This is аn action by a minor plaintiff and his father for medical malpractice occurring on February 18, 1971, when the minоr was nine years old. The action was brought on December 28, 1976, and the sole issue presented is whether it is barred by the statute of limitations, G. L. c. 231, § 60D, enacted by St. 1975, c. 362, § 5, ap *2 proved June 19, 1975, amended by St. 1975, c. 634, § 1, and effective Januаry 1, 1976, by St. 1975, c. 362, § 13. We hold that sufficient time was allowed, between the passing of the act and the time fixed for the limitation, for the commencement of the action. Hence the statute bars the action and is not unconstitutional.
A judge of the Superior Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and reported the question on the complaint, the motion for summary judgment and the stipulated facts. We allowed the plaintiffs’ application for direct appellate review. The defendant, a surgeon, last treated the minor plaintiff on Fеbruary 18, 1971, shortly after his ninth birthday. At least as early as July 24, 1975, the minor plaintiff’s father consulted an attorney in connectiоn with the subject matter of this action and a companion action against another doctor. The аttorney is an experienced specialist in medical malpractice cases. We were аssured at argument that no problem is presented of the plaintiffs’ opportunity to discover the claim. Compare
Hendrickson
v.
Sears,
The statute of limitations governing actions for medical malpractice requires that the аction be commenced within three years next after the cause of action accrues. G. L. c. 260, § 4. Before 1976 the three years began to run against a minor plaintiff only when he reached majority. G. L. c. 260, § 7. He reаched majority at age eighteen. G. L. c. 231, § 85P, inserted by St. 1975, c. 315, § 1, effective January 1, 1974.
Effective January 1, 1976, notwithstanding G. L. c. 260, § 7, a claim such as the present one must be commenced within three years from the date the cause оf action accrues. G. L. c. 231, § 60D.
1
The new provision is one short sec
*3
tion in eighteen pages of provisions relating to medical malpractice. In
Austin
v.
Boston Univ. Hosp.,
A shortened statute of limitations may bе applied to causes of action already accrued “if sufficient time be allowed, between the passing of the act and the time fixed for the limitation, to afford a full and ample time to all persоns, having such causes of action, to commence their suits.”
Loring
v.
Alline,
9 Gush. 68, 71 (1851). The requirement is that “a reasonable time is allowed within which an action may be brought after the enactment of the statute.”
E.S. Parks Shellac Co.
v.
Jones,
This much is common ground. The sole question argued to us is whether the six months frоm June 19, 1975, when § 60D was approved, to January 1, 1976, when it took effect, was a reasonable time to commence the present action. There is no ambiguity in the statute. See
E.B. Horn Co.
v.
Assessors of Boston,
The plaintiffs contend that thе statute is a denial of justice as it applies to a minor aged thirteen, citing
Gaudette
v.
Webb,
The plaintiffs also contend that a requirement of immediаte suit would frustrate the purpose of the 1975 legislation to discourage frivolous claims. See
Austin
v.
Boston Univ. Hosp.,
The reported question is answеred as follows: the shortened statute of limitations applies to the present case and bars it, and is constitutional as so applied. The case is remanded to the Superior Court, where the defendant’s mоtion for summary judgment is to be allowed.
So ordered.
Notes
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section seven of chapter two hundred аnd sixty, any claim by a minor against a health care provider stemming from professional services or heаlth care rendered, whether in contract or tort, based on an alleged act, omission or neglect shall be com *3 menced within three years from the date the cause of action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which the action may be commenced.”