MEMORANDUM OPINION
More than four years ago, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington sought information about the Department of Justice’s criminal investigation of former senator John Ensign. After lengthy litigation under the Freedom of Information- ■ Act — and two orders from this Court — CREW obtained several thousand pages of responsive material. CREW now seeks attorneys’ fees to cover the eosts of the litigation. The Court finds that CREW is entitled to recover fees and it will award $32,865.19.
BACKGROUND
Some years ago, the federal government investigated Senator John Ensign but, as Ensign announced publicly, ultimately elected not to bring any charges." See CREW v. DOJ,
Each agency denied CREW’s requests under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which protect personnel, medical, and law enforcement records from disclosure that would constitute unwarranted invasions of
In addressing the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on that issue, the Court “recognized [that,] in the context of Exemption 7(C)[,] ‘privacy interests are particularly difficult to overcome when law enforcement information regarding third parties is implicated.’ ” Id at 7 (quoting Martin v. DOJ,
The Court agreed with the government’s position that Senator Ensign “enjoys a significant privacy interest in the substance of the investigative files”- — although that interest is “substantially diminished” by his public announcement acknowledging the fact of the investigation itself. Id at 11. But the Court also found that “the public has a substantial interest in DOJ’s decision not-to prosecute him, considering the circumstances.” Id at 12. After all, “Senator Ensign purportedly resigned under threat of expulsion from the Senate.” Id at 13. And “the public — and Congress — -would benefit from knowing that DOJ gives serious consideration to referrals from Congress.” Id. at 14. Balancing these interests, the Court concluded that “[application of DOJ’s categorical rule is ... not appropriate.” Id -
Thus, the government’s categorical withholding could not stand. Instead, the government was ordered to evaluate Senator Ensign’s privacy interests and the resulting availability of exemptions on a doeument-by-document basis. Id The government was required to submit a Vaughn index that identified each document withheld, along with a “relatively detailed justification” for each. Id. at 15. As the Court explained, “submission of a Vaughn Index here w[ould] not harm Senator Ensign’s privacy interests in not being identified as the subject of an investigation — that ship has sailed. And the privacy interests of other third parties mentioned in the records but not already publicly known can be protected adequately by redaction of identifying information.” Id at 14-15 (citations omitted).
But the government failed to meet the deadline to produce that Vaughn index— even after an extension. See Feb. 14, 2014 Mem. Op. & Order [ECF No: 21] at 2. And on the eve of a status conference to address that issue, the government filed a motion requesting another lengthy extension — and “that it' be permitted to submit representative 1% sample Vaughn indices of the 86,000 and 120,000 pages of responsive documents in the custody of the [DOJ] Criminal Division and the EOUSA, respectively.” Id The Court voiced concern with the FBI’s dilatory conduct:. “Had it been processing documents since [the Court’s previous Order] at the rate it now proposes ..., it would have completed processing the 8,000 pages by now, and CREW would already be in, possession of a wealth of non-exempt information.” Id. at 4, And
The government appears to have complied with this second Order, processing thousands of pages of responsive material (though far fewer than estimated in the second round of briefing), releasing many in full or in part, and providing Vaughn indices explaining its withholdings. See Pl.’s Mem, [ECF No. 38-1] at 8-9. CREW did not challenge any of the withholdings. See Oct. 28, 2014 Status Report [ECF No. 31]. CREW has, however, moved for attorneys’ fees to reimburse its costs in pursuing this FOIA action. That is the issue presently before this Court.
ANALYSIS
“The Freedom of Information Act provides for the recovery of [reasonable] attorneys’ fees in cáses brought under its provisions where the complainant has' ‘substantially prevailed.’ Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
I. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
The D.C. Circuit has instructed this court “to consider at least four criteria in determining whether a substantially prevailing FOIA litigant is entitled to attorney’s fees: (1) the public benefit derived from the casé; ’ (2) the commercial benefit, to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiffs interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding.” Tax Analysts v. DOJ,
The government does not attempt to refute CREW’s argument that the first three factors weigh in CREWs favor — but the Court would agree as to the disposition of those factors in any event. CREW is a nonprofit organization “dedicated to promoting ethics and accountability in government and public life.” About Us, CREW,
“The fourth factor considers whether the agency’s opposition to disclosure had a reasonable basis in law, and whether the agency had not been recalcitrant in its opposition to a valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior.” Davy,
The agency’s. position in the second round of briefing — asking to produce representative sample Vaughn indices — was unreasonable. As the Court has previously explained, the government “cite[d]‘ no case where a court ha[d] permitted an agency” to proceed along those lines. Feb. 14, 2014 Mem. Op. & Order at 5. “In effect,” the government sought “an adviso-iy opinion.” Id. at 6. Thus, the agency had no “reasonable basis in law” for seeking to produce sample indices before processing CREWs request, And so this round of briefing, requiring a second opinion from the Court,, served only to delay the inevitable: production of non-exempt documents.
The government barely addresses this second round of briefing, .and only does so to point out that “after the EDOJ] - processed and released thousands of pages of records and provided Vaughn indices, CREW did not further challenge any of [the government’s] withholdings.” Defs
For the first round of briefing — the cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the blanket exemption — the fourth factor is (if marginally) “a closer call.” CREW v. DOJ,
The government did attempt to distinguish those cases as “involving] serious allegations of corruption on matters affecting the public fisc,” whereas this case, according-to the government, involved “allegations of a highly personal nature.” Id. at 21. But the fact that Senator Ensign’s alleged criminal conduct stemmed from an affair does not render any public concern mere “tabloid interest.” Id. Investigations into potential violations of lobbying laws are matters of public interest whether or not their surrounding circumstances are more salacious than usual. And the government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion — especially as it relates to a public figure — is hardly the subject of prurient voyeuristic fixation. Allegations that a senator violated lobbying laws are not “of a highly personal nature,” and it is unreasonable to say otherwise. Id. Given the similarity of these cases, then, the Court finds it- difficult to say that the government’s desire to categorically withhold all responsive documents had a reasonable basis in law. See CREW v. DOJ, No. 11-754,
But “even if [the government] did prevail on this one factor, CREW’S success on the first three would still tip the balance in favor of awarding fees.” CREW, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 182097, at *11. Because courts “must be careful not to give any particular factor dispositive weight,” Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson,
II. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees
“The usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is to multiply the hours reasonably , expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar’ amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc.,
A. Hours Reasonably Expended
CREW “has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its fee request, and supporting documentation must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the [C]6urt to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended.” Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee,
In this Circuit, courts “require that fee applications include contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work with supporting documents, if any.” In re Donovan,
The government first complains that CREW’s counsel used “overbroad time increments” in its billing summary. See Def s Opp’n at 12. Indeed, counsel Anne Weismann’s original declaration failed to describe the increments she used in preparing her billing summary. See generally Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. [ECF No. 38-2]. She later explained, however, that her “general practice was to round down to the nearest 15-minute increment.” Ex. A to PL’s Reply [ECF No. 43-1] at 2. She has also averred that she “typically reduced [her] hours assigned to a specific litigation task by at least ten percent.” Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. at 3.
The government rightly contends that ten-minute or six-minute increments are “more accurate.” Thomas ex rel. A.T. v. District of Columbia, No. 03-1791,
The government expresses similar frustration, however, with the descriptions Weismann employed in her billing summary. Although a “fee application need not present the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted,” Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def.,
CREW is right to say that these descriptions are better than some that courts in this circuit have held inadequate. See, e.g., Donovan,
■ Here, too, CREW can and should do better. Indeed, it has an example of adequate description quite close to home. David Sobel’s billing summary for the reply brief for this very motion is more detailed. See Ex. C to Pl.’s Reply [ECF No. 43-3] at 3 (including entries such as “Research & drafting re ‘reasonable basis’ ” and “Drafting re Lajfey rates”). And it has the virtue of ' billing in six-minute increments. Id. There is no reason that the rest of CREW’s counsel cannot conform to this relatively low, but entirely reasonable;- bar. But while the Court is dismayed by CREW’s submission, it is nonetheless able to “make an independent determination whether- or not the hours
In the government’s view, however, the broad time increments and bro.ader descriptors are symptomatic of a more generalized sloppiness in CREW’s timekeeping. And that point is well taken. Of particular concern ís CREW’s failure to provide contemporaneous timekeeping records. Xee.Def’s Opp’n at 12. The D.C. Circuit has long held that. “[c]asual after-the-fact estimates of time expended' on a case are insufficient to support an, award of attorneys’ fees.” Concerned Veterans,
Other courts have criticized Weis-mann for failing to meet ■ this standard. See CREW,
In order to determine my time for purposes of recovering our fees in this matter, . I reviewed my daily time sheets, separate notes I maintain on individual cases, and records in an electronic time keeping system CREW implemented in October 2013 for litigation.
Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot., at 3.. Compare that paragraph to Weismann’s explanation in a previous case — an explanation that was deemed insufficient:
I reviewed my daily- time sheets and separate notes I maintain on individual case. In addition, since October 2013, ‘'CREW has' implemented an electronic timekeeping system specifically for litigation. ' I reviewed those records as well to determine the total amount of time I spent on this ease.
CREW,
Once again, however, the courts in this district have not always evaluated Weis-mann’s similar affidavits in a similar way. In CREW v. FEC — another case in which Weismann’s declaration closely resembles the one filed here — the court found “no indication that CREW engaged in post hoc reconstruction of hours.”
■This Court appreciates the difficulty in reconciling these outcomes: indeed, Weis-mann’s affidavit is inherently ambiguous. One court has opined that “[c]learly a ‘daily time record is a ‘contemporaneous’ one.” CREW,
This ambiguity could also be resolved by disclosing the daily time sheets themselves. Finding Weismann’s explanation inadequate, the government made just such a request here. See Ex. A to Def.’s Opp’n [ECF No. 40-1] at 5 (asking that CREW disclose “the records that were relied upon according to the [Weismann and Sloan] declarations,” including “the time sheets, the electronic time-keeping records, and. the separate notes”). According to the government, “CREW refused. to provide all the records that were relied upon in constructing the billing, summaries,” but did “disclose[] .... a one-page, incomplete excerpt of what appears to be Ms. Weismann’s time sheet from the electronic system CREW says it implemented in October 2013.” Def.’s Opp’n at 16. “No other reliance records described in [the] declarations,” however, “were disclosed.” Id. '■ ■ .
CREWs failure to disclose all of its records is troubling on multiple fronts. First, it is inconsistent with the Court’s expectations of parties’ conduct in such cases: “This circuit and others have indicated that contemporaneous time charges should be filed with the motion for attorneys’ fees as a matter of course, and certainly should be provided once legitimate questions are raised by the opposing party.” Kennecott Corp. v. EPA,
Second, the single page CREW did provide reveals discrepancies between the hours entered on the electronic timesheet and those reported in the billing summary presented to this Court. For instance, the electronic timesheet records 1.59 hours on December 12, 2013, spent preparing for a status conference and responding to the government’s motion. See Ex.. A to Def.’s Opp’n at 8.- But the billing, summary reflects two hours for that work on that date. See Ex, A t.o PL’s-Mot. at 5. And where the electronic timesheet records .75 hours for editing and filing CREW’s opposition on January 15, 2014, see Ex. A to Def.’s Opp’n at 8, the billing summary reflects only .45 hours, see Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. at 5. The Court does not suggest that these discrepancies are intentional — indeed, the latter mistake is to CREWs detriment. And one can see how these mistakes were made: if 1.59 is misread as hour and min
But the fact of the errors — mens rea aside — exemplifies the importance of providing contemporaneous time-keeping records: it allows the opposing party, and the court, to double-check the accuracy of the proposed billing summary.
The Court declines the government’s invitation to deny all fees — a sanction “to be reserved for only the most severe of situations, and appropriately invoked only in very limited circumstances,” such as “when the party seeking fees declines to proffer any substantiation in the form of affidavits, timesheets or the like, or when the application is grossly and intolerably exaggerated, or manifestly filed in bad faith.” Jordan v. DOJ,
Besides its across-the-board concerns, the government also attacks several line items in CREWs billing summary as unnecessary expenses. The government first argues that the time Melanie Sloan— then-executive director of CREW, see Ex. E to PL’s Mot [ECF 38-6] at 2-spent on this case was “duplicative” and “non-productive.” Def.’s Opp’n at 20. The government notes that Sloan’s hours (4.5 total) consisted entirely of reviewing CREWs filings, as well as participation in one status conference. See Ex. E to PL’s
But the DOJ and Ms.Sloan have been down this road before. In previous fee litigation, the DOJ similarly argued that it should not have to pay for work Sloan performed because she was (theoretically) “involved in the case as the ‘client’ and not the attorney.” CREW v. DOJ,
The government also challenges the two hours Weismann expended for reviewing the Vaughn indices. See Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. at 6 (billing oné hour each for reviewing the Criminal Division and EOUSA Vaughn indices). CREW never challenged those Vaughn indices. Thus, according to the government, the “time spent reviewing them did not produce anything and did not contribute to CREW- prevailing on an issue,” Def.’s Opp’n at 22 — a requirement for recovery, see Concerned Veterans,
Courts in this district 'have varied in their resolutions of this issue. Compare, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
There may be a difference, however, between reviewing the documents produced (after the material sought has been obtained) and reviéwing a Vaughn index to determine whether any further challenges to withholding are warranted. Timing and
To recap: the Court accepts that the one-hour reduction in CREW’s reply ameliorates concern about discrepancies between the billing summary and electronic time records. Arid the Court permits recovery for Ms. Sloan’s work and for review of the' Vaughn indices. In- recognition primarily of CREW’s failure to adhere to the ■standards "for contemporaneous timekeeping set forth in previous cases, however, -the Court will reduce CREW’s hours ■by 18%. This reduction will not apply to the hours spent on the attorneys’ fees briefing by Mr. Sobel, who “maintained a running, contemporaneous tally of time devoted to each discrete task performed,” described each, task in adequate detail, and recorded his time in six-minute increments. .See Ex. C to Pl.’s Reply at 3.
B. Reasonable Hourly Rate
Having resolved the. number of “hours reasonably expended ip the litigation,” the final issue' is to determine a “reasonable hourly fee.” See Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc.,
Fee applicants often rely, on attorney’s fee matrices as evidence of the prevailing market rate. Eley,
Plaintiff proposes updating the Laffey Matrix with the “Legal Services Index Matrix” or “LSI- Matrix.” The LSI Matrix uses as its starting point a Laffey matrix that was updated with 1988-1989 rates in
The government challenges the accuracy of the. LSI Matrix and argues that CREW’s requested award is not reasonable. Def.’s Opp’n at 23-32. The question then is whether CREW has “pro-duee[d] satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates” — derived from the Laffey Matrix as updated for inflation by the legal services index — “are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation!” Eley,
To meet this burden, CREW’s initial fee petition included the LSI Matrix along with: (1) declarations of its counsel attesting to the number of hours spent on the litigation, (2) the declaration of Dr. Michael Kavanaugh, originally submitted in another case, explaining the LSI Matrix, and (3) the 2012 National Law Journal (“NLJ”) billing survey, offered as proof that the LSI Matrix rates are “consistent” with “rates for partners in four large Washington D.C. law firms,” PL’s Mem. at 20.. This initial submission, does not take CREW very far. The D.C. Circuit held in Bley that a nearly identical. record was insufficient to meet plaintiffs burden to justify the reasonableness of its requested rates.
While improved in ' quantity from CREW’s initial submission, a close look at the record reveals that CREW has still not met its obligation to show that its requested rates are appropriate because the majority of CREW’s evidence does not speak to the prevailing rate in Washington, D.C. for similar, services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Most notably, the bulk of the evidence reflects rates charged by lawyers at some of the nation’s largest law firms. The NLJ survey, for example, reports on rates for partners in four Washington,
In considering the persuasiveness of this evidence, the Court first notes that many of these rates-drawn from CREW’s own evidence — still fall below the rates that CREW is actually requesting. And even if it were true that this evidence, showed that attorneys at these firms charge rates in line with the LSI Matrix, the question would still remain: is the fact that attorneys at some of the nation’s largest firms charge rates above $700/hour evidence that such rate is the prevailing rate for FOIA litigation in the Washington, D.C. market? See Eley,
But CREW’s own sources-albeit portions omitted from the excerpts it submitted-rebut the proposition that rates are comparable across firms of all sizes such that the average rate at the biggest firms should be taken as the prevailing rate more generally. See Executive Summary, The 2014 Real Rate Report, at vii (“Of the more than 350 factors we tested, our analysis this year revealed that law firm size was the" biggest driver of law firm rates.... In fact, the effect was so large that regardless of the market location or type of work performed, larger firms consistently charged higher rates.”); Leigh Jones, Law Firm Billing Survey, The National Law Journal, Dec. 17, 2012 (“Big-firm lawyers still have a sweet deal. Top partners at major law firms continue to command premium hourly prices for their sendees.”). And the government’s survey data confirms a correlation between law firm size and hourly rates. For example, in 2014 the national average rates at a firm with 1 to 9 lawyers was $300 for an equity partner and $227 for an associate. Malowane Decl. at 14 (citing the 42nd Annual Survey of Law Firm Economics, 2014 Edition (hereafter, the “2014 Survey”)). Those numbers increase to $454 and $280 for partners and associates at firms with more than 150 lawyers. Id. The government expert attributes this difference to the likelihood that “larger multinational firms may be able to command higher fees due to ... an offering of more services, having a better national or international reputation, [or] having the capacity to take
CREW argues, though, that precedent bars the Court from drawing these sorts of “distinctions ... between attorneys practicing in different settings.” Pl.’s Supp. Mem. at 5 n.3 (citing SOCM,
The Westlaw reports suffer an additional weakness in that they compile information based upon fee applications from D.C. lawyers providing one particular type of complex litigation service, bankruptcy. Ex. D to PL’s Supp. Mem. [ECF 47-4] at 2. That attorneys litigating bankruptcy cáses charged an average of $777 per hour in May 2012 does' not prove that this rate is’ in line with the prevailing rate for complex federal litigation, generally. In fact, according to the 2014 Survey, bankruptcy litigation has the highest billing rates out of all litigation specialties for which the survey has individual data. Malowane Decl. 8 n.8. The Court recognizes that the Lajfey Matrix is itself a relatively blunt tool used to calculate fees for the broad category of complex federal litigation. It does not necessarily distinguish between, say, bankruptcy and FOIA litigation. But that does not mean that the Court should blind itself to the more nuanced distinctions in the varying types and costs of litigation when determining whether CREW’s evidence persuasively shows that the LSI Matrix reflects prevailing rates for complex litigation services. Relying on rates particular to the specialized field of bankruptcy does not advance CREW’s argument that the LSI Matrix reflects reasonable rates for complex litigation services or FOIA litigation in particular.
What remains of CREW’s evidence, then, is the single declaration of a D.C. public interest law firm partner and excerpts from the Real Rate Report 201b. The rate report shows that in 2013 the median rate for litigation partners practicing in Washington, D.C. was $660. Ex. G to PL’s Supp. Mem. [ECF 47-7] at 4. For D.C. attorneys, regardless of practice area, with more than 21 years of experience, the median rate was $706.85. Id. at 5. Likely in recognition that these median figures still do not get CREW to its requested rate of $753 to $789 per hour, CREW
For all the reasons outlined above, CREW’s evidentiary submission provides, at most, weak support for its position. Here, the persuasiveness of defendant’s evidence is relevant to whether CREW’s proffer is ultimately enough to satisfy its burden. See Eley,
For example, Dr. Malowane reviews the ALM Legal Intelligence’s 2011 Survey of Law Firm Economics (“ALM Survey”), which reports that the average billing rate in the Washington, D.C. area for an attorney with more than 20 years of experience was $459. Malowane Decl.. at 56. Dr. Malowane also reviews the 2014 Survey, which reports that the national median rate for attorneys with 31 or more years of experience was $430. Id. at 7-8. Because these numbers are not particular to the type of legal services being provided, in the case of the ALM Survey, or to D.C., in the case of the 2014 Survey, Dr. Malowane offers an alternative two-step method for calculating the prevailing rate. The first step is to identify the national billing rates of attorneys performing federal litigation. Malowane Deck at 7. To do this Dr. Malo-wane relied on the 2014 Survey, which provides billing rates for more than a dozen litigation areas, but does hot include a distinct category for federal litigation. Id. at 7-8 & n.8. She, therefore, relied on the category “other litigation,” which she con
According to the USAO Lajfey Ma-trixfthe government’s proposed method of updating the Lajfey Matrix for inflation— the rate for an attorney with 20+ years of experience for June -2014 through May 2015 is $520.
As hinted at above, the Court realizes that none of these approaches is unassailable. The ALM Survey number is not federal-litigation specific;, the 2014. Survey number is not D.C.-specific; Dr. Malo-wane’s number rests on various assumptions including that D.C. rates match either the Southern Atlantic Region or other highly populated areas; and the USAO Lajfey Matrix relies on the CPI, where legal services “account[] for less than .293% of the total spending represented” in the index, Ex. B to Pl.’s Mot. at 7. But notwithstanding these imperfections, it is telling that all five approaches point to a rate well below what CREW requests.
Had CREW presented an alternative free from its own imprecisions, the relative similarity of the rates generated by the government’s various alternative methodologies might have been less damning. But the LSI method suffers from serious shortcomings as well. It- too-reflects na
So then what rate is appropriate? Both parties agree that at least the USAO Matrix rates are warranted. 'Def.’s Supp. Mem. [ECF No. 46] at 6 n.3 (stating that CREW is entitled to the USAO Laffey Matrix rates “only because the Department of Justice has conceded them in this case”). In the absence of evidence from CREW satisfying its'burden to establish that the LSI Matrix represents the prevailing rate in the relevant market, the USAO Matrix will be used. Although the Court is not convinced that the USAO Matrix is the ideal méasure of rates for complex federal litigation — given the discrepancy in applying the CPI to the legal industry — the Court is nonetheless comfortable applying the $520/hour rate because it is clearly not an outlier. As outlined above, four other approaches point to similar rates: $430, $435, $459, and $512.
This default to the USAO Matrix is due in part to- the fact that CREW has accepted the Laffey Matrix as the original basis of a reasonable hourly rate. PL’s Mem. at 17-20. The only issue here was how that matrix should be updated for inflation. CREW did not otherwise attempt to articulate a rate, perhaps divorced from the original Laffey Matrix, that could be supported with “affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-paying, clients in comparable cases [] and evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts or through settle
* * *
Thus, to recap once more: the Court will apply the USAO Laffey Matrix to set the relevant reasonable hourly rates, and will multiply those rates by 82% of the hours CREW billed in the underlying FOIA litigation. The Court will similarly reduce the “fees on fees” awarded for the litigation of this attorneys’ fees motion, as CREW “prevailed”' only to that extent. See Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean,
■ For the reasons discussed above, the Court -will grant in part CREW’S motion for attorneys’ fees. ■ A Separate Order has been issued on this date.
. Decisions that "involve different fee-shifting statutes” are “instructive in construing the applicable ‘reasonable’ standard that applies to fee awards under FOIA.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
. Indeed, that check is the reason the Court is entertaining these arguments; "nit-picking claims by the [government should [not] be countenanced” for their own sake. Concerned Veterans,
. In its reply, CREW acknowledged the "computation errors” the government pointed out, and accordingly reduced the amount of compensation it sought by one hour. See Pl.’s Reply at 12 n.6.
. The May 2012 report identifies 17 attorneys with 20 or more years of experience; their average rate was $777/hour. Pl.’s Supp. Mem. at 6. The August 2012 report identifies 36 such attorneys, with an average rate of $752/hour. Id.
. In its order for' supplemental briefing, the Court expressed concern about the credibility . of Dr. Malowane, who had averred in a previous case that the LSI Matrix rates were in line with market rates for the prevailing party's attorneys. Aug. 7, 2015 Order [ECF No. 44] ' at 5. This concern has been allayed by the explanation that the rates requested in that case were on behalf of attorneys at the 135th and 150th largest national firms. Def.’s Supp. Mem. [ECF No. 46] at 13; see Ex. B to Pl.’s Reply 'Mem. [ECF No. 43-2] at 4-5. Because the attorneys in question were in fact lawyers at "big law” firms, Dr. Malowane opined that the $705-706 hourly rates requested were roughly comparable- to the hourly rates charged by similarly large firms at the high end of the market as reflected in a National Law Journal Survey. See Def.’s Supp. Mem. at 13, Hence, it has been Dr. Malowane’s consistent opinion that what constitutes a reasonable rate depends on the size of the law firm. The Court’s reliance on Dr; Malowane’s declaration should not be read as agreement that the prevailing rate differs so widely from’case to case, but the Court is satisfied that Dr. Malowane has expressed a principled opinion and is a credible expert.
. This area consists of Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Malowane Decl. at 9,
. In addition to D.C., this grouping consists of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. Malowane Decl. at 10 n.10.
. The government complains that in other cases CREW has requested fees based on the USAO Matrix — as if this is somehow devastating to CREW’s position. See Def.’s Opp’n at 24. This argument was properly rejected by another court in this district. See CREW v. DOJ, No. 11-754,
. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has also considered the parties’ citations to other attorney’s fees decisions in FOIA cases as relevant evidence of the prevailing market rate for these types of cases. See Eley,
. Before June 2013, CREW spent 40.5 hours on the litigation (38.5 by Weismann, 2 by Sloan), which is multiplied by $505/hour to yield $20,452.50. Between June 2013 and May 2014, CREW spent an additional 10.7 hours (8.45 by Weismann after subtracting one erroneous hour, 2.25 by Sloan), which is multiplied by $510/hour to yield $5,457. Since June 2014, CREW spent an additional 2 hours on the underlying litigation at a rate of $520/hour, resulting in a charge of $1,040. Together, the total cost for attorneys' fees on the underlying litigation is $26,949.50.- The Court then reduces this award by 18% for a sum of $22,098.59.
As for, fees on fees, CREW spent a total of 15.5 hours on its fee motion (15.25 by Weis-mann, .25 By ’Sloan).' Multiplied by a rate of $520/hour yields-a total of $8,060. This figure is reduced by 18% plus an additional 13% to reflect the fact that 3 pages of the 23-page brief were devoted to the unsuccessful LSI ■argument. This reduction yields a total of $5,561.40. Sobel spent 14.3 hours on the reply brief at a rate of $520/hour for a total of $7,436. The Court reduces that award by 30% because 6 pages of the 20-page brief were again focused on the LSI' argument. This reduction yields a total of $5,205.20. CREW is not awarded fees for its unsuccess-