414 U.S. 946 | SCOTUS | 1973
Lead Opinion
Affirmed on appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that the Fourteenth and First Amendments prohibit state obscenity regulation, would vacate so much of the judgment as is the sub
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Appellants appeal from so much of the judgment of the three-judge court as denied them declaratory and permanent injunctive relief in this action challenging the constitutionality of California’s statutory search-and-seizure provisions (California Penal Code §§ 1523-1542), as construed and applied, and as aids in the enforcement of the underlying California obscenity statute, California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), which provides as follows:
“Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 311.2 (a) is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore vacate so much of the judgment of the District Court as is the subject of the appeal and remand
