715 F.2d 572 | Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. | 1983
Cities Service Co. (“Cities”) appeals from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (Staple-ton, J.), entered January 4, 1983, denying Cities’ application to intervene in an action brought by Pennzoil Co. against the Department of Energy (“DOE”), and from an order of the same court, entered January 19, 1983, approving an “Agreed Final Judgment” which settles DOE’s counterclaim against Pennzoil in that action. We affirm the district court’s decision to deny Cities’ application to intervene and dismiss Cities’ appeal from the order approving the Agreed Final Judgment.
In an earlier opinion, which describes the background of the case, we affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to DOE on Pennzoil’s claim against it. Pennzoil Co. v. DOE, 680 F.2d 156 (Temp.Em.App.1982), cert, denied,U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 841, 74 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1983). That claim challenged the validity of a 1975 ruling of the Federal Energy Administration as applied to crude oil production at the Walker Creek Field operated by Pennzoil in Arkansas. DOE’s counterclaim, which the district court had not yet addressed at the time of our earlier opinion, was brought under section 209 of the Economic Stabilization Act (“ESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, and alleged violations by Pennzoil of price controls governing the sale of crude oil. In settlement of the counterclaim, the Agreed Final Judgment requires Pennzoil to pay $14,750,000 to the United States Treasury.
In its decision of January 4, 1983, the district court found that Cities had no “interest” within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2)
Section 209 of the ESA, the basis of DOE’s counterclaim, authorizes the Attorney General to bring an action to enjoin practices which violate the regulations promulgated by DOE under the ESA. It further provides that: “In addition to such injunctive relief, the court may also order restitution of moneys received in violation of any such ... regulation.” Section 210 authorizes treble damage suits by “any person suffering legal wrong” as a result of practices which violate the regulations.
While sections 209 and 210 have a common purpose — the enforcement of DOE’s regulations — they vindicate different rights. “Actions by the United States under ESA § 209 are taken to enforce public, not private, rights.” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Edwards, 669 F.2d 717, 722 (Temp.Em.App.), cert, denied,-U.S.
Since Cities was properly denied leave to intervene, there is no need for us to address its contention that the district court erred in approving the Agreed Final Judgment. In keeping with the general rule that “[o]ne who is not a party to a record and judgment is not entitled to appeal therefrom,” Ex Parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 222 U.S. 578, 581, 32 S.Ct. 833, 56 L.Ed. 323 (1911) (per curiam), it has been held that, “one properly denied the status of intervenor cannot appeal on the merits of the case.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 2628, 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976).
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court denying Cities’ application to intervene is affirmed and Cities’ appeal from the order approving the Agreed Final Judgment is dismissed.
. Rule 24(a)(2) provides that:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.