189 Ind. 141 | Ind. | 1919
Appellee brought this action against appellants to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the latter’s negligence. Separate and several demurrers by appellants to the complaint for want of facts were overruled. A general denial by each of the appellants formed the issues submitted to a jury, and with its general verdict in favor of appellee and against all of the appellants for $12,000, it returned answers to 138 interrogatories, of which appellee submitted seventy-one, Citizens Telephone Company submitted fifty-three, and Watson and Company, fourteen. Over the separate motions of appellants for judgment on the answers of the jury to the interrogatories, and their separate motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered on the general verdict. From this judgment appellants appeal, and each have assigned separate assignments of error. We shall give attention to the errors, only, relied on for a reversal.
(1) Does the complaint state facts sufficient to withstand each of the demurrers? The complaint in substance alleged that appellant Citizens Telephone Company was'the owner and engaged in operating a telephone plant in the city of Kokomo, Indiana, with planted poles supporting wires and cables upon many streets of that city, including Monroe and McCann streets; that it employed more than five persons; that on November 18, 1914, appellee was employed by the
It is insisted that the complaint fails to show any knowledge to appellants with reference to the condition of the pole which was not open and obvious, and not an incident to appellee’s employment or a defect which he could not have ascertained by the exercise of ordinary care.
By these objections appellants are seeking to have the doctrine of assumption of risk and contributory negligence applied to the pleaded facts. Neither of the demurrers question the complaint on the ground of assumption of risk, and the facts exhibited are not such as to compel the conclusion that appellee failed to exercise due care for his protection. The complaint was sufficient to require an answer from all of the defendants. Indiana Bridge Co. v. Shepp (1914),
(2) Each of the appellants moved for judgment in their favor on the answers of the jury to the interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict.
It is insisted that a number of the interrogatories submitted by appellee had reference only to matters affecting damages, and, while they did.not call for answers inconsistent with the general verdict, yet they were exceedingly harmful. because effective as .an argument to increase, damages. ,
In this connection our attention is called especially to the answers to interrogatories Nos. 11, 12, 24, 30, 47 and 48 submitted by the telephone company for the purpose of sustaining the contention that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence in climbing
An independent intervening agency which will protect the original wrongdoer must be the efficient cause of the injury of which complaint is made, and not a negligent act or omission of such agency concurring with or succeeding the original negligence permitted by the original wrongdoer to continue and which in the natural course of events results in such injury. In short, the result prevented by the intervening agency, must be the injury complained of, and not the requital for that injury. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pritchard (1906), 168 Ind. 398, 79 N. E. 508, 81 N. E. 78, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 857; King v. Inland Steel Co., supra; Dodge Mfg. Co. v. Kronewitter (1914), 57 Ind. App. 190, 104 N. E. 99; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v.
On the part of the contractors it is said that the alleged acts of trespass conld not he remedied by them •without further acts of trespass, consequently the only thing left for them to do was to notify the owner of the pole, and, this done, they had performed their duty to such owner and its employes thereby insulating their negligence as to such parties. There is no claim of notice to such employes, nor does it appear that the telephone company was notified by these contractors, but the jury found that the telephone company actually knew that the pole in question had been cut. If, as these appellants contend, the telephone company had knowledge, hpwever received, of the trespass, it was required to warn appellee thereof; still its failure to do so would not insulate the negligence of its coappellants on the ground of any duty owing by it to them. It did owe a duty to its servants to warn them of the negligent acts creating unnatural hazards, if such they were — a question for the jury — and its failure so to do was negligence, in that it permitted appellee to meet, unknown to him, .a latent danger which did not usually pertain to the character of the work he was employed to perform. Southern R. Co. v. Howerton (1914), 182 Ind. 208, 105 N. E. 1025, 106 N. E. 369. These contractors were bound to know from common knowledge that sooner or later the pole in question as it stood would be subjected to rightful activities, and in its weakened condition, unless in some manner strengthened, would
O’Conner and Son assert that the court erred in refusing to give seven instructions tendered by them. The first four pointed out proceed upon the theory that the negligence of the telephone company was an intervening cause and without which no injury would have occurred. For the reasons heretofore stated, these instructions were properly refused.
It is claimed that instruction No, 12 given at the request of O’Conner and Son, and instruction No. 18 given at the request of appellee, and applying to Watson and Company and O’Conner and Son, are in
This court has ruled that, where two or more instructions “are inconsistent and calculated to mislead the jury, or leave them in doubt as to the law, the judgment should be reversed.” Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Lynn (1908), 171 Ind. 589, 602, 85 N. E. 999, 86 N. E. 1017. The question then is: Do these instructions leave the minds of the jurors in a state of confusion respecting the duty of appellee to inspect the pole before going upon it? This question should be answered in the negative.
Instruction No. 18 dealt with the question of assumption of risk, while No. 12 was on the subject of contributory negligence. Beading these instructions together, we are of the opinion that the jury would be impressed with the thought that as between these appellants and himself he assumed all of the risk incident to and naturally arising under his employment, but was not required to search for hidden defects negligently caused by them,- but under the instruction requested by O’Conner and Son, and given, it was the duty of appellee, in order to free himself from the charge of contributory negligence, to inspect the pole from its base at the ground up; or, in other words, it was his duty to exercise due care and caution for his own safety by inspecting and observing the condition of the pole before attempting to ascend it for any purpose, and failing so to do, and such failure proximately contributed to his injury, 0 ’Conner and Son would be excused from any liability which resulted to him under such circumstances.
Instruction No. 21 was also properly refused for the reason that it required appellee to make an inspection of the pole below the surface of the ground, and his failure in this respect made him guilty of contributory negligence, and precluded a recovery by him against O’Conner and Son. In other words, the instruction proceeded upon the theory that appellee was bound to make such inspection as a matter of law. For the reason heretofore stated, the ruling of the trial court in this respect must be sustained.
No reversible error having been pointed out, the judgment is therefore affirmed.