CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Assignee of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB v. KARYN PARILLE and ANTHONY PARILLE, et al.
No. 2-15-0286
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
January 22, 2016
2016 IL App (2d) 150286
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County.
No. 10-CH-4540
Honorable Bonnie M. Wheaton, Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Jorgensen and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 This appeal involves the attempt of the plaintiff, CitiMortgage, Inc., to foreclose upon the home of the defendants, Karyn and Anthony Parille, on the basis of a mortgage that turned out to be ineffective as a matter of law. After the Parilles raised this defense, CitiMortgage asserted
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In December 2000, the Parilles, who are married to each other, bought a home at 214 Forrest Trail in Oak Brook. The Parilles took title as tenants by the entirety. To buy the home, they took out a loan of $240,000, which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Both Karyn and Anthony were identified as borrowers in the note, and both signed the mortgage.
¶ 4 In March 2001, the Parilles refinanced their home loan. They borrowed $243,000 from Bank One, again secured by a mortgage. Both of the Parilles signed the note and the mortgage. The following year, the Parilles took out a home equity loan in the amount of $165,000 from Bank One.
¶ 5 In May 2003, the Parilles again refinanced, this time with Lehman Brothers Bank (Lehman). Both of the Parilles signed the note, which memorialized a loan of $475,000 (First Lehman Note). The note was secured by a mortgage (First Lehman Mortgage). Although Karyn was identified in the mortgage as the only “borrower,” both she and Anthony initialed every page of the mortgage, and they both signed the mortgage without qualification. The proceeds of the loan went primarily to pay off the Bank One mortgage and the home equity loan.
¶ 6 Only three months later, on August 20, 2003, Lehman entered into a new loan with Karyn. The loan was for $481,200, and the proceeds were used to pay off the First Lehman
¶ 7 The mortgage securing that loan (Second Lehman Mortgage), like the First Lehman Mortgage, was prepared by Aurora Loan Services, Inc., at the direction of Lehman. It listed Karyn as the only “borrower” and stated that “Borrower is the mortgagor under this Security Instrument.” Karyn initialed every page of the Second Lehman Mortgage. Anthony‘s initials do not appear on any of the pages. One of the provisions in the Second Lehman Mortgage stated, in printed text, as follows: “any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the note[] is co-signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer‘s interest in the Property under the terms of this Security Instrument.” On the last page of the Second Lehman Mortgage, printed text read: “BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security Instrument ***.” Karyn signed on the line below this statement. On the line below that, Anthony signed his name. Typewritten text directly below Anthony‘s signature read: “Anthony Parille is signing this document for the sole purpose of waving [sic] homestead rights.” It is undisputed that the Parilles did not insert (or cause to be inserted) the typewritten text below Anthony‘s signature; rather, it appears that this language was inserted by Aurora Loan Services.
¶ 8 The HUD-1 Settlement Statement given to the Parilles on August 20, 2003, listed Karyn as the sole borrower and was signed solely by Karyn. On September 12, 2003, as a result of the refinancing, the First Lehman Mortgage was released.
¶ 9 In November 2008, the Parilles stopped paying the Second Lehman Mortgage. Lehman assigned the Second Lehman Note and the Second Lehman Mortgage to CitiMortgage on July 16, 2010.
¶ 10 On August 12, 2010, CitiMortgage filed a one-count foreclosure action against the Parilles and various other parties with possible interests in the property (none of whom are before us in this appeal). The action was based upon the Second Lehman Note and Mortgage, and both of these (along with the assignment to CitiMortgage) were attached to the complaint. Although the Parilles first appeared pro se, they later obtained the services of several lawyers. In March 2013, an agreed judgment of foreclosure was entered. In August 2013, shortly before the scheduled date of the judicial sale, the Parilles obtained a new lawyer. They then filed a motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure on the basis that the Second Lehman Mortgage was not a valid encumbrance on the property, because the property was held by both of the Parilles as tenants by the entirety, but only Karyn had signed the mortgage—Anthony‘s signature was only for the purpose of waiving his homestead rights. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the judgment of foreclosure.
¶ 11 Thereafter, CitiMortgage filed an amended complaint, followed closely by a second amended complaint that corrected typographical errors in the amended complaint. The second amended complaint asserted six claims: foreclosure of the Second Lehman Mortgage (count I); reformation of the mortgage to nullify the typewritten language below Anthony‘s signature (count II); equitable lien (count III); unjust enrichment, against Anthony only (count IV); fraud, against Karyn (count V); and fraud, against Anthony (count VI).
¶ 12 The Parilles filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to
¶ 13 Further, they argued that count IV was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which was five years for unjust enrichment claims.
¶ 14 As to the remaining counts, the Parilles sought dismissal pursuant to
¶ 15 After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled. It dismissed counts I and IV with prejudice on the grounds that the Second Lehman Mortgage was not effective to encumber the property and that any unjust enrichment claim was untimely. It dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, permitting CitiMortgage to replead them if it wished. Following an unsuccessful motion to reconsider, CitiMortgage did so.
¶ 16 CitiMortgage‘s third amended complaint alleged the same six claims raised in its prior complaint. As to counts I and IV, the third amended complaint stated that they were realleged solely to preserve them for appeal. The third amended complaint contained the following changes from the previous complaint. As to count I, all of the previous complaints had stated, in the “form” portion of the foreclosure claim required by
¶ 17 The Parilles filed a combined motion to dismiss the third amended complaint pursuant to
¶ 18 After briefing and a hearing, the trial court again dismissed the complaint, this time with prejudice. As to count I, it reasoned that, by the express terms of the Second Lehman Mortgage, Anthony was not a mortgagor and thus the mortgage was ineffective, and it found that none of the remaining counts (counts II, III, IV, V, and VI) stated a cognizable claim. In closing, the trial court commented that it did not believe that CitiMortgage was completely out of luck, as it might have a cause of action at law against Karyn on the Second Lehman Note, but any such claim could not be heard in the current case, which had been brought in chancery.
¶ 19 Over the following few weeks, the Parilles filed two motions: a motion seeking attorney fees pursuant to
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Appeal
¶ 22 We begin by considering CitiMortgage‘s appeal from the dismissal of its third amended complaint and the denial of leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
¶ 23 A motion to dismiss brought under
¶ 24 The trial court dismissed count I, the foreclosure claim, pursuant to
¶ 25 Here, the Second Lehman Mortgage was attached to the complaint as the instrument giving rise to the foreclosure claim. The trial court correctly construed the Second Lehman Mortgage as having been made solely by Karyn: the first page identified Karyn as the only “Borrower” and further stated that “Borrower is the mortgagor under this Security Instrument“; only Karyn initialed every page; and on the last page, only Karyn signed without qualification. Although Anthony also signed the last page, his signature was qualified by the typewritten text stating that he was signing solely for the purpose of waiving his homestead rights. There is no reason not to give effect to the typewritten qualification: it merely reinforces the other expressions of intent that Karyn was to be the sole mortgagor. Anthony did not sign the mortgage as a mortgagor.
¶ 26 Thus, although CitiMortgage alleged that Anthony intended to, and did, sign the Second Lehman Mortgage as a mortgagor, this allegation is contradicted by the plain language of the instrument itself. CitiMortgage urges that its allegations must, at this stage, be taken as true, but it ignores the law that an instrument attached to a complaint must be considered part of the complaint and, if the allegations of the complaint conflict with the facts disclosed in that instrument, the instrument controls. Burton, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1034. CitiMortgage also argues that intent is a question of fact, but the issue of the parties’ intent when signing a contract is to be determined solely from the language of that contract, unless the contract is ambiguous. Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 233.
¶ 27 CitiMortgage argues that the instrument is ambiguous, because the intent that Anthony convey his interest in the property is inferable from the provision stating that “any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the note[] is co-signing this Security Instrument *** to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer‘s interest in the Property.” However, this provision is not applicable to Anthony because, by the express terms of the
¶ 28 CitiMortgage‘s final argument regarding count I is that the Parilles did not raise any “affirmative matter” that would defeat their complaint, as required by
¶ 29 We next turn to count II, the claim for reformation, the sufficiency of which was challenged by the Parilles under
¶ 30 The Parilles argue that CitiMortgage failed to allege any facts showing a prior agreement between themselves and Lehman that was not reflected in the Second Lehman Mortgage. However, we must read the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1996). Count II alleges that, because the Second Lehman Mortgage resulted in the release of the First Lehman Mortgage, Lehman “would not have agreed to” enter into the Second Lehman Note unless the Second Lehman Mortgage also encumbered the interests of both of the Parilles. This is, in essence, an allegation that Lehman intended the Second Lehman Mortgage to encumber the interests of both Parilles in the property. (Although this type of allegation might be unusual, the Parilles have not cited any case law showing that CitiMortgage cannot allege the intent of someone other than itself in this way.) Further, CitiMortgage alleged that the Parilles intended that both Karyn‘s and Anthony‘s interests in the property would be encumbered by the Second Lehman Mortgage. The fact that, as discussed above, this allegation is contradicted by the express language of the instrument itself is not fatal to a claim for reformation. Because the thrust of such a claim is that the instrument‘s language does not accurately reflect the parties’ agreement, parol evidence may be introduced on the issue of the parties’ intent, “even when the instrument to be reformed is clear and unambiguous on its face.” Beynon Building Corp. v. National Guardian Life Insurance Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 754, 760 (1983). Construing count II liberally, we find that it adequately alleges that the Parilles and Lehman agreed that Lehman would loan the Parilles $481,200 that would be used to pay off the First Lehman Mortgage, in return for a mortgage secured by both of the Parilles’ interests in the property.
¶ 31 The Parilles argue that the allegations are insufficient in another way, however, because they show that Lehman and/or CitiMortgage was mistaken about the effect of the Second Lehman Mortgage, which is a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact. They contend that
¶ 32 We pause to note that our reversal of the dismissal of count II should not be taken to suggest that CitiMortgage will be able to prove its claim for reformation. “There is a presumption that a written instrument conforms to the intention of the parties thereto ***” Klemp v. Hergott Group, Inc., 267 Ill. App. 3d 574, 584 (1994). Thus, “[t]o succeed in an action for contract reformation, a party must show [the elements of the claim] by strong, clear, and convincing evidence.” Alliance Syndicate, Inc. v. Parsec, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 590, 603 (2000). Further, given that the defect in the Second Lehman Mortgage appears on the face of the recorded documents (that mortgage and the warranty deed to the property), arguments may be raised about CitiMortgage‘s diligence in deciding to accept the assignment from Lehman that could affect CitiMortgage‘s ability to assert this claim. As no such arguments are presently before us, however, we express no opinion on the ultimate merits of the claim. We therefore turn our attention to count III.
¶ 33 Count III asserts a claim for an equitable lien. The imposition of an equitable lien is a remedy for a debt that cannot be legally enforced, but which ought in right and fairness to be recognized. Hargrove v. Gerill Corp., 124 Ill. App. 3d 924, 930-31 (1984). An equitable lien can arise despite the absence of an express agreement by the defendant to be liable for the debt. Id. at 931. For example, an equitable lien has been imposed upon land when a tenant has made improvements on that land. Id. In order to assert an equitable lien, a plaintiff must allege (1) “a debt, duty or obligation” owed to it by the defendant, and (2) the existence of a res—an asset that in some way is particularly related to the debt or obligation. Id.
¶ 34 Here, CitiMortgage seeks the imposition of an equitable lien on the property. The Parilles sought dismissal of this claim under
¶ 35 Count III alleges that Anthony received a benefit from Lehman—Lehman paid off the First Lehman Mortgage. (For the purposes of our analysis here, we assume without deciding that the First Lehman Mortgage was a legally valid mortgage that encumbered both Anthony‘s and Karyn‘s interests in the property). CitiMortgage also alleged that Lehman would not have done this unless it was to receive a similar mortgage in return. It argues that these allegations are enough to give rise to a duty by Anthony toward CitiMortgage.
¶ 36 Illinois case law does not directly answer the question whether these allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a duty or obligation by Anthony toward Lehman and CitiMortgage as its successor. As noted above, the typical example of a circumstance giving rise to such a duty is where one party has improved land belonging to another. Id. That situation is not present here. The facts in W.E. Erickson Construction, Inc. v. Congress-Kenilworth Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1985), are somewhat similar to those in the case before us, although it is
¶ 37 Of the three cases cited by CitiMortgage in its arguments regarding equitable lien, one is an unreported Illinois case (and thus we ignore CitiMortgage‘s citation of it), and another involves very different facts and an equitable lien asserted to have arisen out of a contract, a different creature than the extra-contractual equitable lien sought here. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Dolci, 2012 IL App (2d) 111275-U; La Salle National Trust, N.A. v. Village of Westmont, 264 Ill. App. 3d 43 (1994). The remaining case, Shchekina v. Washington Mutual Bank, No. 08 C 6094, 2012 WL 3245957 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2012), is an unpublished federal case. “Unpublished federal decisions are not binding or precedential in Illinois courts.” King‘s Health Spa, Inc. v. Village of Downers Grove, 2014 IL App (2d) 130825, ¶ 63. However,
¶ 38 We find Shchekina well reasoned and persuasive on the issue of whether the invalidity of a later mortgage may potentially support a claim for an equitable lien. However, there is an important distinction between Shchekina and this case: in Shchekina, the bank sought, among other things, to be equitably subrogated to the most recent valid mortgage as an alternative to disproving the homeowner‘s allegations of forgery. This equitable subrogation claim was the basis for the court‘s finding that the homeowner owed the bank a duty. Moreover, by seeking equitable subrogation to a prior mortgage, the bank implicitly agreed to accept an equitable lien in a lesser amount (the amount of the last valid mortgage rather than the higher amount of the newest mortgage) if the homeowner proved that the later mortgages were forged. Id.
¶ 39 Here, by contrast, CitiMortgage‘s third amended complaint included no request for equitable subrogation. Further, although CitiMortgage sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint that included an alternative claim titled “equitable subrogation,” that claim (count VII) did not sufficiently state a claim for equitable subrogation on the First Lehman Mortgage (the
¶ 40 We next consider count IV, the claim of unjust enrichment. This claim was properly dismissed pursuant to
¶ 41 CitiMortgage argues that the discovery rule applied, tolling the commencement of the limitations period until it knew that the Parilles would assert the invalidity of the Second Lehman Mortgage. In Illinois, “[t]he discovery rule postpones the start of the limitations period until a party knows or reasonably should know both that an injury has occurred and that it was wrongfully caused.” Henderson Square Condominium Ass‘n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 52. There is no tolling merely because a party is not aware of facts making it prudent for it to act on its legal rights, and CitiMortgage‘s argument to the contrary borders on the frivolous. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to CitiMortgage‘s over a century ago, in Ater v. Smith, 245 Ill. 57, 71-72 (1910):
“[I]f the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon such inquiry but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches the same as if he had known the facts. The rule is the same where ignorance of the facts, or concealment of them by one whose duty it was to disclose them, is relied on to arrest the running of the Statute of Limitations.”
In Ater, the children of a decedent asserted that they had not realized the invalidity of the deeds made by their father until after litigation for an accounting had begun, when there was testimony
¶ 42 Here, all of the relevant facts—the Parilles’ ownership of the property by the entirety, and Karyn‘s designation as the sole borrower under the Second Lehman Note and as the sole mortgagor under the Second Lehman Mortgage—were known (or should reasonably have been known) in September 2003 when the First Lehman Mortgage was released. Any cause of action for unjust enrichment was complete at that time, and could have been brought thereafter. The relevant facts were all of record, and the commencement of the limitations period did not await CitiMortgage‘s realization of the legal effect of those facts, or that the Parilles would stand upon those facts. See id.; see also Waterman Hall v. Waterman, 220 Ill. 569, 577 (1906) (where one cotenant purported to convey the entire estate, conveyance was recorded, and grantee thereafter occupied entire property, facts were sufficient to place other cotenants on inquiry notice despite their lack of awareness, until shortly before the litigation, that they had an interest in the property). Accordingly, we reject CitiMortgage‘s attempt to invoke the discovery rule to preserve its claim of unjust enrichment. The trial court properly dismissed count IV as untimely.
¶ 43 The same statute of limitations bars counts V and VI, the fraud claims. Like unjust enrichment, fraud is subject to a five-year limitations period under
¶ 44 The final argument raised by CitiMortgage concerns the trial court‘s denial of leave to file a fourth amended complaint. The right to amend a complaint is not absolute, but is a matter within the trial court‘s discretion. Alpha School Bus Co. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 748 (2009). Accordingly, we will not reverse the trial court‘s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 748-49. Generally, a trial court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of allowing amendments to pleadings if doing so will further the ends of justice. Id. at 748. In making its determination, the trial court should consider, among other things, whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading or state a claim. Id.
¶ 45 In its proposed fourth amended complaint, CitiMortgage attempted to assert two new claims, for equitable subrogation (count VII) and conventional subrogation (count VIII). As we have already noted (supra ¶ 39), the proposed count VII contained a jumbled collection of allegations that did not state a claim for equitable subrogation. The proposed count VIII reveals the same problems, alleging that CitiMortgage is entitled to be subrogated to Lehman‘s priority with respect to the Second Lehman Mortgage and requesting a declaration that the Parilles’ interests in the property are subordinate “by virtue of” the Second Lehman Mortgage. However, we have held that that mortgage was ineffective to convey any security interest to Lehman, and thus subrogation to Lehman‘s interest in that mortgage would not provide CitiMortgage with any
¶ 46 To recap, we affirm the dismissal of all of CitiMortgage‘s claims except for its claim for reformation in count II. We also affirm the trial court‘s denial of CitiMortgage‘s motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. We now turn to the Parilles’ cross-appeal.
¶ 47 Cross-Appeal
¶ 48 In their cross-appeal, the Parilles raise two arguments: first, that the trial court‘s denial of their motion to clarify or amend the judgment was improper; and second, that the trial court should have granted them attorney fees pursuant to
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County entered on November 24, 2014, dismissing the third amended complaint with prejudice, is affirmed as to counts I, III, IV, V, and VI, but reversed as to count II. We affirm the trial court‘s order of February 25, 2015, insofar as it denied leave to file a fourth amended complaint, but we vacate the portions of that order relating to the Parilles’ motions to clarify or amend and for attorney fees. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 51 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; order affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.