150 Ga. 524 | Ga. | 1920
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
The duty of construing the ordinance devolved upon the judge. City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 102 Ga. 293 (2), 296 (29 S. E. 749) ; 2 McQuillin on Mun. Corp. 1733, § 810. And it has been held that the rules of construction for an ordinance are the same as for a statute. Ib. In arriving at the intention, the facts and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the ordinance exempting the railway company from paying any part of the paving cost, as well as the old law, may be considered. The record shows that the receiver of the Augusta Eailway Company, before the adoption of the ordinances in 1896, addressed, a communication to the Board of Commissioners of Summerville and the City Council of Augusta, stating that the company was insolvent and in the hands of a receiver and was about to be sold and reorganized, and that the failure of the company was due to the large expense put upon it in paving the streets of Augusta, and that it would be impossible to reorganize the company unless it was relieved of this burden. It appears also that in pursuance of this communication the Village of Summerville adopted the ordinance relieving the company from any cost of paving the streets, and the City Council of Augusta passed a similar ordinance. It appears that prior to the passage of these ordinances the railway company had been required to pave the track area. In cases of doubt the title of an act may furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature. U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (4 L. ed. 471); Etowah
Judgment affirmed.