MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before us on appeal from a final judgment of the bankruptcy court. Citibank brought an adversary proceeding against the debtor, Aphrom Michel, seeking to prevent him from discharging his debt to Citibank. Specifically, Citibank argued that Michel had borrowed money from it by fraudulent means, rendering the debt non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court found that Michel had not committed fraud and therefore discharged the debt. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
Neither party challenges the facts found by Judge Barliant. Prior to 1996, Michel had a good credit record with Citibank, leading it to extend an $18,000 line of credit to him. In 1996, Michel fell into debt and tried a desperate ploy to save his family’s finances: he traveled to Las Vegas, where he gambled $30,000 at the blackjack tables. Predictably, he lost it all, including $16,800 he had borrowed from Citibank. This result was predictable not just to an objective observer, but to Michel himself: despite the fact that he was a frequent gambler, Michel had never left a casino with a net profit.
Based on these facts, Judge Barliant concluded that Michel had acted in reckless disregard of a known risk: “At the time [Michel] obtained the advances from [Citi *605 bank], [he] knew that he did not have the financial wherewithal to repay them unless he won at gambling.... He decided to risk so much because he believed the more he gambled the better his chances of winning, although he had never won at gambling.” Tr. at 4-5. 1 Nevertheless, Judge Barliant concluded that Michel had not committed fraud:
[T]he ultimate issue in this ease is what it always is in these eases: Did the debtor know his representation was false when he made it and did he make it with the intent to deceive the creditors into extending the credit. The standard is subjective, not objective.... Applying that standard here, I find that the debtor did not know that his representations of an intent to repay the credits were false and did not make them with the actual intent to deceive.... He had deluded himself into believing that there was a realistic possibility that he would win. Given his credit, employment and family history, all of which were good, there is no reason to believe that he did not intend to use his winnings to pay his debts. Indeed, I believe the reason he changed his pattern of behavior by gambling more than he ever had was that he was trying to pay the large debts he had.
Tr. at 5-6,8-9.
II. Discussion
For a court to refuse to discharge a debt under § 523(a)(2)(A), it must find that: (1) the alleged fraud-feasor made a representation “either knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard for the truth”; (2) the misrepresentation was made with the intent to deceive; and (3) the creditor actually and justifiably relied on the misrepresentation.
In re Scarlata,
Citibank contends that by using his credit card Michel made two implicit representations: (1) that he had the ability to repay the money he borrowed, and (2) that he intended to do so.
See
Pl.’s Br. at 8-9,12. We need not concern ourselves with any representation about ability to repay because fraud claims based on this kind of representation are not permitted under § 523(a)(2)(A).
See
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (expressly excluding from its coverage any “statement respecting the debtor’s ... financial condition”);
In re Anastas,
Thus, the critical factual question is whether Michel’s professed intention to repay Citibank was false.
4
Citibank complains that Judge Barliant analyzed this question
*606
improperly, determining Michel’s intent “solely by [his] stated subjective intent, however implausible, unreasonable or reckless.” PL’s Br. at 1. This contention misconstrues the disposition-below. A bankruptcy judge attempting to determine the applicability of § 523(a)(2)(A) must evaluate the subjective intent of the debtor: there is no fraud when a person makes a representation that he sincerely believes is true.
See Palmacci v. Umpierrez,
Judge Barliant’s approach was legally sound: in addition to his own impressions of Michel’s credibility, he considered all the objective evidence of intent that had been proffered, and he never barred Citibank from presenting potentially relevant objective evidence of Michel’s intent at trial. Based on his review of the evidence, Judge Barliant found as a factual matter that Michel’s representation of an intent to repay Citibank was not false,
see
Tr. at 9-10, and we may disturb this finding only if it is clearly erroneous.
See In re Sheridan,
We acknowledge that another bankruptcy judge might have seen matters differently, finding that (1) Michel’s long history of losing at gambling, (2) the objective unreasonableness of expecting to win, and (3) the sudden increase in the size of Michel’s wagers roughly five months prior to filing for bankruptcy, indicate the lack of a sincere intent to repay his creditors through gambling. But the fact that reasonable minds could take different views of these facts cannot support the conclusion that Judge Barliant’s view was clearly erroneous.
Our resolution of this case should not be taken as sign of broad disagreement with other courts that have refused to discharge gambling debts pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A). Everyone agrees that gambling is an unreasonable way for an indebted person to try to regain solvency. But indebted gamblers break down into two groups: (1) those who maintain a sincere (though unreasonable) hope of winning and truly intend to repay their debts if they win, and (2) those who fully understand that they are headed for bankruptcy, but wish to have some fun at the expense of their creditors before they file. Determining which of the two mindsets a bankrupt debtor once held is difficult, and it is no surprise that courts reach different results based on various sets of facts. Most factual scenarios involving bankrupt gamblers are sufficiently ambiguous that reasonable minds could differ regarding which of the two descriptions better fits the debtor. We would only disagree with a court that took the position that because gambling is a unreasonable way to try to make money, all persons who gamble while in dire financial straits lack the intent to repay their creditors. 6
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed. It is so ordered.
Notes
. References to Judge Barliant's oral ruling will be cited as "Tr. at _." References to the trial transcript will be cited as "Trial Tr. at_"
. Although the Seventh Circuit’s opinions in
In re Scarlata
and
In re Mayer
described the third element of a fraud claim as "reasonable” reliance, the Supreme Court subsequently indicated that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires only "justifiable” reliance.
See Field v. Mans,
. To make a fraud claim based on a representation about the debtor’s ability to pay, a creditor would have to proceed under § 523(a)(2)(B), but that section requires that the representation be in writing. There is no evidence that there was a written misrepresentation in this case.
. In our view, when a person makes a representation about his or her own intent, that represen *606 tation is either true or intentionally false. Unlike ' other kinds of factual misrepresentations, which can be fraudulent if made recklessly, see supra, we believe that it is impossible to make a reckless statement about one’s own intent. One either intends to perform a given act or one does not If a person is uncertain about whether he or she truly intends to perform a given act, indicating a firm intention to perform that act is a deliberate lie, not a reckless misstatement of fact.
. To this end, bankruptcy courts have employed a variety of lists of objective factors that may help to determine whether a debtor intended to repay his credit card debts. One frequently cited 12-factor list was set forth in
In re Dougherty,
1.The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2. Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of bankruptcy before the charges were made;
3. The number of charges made;
4. The amount of the charges;
5. The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made;
6. Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;
7. Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
8. Whether or not the debtor was employed;
9. The debtor’s prospects for employment;
10. The financial sophistication of the debtor;
11. Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor’s buying habits; and
12. Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.
. Although we have no douht that many legitimate fraud claims are brought against bankrupt gamblers by credit card companies, we are unsympathetic to the proposition that gambling on credit is fraudulent merely because it is objectively risky. Credit card companies seem to be quite willing to accept interest payments from cardholders who run up foolish gambling debts. Some of them actually encourage gambling on credit by placing their cash machines in casinos. See Tr. at 4. It is troubling to us that credit card companies knowingly facilitate unwise behavior like gambling, but then turn around and argue that gamblers are defrauding them by engaging in unwise behavior. If the use of borrowed money to gamble is unreasonable per se, why do the credit card companies not take action to prevent it? We suspect that they do not do this because — like the less sophisticated gamblers they now condemn — they are gambling that their winnings (in the form of higher interest payments from solvent gamblers) will exceed their losses (in the form of gamblers discharging their debts in bankruptcy). Having chosen to gamble, they should not he permitted to complain every time they lose.