Citizens' Gas Co. v. Whitney, 232 Pa. 592

Citizens' Gas Co. v. Whitney

232 Pa. 592 | Pa. | 1911

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Elkin,

This is an action of ejectment to determine the title and recover the possession of the oil and gas in and under certain lands described in the writ. The plaintiff never took actual possession of the land under its deed for the purpose of operating for oil and gas, but this is not a bar to its right to recover possession, as was decided in Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338. The suit having been properly brought, the only question for our determination is whether error was committed at the trial. The first assignment relates to the refusal of the trial judge to grant a severance upon the petition of the Bradford Gas Company. The general rule is that the granting of a severance in civil suits of this character rests in the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be reversed unless there has been abuse in the exercise of that discretion. We fail to find any such abuse of discretion in the present case as to warrant a reversal on this ground. The defendants filed a joint appearance and a joint answer and prepared all their pleadings with a view to making a joint defense. Certainly under such pleadings it cannot be said that one of the defendants was entitled to a severance as a matter of right. The Bradford Gas Company was a lessee of Whitney and necessarily stood upon the title of its lessor. If Whitney had no title, his lessee acquired no right or privilege. The return to the writ showed both defendants to be in possession of the premises. The joint answer of the defendants sets up the privity of their title which they undertake to assert and defend. There is nothing unusual about this joinder of defendants in actions of ejectment. The Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. Laws, 370, provides that the landlord may defend with the tenant who has been sued in ejectment, while the Act of May 8, 1901, *597P. L. 142, clearly contemplates that all claimants to the premises, whether in possession or not, shall be made parties to the writ. The trend of decision and of statutory procedure in recent years, while requiring one in possession to be made a party, recognizes and approves the practice of joining all parties claiming title to or interest in the premises, and as a general rule this may be done without respect to privity of title or unity of interest. See Warvelle on Ejectment, sec. 96, and following pages. In the case at bar both defendants are in possession. They appeared jointly, answered jointly and there is no reason why they should not jointly defend. This is a case in which the plaintiff was entitled to have the whole controversy settled in one trial. The learned trial judge was clearly right in refusing to grant a severance.

The question of title involved here depends upon whether Whitney and the Bradford Gas Company had notice, actual or constructive, either or both, of the deed from Sherwood to the appellée company. This deed was executed first in point of time but was not recorded until after the deed to Whitney had been executed and recorded. If Whitney was a bona fide purchaser of the premises without notice of the unrecorded deed, he took a good title. If on the other hand he had notice of the outstanding unrecorded deed to appellee, he was bound by that notice, and took the risk of that being a valid conveyance. All of this was a question of fact to be determined by the jury under proper instructions by the court. The question was submitted to the jury and the verdict shows that they believed both Whitney and the Bradford Gas Company had notice of the conveyance to appellee at the time of their respective purchases. The evidence was sufficient to warrant such a finding. Indeed, upon a review of the whole record we do not see how any other conclusion could be reached. There is only one error called to our attention by the assignments which has any substantial merit. The evidence of Whitney shows that at the time of making the lease to the Bradford Gas Com-*598party he gave notice that the appellee company had a deed for the oil and gas in the premises and that the deed was then on record. There is no doubt as to the testimony of Whitney, and the only question is whether it could be considered as affecting the rights of the Bradford Gas Company.

The plaintiff called Whitney as if on cross-examination. The court ruled it was proper to do so but that his testimony on such cross-examination should in no wise affect the Bradford Gas Company. To that part of the ruling limiting the effect of the testimony upon the Bradford Gas Company the plaintiff excepted and a bill was sealed. The examination of the witness was then proceeded with at length. He was first examined by counsel for plaintiff, then cross-examined by counsel for the Bradford Gas Company and then re-examined on every phase of the question relating to the subject of notice. While the court had ruled that his testimony should not affect the Bradford Gas Company, counsel for this company undertook on cross-examination to elicit answers tending to show that the witness, Whitney, had not given any such notice. In other words, the parties themselves treated the witness as competent for all purposes and so conducted the examination. The court erred in its ruling limiting the effect of the testimony of this witness, but this error was induced by counsel for the Bradford Gas Company and was made over the objection of counsel for plaintiff. To make this error the ground of reversal would work a hardship on appellee company which had protested against it and would give an unfair advantage to the party inducing it. This ought not to be permitted unless imperatively required by rules of practice or of law. We think the rule announced in some of the federal courts is sound and covers this case. It was held in the United States circuit court of appeals, that: “They had not invited the error of that ruling, but had protested against it. This was all they could do. The plaintiffs had induced the court to commit an error, and were thereby prohibited from avail*599ing themselves of it in any court of review:” Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. Repr. 457. The application of the rule depends to some extent upon the facts of each particular case and there may be cases in which it could not be applied without doing violence to established rules of law. In the present case no such barrier exists. The Bradford Gas Company did not rely on the ruling of the court limiting the effect of the testimony of this witness but undertook on cross-examination to strengthen its case by showing that Whitney had told its representative that he had no notice at the time of the purchase from Sherwood of the prior deed to plaintiff. This was the crux of the case and the point toward which the whole examination was directed. The Bradford Gas Company had the benefit of his answer and made it part of its defense. Under these circumstances we think it must be held to have waived, the limitation it induced the court to make and that it made the witness competent for the general purposes of the case. The trial judge in such cases has a large measure of discretion and may permit parties to elicit material facts in order to ascertain the truth without regard to the technical consideration of who called the witness: Gantt v. Cox & Sons Co., 199 Pa. 208. This was the substantial result of what was done in the present case. The ruling complained of was practically disregarded and the witness was examined by all parties with a view of ascertaining the truth. The court approved of this course of procedure as indicated by subsequent rulings and by questions frequently asked from the bench. As we view the record there was a just and fair trial upon the merits and we see nothing to warrant a reversal upon technical grounds.

The question as to constructive notice need not be discussed because the evidence was ample to show actual notice and the verdict of the jury establishes the fact.

Judgment affirmed.