Dеfendants appeal from an April 6, 1978, declaratory judgment for plaintiff-insurer holding the limits of liability under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy betwеen the parties to be $20,000 for one person and $40,000 for two or more persons in any one accident, as stated on the face of thе policy.
On July 27, 1975, defendants were hit head-on by a negligent uninsured motorist. Lillian Tunney was fatally injured, Raymond Tunney sustained severe personal injuries, and his daughter, Patrice Tunney, was also seriously injured.
At the time of the collision, Raymond and Lillian Tunney owned two automobiles, both insured by plaintiff under one poliсy that named Raymond and Lillian Tunney as the insureds. They were driving one of these automobiles at the time of the accident. The Tunneys paid sepаrate premiums of *226 $.75 for uninsured motorist coverage of $20,000 per person, $40,000 maximum per accident for each automobile. Defendants contend that, as the policy covers two automobiles for which separate uninsured motorist coverage premiums were paid, they аre entitled to double the limits of the policy and should recover $40,000 per person, to a maximum of $80,000 per accident.
The introductory languаge found on page 1, and preceding all other sections of the policy states:
"CITIZENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY of Howell, Michigan (Herein called the Company)
"In сonsideration of the payment of the premium, in reliance upon the statements in the Declarations made a part hereof, and subject to the limits of liability, the exclusions, the conditions and other terms of this policy, does hereby agree with the named Assured:”
Page 12, paragraph 7, of the policy contains the following language:
"7. Insurance on Two or More Automobiles.
"When two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each, but an automobile and an attached trailer shall be deemed to be one automobile as respects the limits of liability under Section Two and separate automobiles under Section One, including any deductible provisions applicable thеreto.
"Neither the inclusion herein of more than one Assured nor the application of the policy to more than one automobile shall operate to increase the limit of liability stated in the policy (or in the Declarations) for any coverage.”
Before the enactment of the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101
et seq.;
MSA 24.13101
et seq.,
and the repeal of the uninsured motorist statute,
*227
formerly MCL 500.3010; MSA 24.13010, Michigan law allowed "stacking” of uninsured motorist coverage provided by separate рolicies despite language in the policies limiting recovery in cases where "other insurance” was available.
Blakeslee v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co,
This Court held in
Kozak v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange,
Defendants contend that the above quoted language from page 12, paragraph 7, of the policy crеates an ambiguity in that it first states that the
*228
terms of the policy shall apply separately to each automobile insured under the policy, аrguably setting up a stacking situation, and then adds that the inclusion of more than one automobile in the policy shall not operate to incrеase the stated limits of liability. If an ambiguity does exist, the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer who drafted the poliсy.
Dittus v Geyman,
We do not find that the cited language creates an ambiguity. It has often been noted in cases from other jurisdictions that language stating that the terms of a policy shall apply separately to each insured vehicle simply makes the policy applicable to whichever automobile is involved in an accident.
Allstate Ins Co v Mole,
414 F2d 204 (CA 5, 1969),
Yates v Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club of Southern California,
275 Cal App 2d 301; 79 Cal Rptr 604 (1969),
Otto v Allstate Ins Co,
2 Ill App 3d 58;
Finally, defendant (at oral argument) averred that, because twо separate premiums for unin *229 sured motorist coverage were paid, a situation was created where he expected to reсeive double recovery. This argument proceeds on the premise that, if the premium for uninsured motorist coverage on the second car is less than that for the first, it represents consideration only for the insurer’s increased risk of exposure, and, as such, there has been no doublе payment warranting double recovery. 2 From this premise, it follows that, if the premium for the second car is equal to that of the first, as in the instant case, the insured has paid twice for uninsured motorist coverage, and a double recovery is justified.
Although this type of argument has proven persuаsive in other jurisdictions,
Sturdy v Allied Mutual Ins Co,
203 Kan 783;
Our decision to affirm the trial court, however, should not be construed as a complete bar to the stacking of insurance coverage. We hold only that, in the absence of proof of double payment warranting double coverage, we will not ignore the clear impact of this insurance contract "separabil *230 ity” clause, and leave to future cases, with adequate reсords, the question of double recovery under the no-fault act.
The trial court was correct in holding the limits of liability to be the amounts stated in the policy.
Affirmed.
Notes
Some cases have held that similar language does create an ambiguity. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins Co v Sweet, 186 So 2d 95 (Fla App, 1966). These cases usually involve special forms of insurance, such as medical payment insurance, and they are distinguishable on this ground. See Allstate Ins Co v Mole, supra, Otto v Allstate Ins Co, supra.
See, Ringenberger v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co, 214 So 2d 376 (Fla App, 1968), Otto v Allstate Ins Co, supra.