94 Ind. 474 | Ind. | 1884
On the afternoon of the 12th day of July, 1881, Mrs. Mary M. Eaton purchased of the proper agent at the Union Depot, at Indianapolis, a ticket-entitling her to transportation over .the railroad belonging to and operated by the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Indianapolis Railroad Company, from that depot to Morehouse, a flag station a few miles east of Indianapolis, and soon thereafter, that is to say, on the same afternoon, entered a train of that company’s cars which stopped regularly at Morehouse when signaled to do so. Her place of ultimate destination was the house of a brother-in-law, named Graham, who lived three miles south -of Morehouse, and she expected Graham to meet her at Morehouse upon her arrival at the place. After leaving Indianapolis the conductor took up her ticket, but, for some unexplained reason, failed to signal the engineer to stop at Morehouse, and in consequence the train did not stop at that station.
When Mrs. Eaton discovered that the train was passing Morehouse without stopping, she appealed to a gentleman sitting near her for assistance, and requested him, if possible, to have the train stopped at the approaching crossing of a dirt road, saying that she would be willing to get off at that place." That gentleman went forward and soon returned with
This action was prosecuted by Mrs.-Eaton against the railroad company to recover damages for being carried beyond Morehouse, and being compelled to walk so great a distance-to reach Graham’s house. After evidence had been introduced at the trial at special term, establishing, or tending to establish, the facts herein above stated, the plaintiff offered to prove: First. That the weather was hot and sultry during-the afternoon and evening-of the 12th day of July, 1881„
The trial at special term resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. Upon an appeal to the general term the judgment at special term was reversed, the court holding . that the judge at special term had ruled correctly in excluding the offered evidence as to the plaintiff’s injuries from crossing the creek and bayou, as to her being attacked and chased by dogs, and as to her sickness claimed to have resulted from the incidents of her journey from Julietta to the house of her brother-in-law, but had erred in the* exclusion of all the other items of rejected evidence, and it is from that judgment of reversal that this appeal is prosecuted.
The question as to what may be taken into consideration in the assessment of damages in a case like this is one which has provoked much discussion, and concerning which the text-writers have been unable to formulate any general rule of
A narrower limit is applied in the assessxnent of damages-for a breach of contract, pure and simple, than is prescribed in an action for a tort, and, in our judgment, much of the conflict between decided cases and the individual views of judges, to which we have referred, has resulted from a failure to carefully obsex-ve that distinction between the two-classes of damages. Two of the cases cited by counsel will serve to illustrate our meaning in this respect. One is the case of Hobbs v. London, etc., R. W. Co., 11 Moak Eng. R.181, and the other is Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344 (34 Am. R. 89). These cases were both treated as, and decided upon the theory that they were, actions for a breach of contract merely,-when in truth they were both actions for a neglect of duty by a common carx’ierfrom which an injury resulted to a passenger, and hence were, in all their essential featui’es, actions for tortious misconduct on the part of the defendants.
Counsel for the appellant contend for the application of the doctrine of these and other kindred cases to the case at bax’, upon the like theory that it is only an action for the bi’each of a conti’act for transportation, entered into between the pax’ties, arid, consequently, an action in which the nax-rower limit ought to be applied in the assessment of the daxnages. It is true that the appellee entered the appellant’s train of cars at Indianapolis, under an implied coritract for her transportation to Moi’ehouse, but when the appellant carried the appellee beyond Morehouse, against her will, it ceased to carry her as a passenger for hire, and became a wrong-doer, responsible for whatever injury or inconvenience, if any, which might result to her from being thus caxx-icd beyond her place of destination.
Thompson on Carrier's of Passengex’s, p. 568, says: “The
Thompson on Negligence lays down the following general rule on the subject of consequential damages: “Whoever does a wrongful act is answerable, for all the consequences that may ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events,, though such consequences be immediately and directly brought about by intervening causes, if such intervening causes were set in motion by the original wrong-doer.” 2 Thomp. Neg. 1084; Add. Torts, 5; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reaney,. 42 Md. 117.
In the case of Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 402, Lord Ellen-Borough said: “ If I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous alternative, I am responsible for the-consequences.”
The case of Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. W. Co., 54 Wis. 342 (41 Am. R. 41), the facts, briefly stated, were that Brown and wife, and a seven year old child, took passage on the railway to a place called Manston; that before reaching’ Manston, and at a place three miles east of that place, Brown and wife were told by a brakeman that they were then at Manston, and to leave the train, which they accordingly did; that it was then night; that it had rained the day before, and
That case was, perhaps, a stronger one against the railway company, in some respects, than the one at bar, but the general principles announced, as decisive of that case, have a practical application to the facts of this case, and are entitled, as we believe, to the favorable consideration of this court.
The court in that case, after referring to Avhat had been announced as a correct legal proposition in another case, continued : “ So, in the case at bar, the. defendant, by its negKgence, placed the plaintiffs in a position where it was necessary for them' to act to avoid the consequences of the wrongful act of the defendant, and, acting with ordinary prudence and care to get themselves out of the difficulty in which they had been placed, they sustained injury.' Such injury can be, and is, traced directly to the defendant’s negligence as its cause; and it is its proximate cause, Avithin the rules of law upon that subject.”
It is due, hoAvever, to the importance of the subject to state that the opinion in that case Avas promulgated by a majority vote only, íavo of the judges dissenting, and for that reason we would not quote from it with approbation if we were not fully satisfied that the conclusion reached was substantially a correct conclusion upon the facts as we find them reported. The case is, at all events, one of interest because of its grouping
When the appellant set the appellee down at Julietta, it did so at the peril of having to respond in damages for whatever injury, if any, she had already sustained, or might thereafter sustain, by being carried out of her way on the journey she started out to make, and placed her in a position in which she was required to do whatever was necessary to extricate herself from the ■consequences of the wrong which had been inflicted upon her.
If, therefore, without being able to procure a conveyance, and acting with prudence and care, the appellee proceeded on foot to complete her journey, and thereby, and as incidental thereto, received injuries, and incurred vexatious annoyances, she became entitled to have those injuries and annoyances taken into consideration in estimating her damages in the event ■of a verdict in her favor.
Some of the facts which the appellee proposed, but was not permitted to prove, might not have been of much value as evidence, but, as incidents connected with the appellee’s journey, they were all facts which, we think, ought to have been admitted in evidence for the consideration of the jury. If the dogs which attacked and chased the appellee had bitten or otherwise physically injured her while on her way, that would doubtless have constituted a distinct and disconnected injury, for which the appellant would not have been responsible, but the fright and peril, which she proposed to prove were occasioned by the dogs, amounted only to annoyances incidental to the walk which, it is assumed, the appellee wás constrained to make, and hence stand upon different grounds.
The conclusion we have reached in this case is supported, either directly or indirectly, by the'following cases: Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 76 Ind. 166 (40 Am. R. 230); Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426 (42 Am. R. 508); Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; Eten v. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252;
The judgment of the court below at general term is affirmed, with costs.