but, by supplying the omitted words, we find the legislative declaration to be that, when the railroad property is situated partly within and partly without the limits of a city or town, “such portions of the said plant shall be assessed separately,” and this we think is manifestly a. very different proposition. The portions which are to be assessed separately are not the machinery, poles, wires, and other itemized elements in the construction of the road, but the portions or parts into which the railway property is divided by the boundary lines of the taxing districts through which it passes.
It is shown that one mile of the appellant’s railway,'or about one-sixth of the entire line, is within the limits of Marion; and, under the law as we have inter-
As already intimated, we think that the value of the franchise held by the corporation — the right to occupy the streets — is not the subject of assessment under the statute
III. The order of the trial court restoring and confirming the assessor’s valuation of certain real estate owned by the company in Marion has sufficient support in the record. The point made by counsel for appellee that this property should not have been separately assessed, but regarded as part of the railway for the purpose of taxation, is not involved in the issues before us. It was in fact separately assessed. The only question raised before the board of review was a question of values, and to that alone was the inquiry of the district court directed. There was no error in the order.complained of.
The judgment of the district court is, upon both appeals, AKFIRMED