126 Ind. 99 | Ind. | 1890
— The appellee, at the time he was employed to render the professional services which he seeks to recover the value of in this action, was a physician and surgeon, in regular practice at Morris, in this State. He was employed directly by one of the appellant’s conductors, by whom he was informed that a telegram had been received from the appellant’s general superintendent authorizing his employ
The appellant offered to prove that it had in its employment a chief physician and surgeon, whose duty it was to employ surgeons to give professional attention to persons injured by its trains, but the evidence was excluded. There was no error in excluding this evidence. It was immaterial whether the appellant had, or had not, a chief surgeon in its service charged with the duty of employing subordinate surgeons, for there is no pretence that the appellee had notice of that fact. He was not bound to look beyond the general superintendent as the source of authority warranting his employment. It is quite well settled that a general superintendent has authority to employ surgeons to give attention to persons injured by the trains of the company he represents. And it is rightly so held, for it would be unreasonable to require a surgeon to give professional assistance to a person injured by the company’s trains and then deny him compensation, upon the ground that the superintendent had no authority to employ him, because that authority was lodged in a chief surgeon. Nor are we willing to sanction a rule imposing upon the surgeon whose services are requested by the superintendent, the duty of making specific inquiry as to the scope of the superintendent’s authority. Such a rule would operate harshly in many cases, for, if the surgeon must stop to make inquiries before leaving his home or office, the injured man might perish. Better railroad companies should be held responsible for the acts of such a high officer as a general superintendent, although as between him and his principal that officer may usurp authority that is vested
Having adjudged that the appellant’s general superintendent has authority to employ a surgeon to minister to a person injured by its trains, we have effectually disposed of the case, and little more need be said, for, if he had such authority, the surgeon employed by that officer was not bound to institute an inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the injured man was hurt under such circumstances as rendered the company liable. It was enough for the surgeon
Judgment affirmed.