34 Conn. App. 685 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1994
The plaintiffs, Robert and Catherine Cioffoletti, have filed a motion for review of the trial
This case was previously before this court. The plaintiffs brought an administrative appeal from the commission’s amendment of its zoning regulations to add a new section. That provision, § 306, would have required the plaintiffs to obtain a special permit to continue the lawful nonconforming use of their property for gravel mining operations. In 1990, the trial court, West, J., held that § 306.0.H. of the Ridgefield zoning regulations exceeded the accepted policy of preventing the extension of nonconforming uses and was an attempt to prohibit an established nonconforming use. This court affirmed that judgment. Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 24 Conn. App. 5, 584 A.2d 1200 (1991). Subsequently, the defendant adopted another amendment to the same regulation.
On June 11,1993, the trial court, McGrath, J., concluded that the judgment was accurately set out in the memorandum of decision and not in the judgment file prepared by the commission and signed by the clerk of the court. The court found, on the basis of the language of the memorandum of decision, that the commission was not in contempt because no court order had prohibited amendment of the regulation.
On June 14, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certification seeking to appeal from the trial court’s judgment. On July 7, 1993, this court dismissed the petition without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ filing a late appeal on or before July 28, 1993.
On June 18, 1993, the commission filed a motion to correct the judgment file, claiming that it did not reflect the judgment as indicated in the memorandum of decision. On September 2, 1993, the commission filed a motion for rectification asking the trial court to correct the judgment to reflect that the other issues
On October 8,1993, the trial court, West, J., granted the commission’s motion to correct the judgment file to reflect the judgment of the court as stated in the memorandum of decision.
The plaintiffs timely filed this motion for review of the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct.
A trial court possesses the power to modify substantively its own judgment within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed. State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 437, 513 A.2d 620 (1986). A court may correct a clerical error at any time, even after the expiration of the four month period. Blake v. Blake, 211 Conn. 485, 495, 560 A.2d 396 (1989).
“In civil matters, the preparation of the judgment file is a clerical matter; the written judgment relates back to the filing of the memorandum.” State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 127, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). “A clerical error is a mistake or omission in a judgment which is not the result of the judicial function. Such a claimed error does not challenge the court’s ability to reach the conclusion that it did reach, but involves the failure to preserve or correctly represent in the record the actual decision of the court. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 202.” Ravizza v. Waldie, 3 Conn. App. 491, 493, 490 A.2d 90 (1985).
In this case, the judgment file did not accurately reflect the memorandum of decision of the trial court and the unchallenged articulation of that decision in the prior appeal. The original decision of the trial court dated March 16, 1990, stated that “section 306.0.H. is illegal because it attempts to prohibit an established nonconforming use. Inasmuch as this determination is dispositive of the instant appeal, a discussion of the other grounds raised by the plaintiffs is unnecessary.
The trial court corrected the judgment file to reflect the substance of its memorandum of decision. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s correction of the judgment file was a clerical function and not a substantive judicial change. The plaintiffs’ motion for review is granted but any relief is denied.
In light of our finding that the correction of the judgment file was proper, we conclude that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal based on mootness should be granted. The plaintiffs’ motion for contempt relied on the language of the original judgment file indicating that all issues were decided in their favor. The basis for the plaintiffs’ motion and their arguments in support of their appeal have been rendered moot. This court can give no practical relief in these circumstances and, accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944).
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
Practice Book § 326 provides in pertinent part: “Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the superior court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed.”
The plaintiffs were not required to file a petition for certification in this matter because the appeal was taken from the denial of a motion for contempt and not from a zoning decision requiring certification pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8.
The trial court also granted the motion for rectification. No motion for review was filed concerning the granting of the motion for rectification.
Notice of the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to correct was issued on October 12, 1993. The motion for review was filed October 19, 1993. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4053, a motion for review of any order relating to the perfecting of the record for the appeal shall be filed within ten days from the issuance of notice of the order sought to be reviewed.
The memorandum of decision dated July 31, 1990, stated in pertinent part that “the court has declined to hold that the entire section 306 of the Ridgefield zoning regulations is invalid. The court’s holding that section 306.O.H. is illegal has been dispositive of plaintiffs’ appeal; therefore, a discussion of the validity of other subsections of section 306 is unnecessary.”