¶ 1 In 1996, Arizоna voters passed Proposition 101, which added Article 9, Section 2(6) to the Arizona Constitution. That provision allows the legislature to exempt from taxation a maximum of $50,000 of the full cash value of “personal property of a taxpayer” that is used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes. At the time it referred Proposition 101 to the electorate, the legislature conditionally enacted former Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated (“A.R.S.”) section 42-280 (Supp.1998), which granted the above-described exemption for “each taxpayer.”
¶ 2 Appellants are corporations that operate multi-location businesses throughout Arizona. They contend that the tax court erred by ruling that former section 42-280 granted them only a single, statewide exemption in 1997 and 1998 rather than a maximum $50,000 exemption for personal property located at each of Appellants’ business locations. Our resolution of this appeal turns on whether the term “taxpayer” used in Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution and former A.R.S. sеction 42-280 refers to (a) the “business location” where personal property is used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes, or (b) the owner of such property who pays taxes. We hold that the term “taxpayer,” as used in these provisions, means the owner of the described property who pays taxes, and Appellants were thus only entitled to a single, statewide exemption. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 3 All property in Arizona is subject to taxation by the state unless exempt under federal law or the Arizona Constitution.' Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 2(12). In 1996, the Arizona Legislature referred to the electorate Proposition 101, which proposed adding Article 9, Section 2(6) to the Arizona Constitution to provide as follows:
The legislature may exempt personal property that is used for agricultural purposes or in a trade or business from taxation in a manner provided by law, exceptthat the exemption does not apply to any amount of the full cash value of the personal property of a taxpayer that exceeds fifty thousand dollars. The legislature may provide by law to increase the exempt amount according to annual variations in a designated national inflation index.
(Emphasis added.) The legislature also conditionally enacted former A.R.S. section 42-280, which stated in pertinent part:
A. Pursuant to article IX, section 2, subsection (6), Constitution of Arizona, personal property that is class 4 property used for agricultural purposes or that is class 3 property used in a trade or business is exempt from taxation up to a maximum аmount of fifty thousand dollars of full cash value for each taxpayer.
(Emphasis added.) Former section 42-280 1 (the “business property exemption’) would only become effective if the voters approved Proposition 101. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, 7th S.S., ch. 5, § 4.
¶4 The voters passed Proposition 101 at the general election held on November 5, 1996, and Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution became effective on December 6, 1996. Section 42-280 thereafter became effective on January 1, 1997. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, 7th S.S., ch. 5, §§ 4, 5.
¶ 5 The Arizona Department of Revenue (“ADOR”) interpreted the term “taxpayer” in Article 9, Section 2(6) and A.R.S. section 42-280 as referring to an owner of taxable personal property, regardless of the number of separate business locations maintained by that owner. Accordingly, county assessors allowed Appellants to claim only one business property exemption for tax years 1997 and 1998, even though Appellants owned and operated businesses at multiple locations.
¶ 6 Appellants commenced this litigation to challenge Appellees’ interpretation and implementation of the business property exemption for tax years 1997 and 1998. They argued, as they do in this appeal, that the “taxpayer” referred to in Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona' Constitution and A.R.S. section 42-280 is the property location or “assessment account” 2 maintained by taxing authorities. They further contended that any differing definition would violate the Uniformity Clause, Article 9, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the tax court ruled that “taxpayer” means a business owner rather than an assessment account and that this interpretation does not create a conflict with the Uniformity Clause. We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-210KB) (1994).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7 We determine
de novo
whether any genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment and whether the tax court erred in applying the law.
Prince v. City of Apache Junction,
DISCUSSION
A. The meaning of “Taxpayer” under Article S, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. section 42-280
¶8 All parties agree that the scope of A.R.S. section 42-280 is necessarily curtailed by the authority granted to the legislature under Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 2(12);
Kunes v. Samaritan Health Service,
1. Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution
¶ 9 Our primary purpose in construing a constitutional amendment is to effectuate the intent of those who framed it and the electorate that approved it.
Jett v. City of Tucson,
¶ 10 Appellants argue that the term “taxpayer” in Article 9, Section 2(6) is plainly synonymous with “property location” or “assessment account” because (1) ADOR and the counties have historically treated business properties, and not their owners, as “taxpayers” and have indexed and organized their property tax databases accordingly, (2) ADOR provided fiscal impact estimates to the legislature, which were later repeated in the Voter Information Packet for Proposition 101 and attendant press releases, that predicted the effect of the proposed business property exemption on аssessment accounts rather than on property owners, and (3) the legislature amended A.R.S. section 42-280 in 1998, which “clarified” that “taxpayer” means “assessment account.” Appellants alternatively argue that this evidence demonstrates the ambiguity of the term “taxpayer” and that we should therefore construe the word to mean “property location” or “assessment account.” As correctly noted by Appellees, however, we may not consider this extrinsic evidence to discern the meaning оf “taxpayer” unless we first conclude that the term is facially ambiguous or uncertain.
Ward v. Stevens,
¶ 11 We interpret undefined words in a constitutional provision according to their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning as understood and used by the people.
Airport Properties v. Maricopa County,
¶ 12 Appellants contend, however, that we should not apply the common definition to the term “taxpayer” because “[property taxes in Arizona are owed by the property, not the owner of the property.”
Read v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue,
¶ 13 Additionally, although the idea that property “owes” taxes figuratively captures the essence of ad valorem taxation, the property itself is not the “taxpayer.” Under our ad valorem taxing system, the property serves as the collateral on which the taxing authority realizes if taxes are not paid.
See
A.R.S. §§ 42-17153, 18101 (1999 & Supp. 2000). The aсtual “taxpayer,” however, is the person or entity that owns or controls the property and either pays the tax or forfeits its property interest.
Cf. County of Pima v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue,
¶ 14 The context in which “taxpayer” is used in Article 9, Section 2(6) further bolsters our conclusion that neither the referring legislature nor the electoratе intended “taxpayer” to mean “business location” or “assessment account.” The provision authorizes a fifty-thousand-dollar maximum exemption for “the personal property
of a taxpayer.”
Ariz. Const, art. 9, § 2(6) (emphasis added). The emphasized language contemplates that the taxpayer
owns
the property.
Cf. Kunes,
¶ 15 Appellants finally argue that we should refrain from deciding that “taxpayer” refers to a property owner because this interpretation would lead to a “nonsensical” result that could not have been intended by the legislature or the electoratе.
See In re Cameron T.,
¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the term “taxpayer” in Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution plainly refers to a person or entity that owns personal property used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes and who pays tax on such property. Because this provision is clear and unambiguous, we do not address Appellants’ arguments that extrinsic evidence reveals a
¶ 17 By aрproving Proposition 101 and amending the constitution, Arizona voters authorized the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation specified classes of an owner’s personal property that is used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes and does not exceed fifty-thousand dollars in full cash value. Having delineated the scope of authority granted to the legislature by the constitution, we now address the meaning of “taxpayer” as used in A.R.S. section 42-280.
2. A.R.S. section 42-280
¶ 18 The legislature did not define the term “taxpаyer” in A.R.S. section 42-280. Because “taxpayer” is defined in seven other provisions within Title 42, A.R.S., and is given a general definition in Title 43, A.R.S., governing income tax, some appellants argue that the lack of a specific definition for “taxpayer” in section 42-280 renders the term ambiguous. We disagree. By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.
Kessen v. Stewart,
¶ 19 Section 42-280 was conditionally enacted pursuant to Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution, and the statutory language closely tracks that constitutional provision. Thus, for the reasons set forth in our discussion of the meaning of “taxpayer” in Article 9, Section 2(6), wе conclude that “taxpayer,” as used in section 42-280, clearly and unambiguously refers to an owner of personal property used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes and who pays tax on such property. This definition conforms with the grant of authority set forth in Article 9, Section 2(6). If section 42-280 is interpreted as giving additional business property exemptions to owners who operate multilocation businesses, rather than limiting the owner to one such exemption, the statute would exceed the authority granted by Article 9, Section 2(6) and would be rendered unconstitutional. For this additional reason, we decline to vary the plain meaning of “taxpayer” as used in section 42-280.
See Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
¶ 20 Appellants argue, however, that the legislature has “clarified” the meaning of “taxpayer” in both Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution and section 42-280, and we should apply that definition retroactively. We reject this contention.
¶ 21 In 1998, the legislature amended section 42-280, thеn renumbered as section 42-11127, by providing that specified classes of personal property used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes are “exempt from taxation up to a maximum amount of fifty-thousand dollars of full cash value of
each assessment account.”
A.R.S. § 42-11127(A) (Supp.1999) (emphasis added). The legislature further provided that “[flor purposes of this section and article IX section 2, subsection (6), constitution of Arizona, an assessment account is considered to be a taxpayer.” A.R.S. § 42-11127(D). Appellants contend that section 42-11127 “clarified” the meaning of “taxpayer” in former section 42-280 and Article 9, Section 2(6) to mean “assessment account” and we must ascribe that meaning to the term.
See City of Mesa v. Killingsworth,
¶ 22 We need not determine whether section 42-11127 “clarified” or “changed” the meaning of “taxpayer” in section 42-280 because a legislative amendment may only “clarify” an ambiguous statute.
Weekly v. City of Mesa,
¶ 23 Additionally, “clarifying” the term “tаxpayer” in former section 42-280 to mean “assessment account” would render that provision unconstitutional because the legislature was not authorized by Article 9, Section 2(6) to enact such legislation.
3
See discussion
supra,
¶¶ 9-17.
Conrad v. Maricopa County,
B. Effect of the Uniformity Clause
¶ 24 Appellants next argue that we must adopt their interpretation of Article 9, Section 2(6) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. section 42-280 to avoid violating the Uniformity Clause of the Arizona Constitution, Article 9, Section l.
4
In a related argumеnt, Appellants contend that Appellees violated the Uniformity Clause by their application of section 42-280. As primary support for each contention, Appellants rely on our supreme court’s opinion in
America West Airlines v. Department of Revenue,
¶ 25 But we need not decide whether the business property exemption impermissibly differentiates among taxable personal property within the same class. Even if Appellants are correct that the business property exemption allows the taxing authorities to differently tax property within the same class in violation of the Uniformity Clause, we must reject their position because, unlike the case in America West, such treatment is constitutionally authorized by another provision — Article 9, Section 2(6).
¶26 Assuming that Proposition 101 amended Article 9, Section 2 so that it conflicts with the Uniformity Clause, we must harmonize the provisions to make the constitution “a consistent workable whole.”
State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan,
¶27 The merit of Appellants’ argument depends entirely upon thеir theory that a constitutional amendment affects only explicitly amended provisions. Appellant Circle K cites
Ward v. Stevens,
¶ 28 Our supreme court recently noted that “ ‘[i]t is an established axiom of constitutional law that where there are both general and specific constitutional provisions relating to the same subject, the specific provision will control.’ ”
Clouse v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
¶29 Our interpretation of Article 9, Section 2(6) harmonizes this provision with the Uniformity Clause in a way that renders the constitution “a consistent workable whole.”
Nelson,
¶ 30 Indeed, other provisions within Article 9, Section 2 authorize the legislature to exempt from taxation рroperty owned by certain veterans, widows, widowers, and disabled persons, up to a fixed-dollar cap. Ariz. Const, art. 9, §§ 2(7)-(10), 2.1 and 2.2. Application of these exemptions results in an effective tax rate for eligible taxpayers that differs from the rate applicable to an ineligible taxpayer who owns the same kind of property. Use of these exemptions likewise yields an effective tax rate that varies depending on the total value of otherwise taxable property owned by eligible taxpayers. Id. Like Article 9, Section 2(6), none of these provisions explicitly “amends” the Uniformity Clause, but co-exists with it.
¶ 31 We hold that by amending the constitution to add Article 9, Section 2(6), the legislature and the Arizona electorate intended to authorize the legislature to annually exempt the first fifty-thousand dollars of full cash value of an owner’s personal property used for agricultural, trade, or business purposes. To the extent this provision conflicts with the Uniformity Clause, we further hold that the specific authority granted by Article 9, Section 2(6) controls. Consequently, we need not consider whether Article 9, Section 2(6) or A.R.S. section 42-280 “violates” the Uniformity Clause under the analysis adopted in
America West Airlines.
Finally, because Appellees taxed property pursuant to A .R.S. section 42-280 in a manner consistent with the authority granted by Article 9,
CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Notes
. The legislature renumbered former A.R.S. section 42-280 as A.R.S. section 42-11127 in 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 150, § 172, and amended it in 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 190, and 4th S.S., ch. 3, § 5, both effeсtive January 1, 1999. Unless otherwise noted, we will, refer to the statute as section 42-280.
. An "assessment account” is an administrative device that enables the assessor to apply the appropriate tax rate based on the location of the property. One business owner may have many assessment accounts if its property is located in different taxing jurisdictions within the state.
. We do not address the constitutionality of A.R.S. section 42-11127 because that issue is not before us.
. "[A]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax....”
. Appellants offered a hypothetical that best illustrates the argument:
[I]f all Wendy’s restaurants in Arizona were owned by Wendy’s Corp., only one of the Wendy's restaurants would be entitled to the $50,000 exemption, while if the McDonald’s restaurants in Arizona were incorporated as McDonald's Restaurant # 1, Inc., McDonald's Restaurant # 2, Inc., and so on, each McDonald's restaurant would be entitled to a $50,000 exemption. As such, the McDonald’s restaurant with nearly identical personal property as the Wendy’s restaurant across the street would receive dissimilar tax treatment.