*218 OPINION OF THE COURT
Dеfendants here appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which, among other things, affirmed Supreme Court’s order and judgment recognizing and docketing certain judgments entered against them by the English High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, pursuant to New York’s version of the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act (CPLR art 53). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the English judgments at issue satisfy the statutory prerequisites for recognition.
I.
In 1992, Castor Holdings Ltd., a Canadian real estate and financial investment company, declared bankruptcy. Plaintiffs CIBC Mellon Trust Company, as trustee of several pension and other benefit funds, and DaimlerChrysler Canada, Inc. had lost millions of dollars in investments in Castor. In May 1996, plaintiffs commenced legal proceеdings in England in the High Court, alleging that they had been duped into making these investments by what amounted to a massive, multinational fraud. The suit named Wolfgang Otto Stolzenberg, the president, CEO and chairman of Castor, as the primary defendant accused of masterminding the fraud.
Marco Gambazzi, a Swiss attorney, was also individually named as a defendant. Gambazzi owned, in whole or in part, and contrоlled Mora Hotel Corporation N.V. and Chascona N.V.,* 1 which were among the numerous corporations eventually named as defendants in the English proceedings. Plaintiffs initially asserted only a “tracing” claim against Mora for receipt of funds for no consideration, which were traceable to the alleged fraud. When plaintiffs added a claim of conspirаcy against Mora in January 1999, they joined Chascona as a coconspirator.
Mora is the ground lessee and operator of the Gorham Hotel, located in midtown Manhattan, and Chascona is the fee owner *219 of the property. They are both Netherlands Antilles corporations authorized to do business in New York. The Gorham Hotel is apparently thеir sole asset.
Plaintiffs made two kinds of ex parte applications to the High Court. The first sought leave to serve various nonresident defendants, including Mora (and later, Chascona), as “necessary or proper” parties. This rule (see UK Civ Pro Rules [1998] SI 1998/3132, part 6 [III], rules 6.20, 6.21) allows out-of-the-jurisdiction service on such a party when the liability of the defendants, either jointly or individually, depends upon a single investigation (see Massey v Heynes & Co., 21 QBD 330 [Ct App 1888]). In order for the High Court to exercise such “necessary or proper” jurisdiction, however, at least one defendant — in this instance, Stolzenberg — must be an English domiciliary and serve as the base or anchor defendant (see rules 6.20, 6.21). The second kind of ex parte application sought Mareva injunctions or orders (see Mareva Cia. Naviera S.A. v International Bulkcarriers S.A., 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 [1975]) to freeze defendаnts’ assets on a world-wide basis during the pendency of the English proceedings and to direct certain discovery. The initial Mareva order required Mora to provide information and documents relating to the tracing claim and its assets as well as copies of any documents relevant to the proceedings. In support of this application, plaintiffs submitted attorney affidаvits and voluminous supporting documentation. After reviewing these materials over nine days, the High Court determined that plaintiffs had made the requisite showing; namely, a “good arguable case.”
In March 1997, plaintiffs served Mora in New York with a writ of summons and the Mareva order. Mora appeared in the English proceedings for the limited purpose of contesting the High Court’s jurisdiction over Stolzеnberg, the anchor defendant, on the grounds that he was not domiciled in England at the time that Mora argued was critical (i.e., when the writ of summons for Stolzenberg was served rather than when it was issued). In May 1997, the High Court rejected Mora’s argument and dismissed its application to set aside service of the writ on it; and the Court of Appeal dismissed Mora’s appeal in October 1997. Finally, in Oсtober 2000, the House of Lords dismissed Mora’s appeal from the Court of Appeal. Chascona abandoned its identical jurisdictional challenge following the House of Lords’ dismissal of Mora’s appeal.
While disputing the High Court’s jurisdiction, Mora elected not to comply with the Mareva order relating to the tracing *220 claim and several subsequent orders to secure compliance with it. Some of these orders were “unless” orders, which explicitly warned Mora that continued recalcitrance would lead to its debarment or preclusion from defending against the tracing claim and permit plaintiffs to obtain judgment. When Mora failed to take heed, a default judgment was entered against it for roughly $600,000 (U.S.) in February 1999, following a damages assessment hearing.
In July 1999, plaintiffs appliеd ex parte to increase to $420 million (Can.) the value of Mora’s assets covered by the Mareva order, and to grant the same freezing relief with respect to Chascona on account of the conspiracy claims pending against them both. Once again, before granting plaintiffs’ applications, the High Court examined the evidence to determine whether рlaintiffs had established the requisite “good arguable case.”
Thereafter, as a result of their failure to comply with the new Mareva and concomitant “unless” orders, both Mora and Chascona were debarred from defending against the main fraudulent conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs applied to the High Court for an assessment of damages, and a hearing was held. In December 1999, dеfault judgments of roughly $330 million (U.S.) were entered in England against both Mora and Chascona on the conspiracy claims.
In May 2000, plaintiffs commenced an action in Supreme Court, seeking recognition of the English judgments pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act (CPLR art 53) and New York common law, as well as an attachment of the Gorham Hotel, reportedly worth аpproximately $30 million. On January 16, 2001, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs summary judgment recognizing and docketing the English judgments; confirmed the attachment; appointed a postjudgment receiver to manage and sell the Gorham Hotel in satisfaction of the English judgments; and denied defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint.
The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s order and judgment on May 28, 2002 (
*221 Subsequent to Supreme Court’s decision and order, defendants in 2001 and 2002 applied to the High Court to set aside the default judgments entered against them because of their failure to comply with the “unless” orders, and to allow them to defend the tracing and conspiracy claims on the merits. After a six-day hearing, which took place from December 9-16, 2002, the High Court dismissed defendants’ applications on February 3, 2003. Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that defendants’ applications to the High Court mooted the asserted constitutional bases. We withheld decision and entertained oral argument on both the motion and the appeal.
II.
New York has traditionally beеn a generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages rendered by foreign courts
(see e.g. Lazier v Westcott,
Article 53 applies to “any foreign country judgment which is final, conclusive and enforсeable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal” (CPLR 5302). Simply put, a foreign country judgment is considered “conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money’ (CPLR 5303) unless
“1. the judgment was rendered under a system *222 which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; [or]
“2. the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant” (CPLR 5304 [a] [1], [2]).
Moreover, “[i]n proceeding under article 53, the judgment creditor does not seek any new relief against the judgment debtor, but instead merely asks the court to perform its ministerial function of recognizing the foreign country money judgment and converting it into a New York judgment”
(Lenchyshyn v Pelko Elec.,
On this appeal, defendants direct their principal fire related to CPLR 5304 (a) (1) at the High Court’s use of
Mareva
orders. While we have expressed concern regarding the power and potential commercial disruption of
Mareva
orders
(see Credit Agricole Indosuez v Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank,
In summary, the relevant inquiry under CPLR 5304 (a) (1) is the overall fairness of England’s legal “system,” which is beyond dispute
(see Society of Lloyd’s v Grace,
*223 Turning next to CPLR 5304 (a) (2), the question is whether the English courts had jurisdiction over defendants. Before reaching this question, however, we must consider the merits of plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argue that when defendants applied to the High Court, seeking relief from the English judgments and the opportunity to defend on the merits, they “voluntarily appeared in the proceedings” within the meaning of CPLR 5305 (a) (2), thus mooting this appeal. While such a voluntary appearance would not, in our view, moot the aрpeal, it would abrogate the reviewability of defendants’ argument that the English judgments are unenforceable in New York because the English courts lacked jurisdiction over them.
Section 5305 (a) (2) provides in relevant part that a foreign judgment shall not be denied recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if “the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure * * * or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him” (CPLR 5305 [a] [2]). Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ application to the High Court does not fall within either exception, particularly the second; i.e., it was not an appearance “for the purpose * * * of сontesting * * * jurisdiction * * * over [them].”
The commentary for CPLR 5305 (a) (2) explains that this second exception is restricted to an
“appearance * * * solely to protest jurisdiction, what New York used to call and some places still call a ‘special appearance’. If the judgment debtor did any more than she had to do, however, to preserve her jurisdictional objection in the foreign court, she would thereby have submitted voluntarily to its jurisdiction and forfeited the right to claim an exception for herself under this paragraph” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5305:l, at 556 [emphasis supplied]).
Federal courts applying New York law have, in fact, interpreted CPLR 5305 (a) (2) to foreclose a defendant from contesting a foreign judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction once the defendant has done anything more than it had to do to preserve its jurisdictional objection (see
S.C. Chimexim S.A. v Velco Enters. Ltd.,
*224 In S.C. Chimexim S.A., a Romanian plaintiff sued an American corporate defendant with its principal place of business in New York for an alleged breach of contract in Romania. The dеfendant failed to appear and the Romanian tribunal, thereafter, entered judgment for approximately $200,000. The defendant appealed from the Romanian judgment, raising multiple grounds going to both the merits and personal jurisdiction. In the federal action to enforce the Romanian judgment, the court held that the defendant had made a voluntary appearance pursuant to CPLR 5305 (a) (2) and was, thus, precluded from contesting personal jurisdiction (S.C. Chimexim S.A. at 215).
In Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd., a Japanese judgment creditor sought an order confirming attachment of a New York company’s assets in order to satisfy the judgment it had obtained against the company in Japan. The court determined that the New York company’s appearance in the Japanese action to defend on the merits after losing its jurisdictional challenge was a voluntary appearance within the meaning of CPLR 5305 (a) (2) (Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. at 1222-1226).
The Nippon court reasoned that the traditional conceptual differences between “general” and “special” appearances prevailing at the time CPLR article 53 was adopted formed the “conсeptual underpinnings” of section 5305 (a) (2) (id. at 1225). The court also relied upon a section of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, which states that “[a] general appearance is one where the defendant either enters an appearance in an action without limiting the purpose for which he appears or where he asks for relief which the court may give only if it has jurisdiction over him” (id. at 1224, quoting Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 33, Comment d). Included in this category are those instances where a defendant “makes a motion raising a question as to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim even though the defendant shows that he does not intend thereby to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court” (id.).
While New York no longer distinguishеs between a general and special appearance (see CPLR 320), we agree with the Nippon court that the language and structure of CPLR 5305 (a) (2) have retained the traditional distinction for purposes of recognition actions. Accordingly, the pertinent question-here is whether defendants’ applications to the High Court amounted to a voluntary appearance within the meаning of CPLR 5305 (a) (2).
*225
The “skeletal argument” submitted by defendants on their applications to set aside the English judgments and the High Court’s decision leave no room for doubt that defendants were arguing the merits of the conspiracy claims in the English proceedings. They made arguments and presented proof in an attempt to persuade the High Court that their reasons for disobeying the
Mareva
and “unless” orders were reasonable. Significantly, “[c]onsiderable time was spent, on the hearing of the Applications, on the issue of the legal merits of the claims against Mora and Chascona”
(CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v Stolzenberg,
[2003] EWHC 13 [Ch],
We disagree. When defendants appliеd to the High Court to set aside the English judgments and to defend on the merits, they did more than they had to do to preserve a jurisdictional objection — which was, in any event, foreclosed to them in England by the House of Lords’ decision — and so they voluntarily appeared in the foreign proceeding within the meaning of CPLR 5305 (a)(2).
We note that CPLR 5305 (a) (2) does not on its face distinguish between voluntаry appearances taking place in the foreign proceeding before or after judgment; and the two federal cases discussed above each involved postjudgment appearances by the judgment-debtors. The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws likewise makes no pre- or postjudgment distinction, stating that a defendant may be deemed to hаve made an appearance in an action and, therefore, to have submitted to a court’s jurisdiction, by, among other things, “taking steps in the action *226 after judgment either in the trial court or in an appellate court” (Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 33, Comment b [emphasis supplied]; see Restatement [Third] of Foreign Relations Law of United States § 421 [3] [stating that “(a) defense of lack of jurisdiction is generally waived by any appearance * * * if the appearance is for a purpose that does not include a challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction”]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Judges Smith, Ciparick, "Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur; Chief Judge Kaye taking no part.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Notes
. Gambazzi had also served as a director of Castor, a managing direсtor of Castor’s principal lending subsidiaries and an officer or director of a number of other Castor subsidiaries.
. Twenty-nine other states and the District of Columbia have adopted variations of the Uniform Act.
. See also Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buf L Rev 1 (1969).
. The High Court Judge, The Honourable Mr. Justice Etherton, remarked on both the volume of materials submitted and the length of the proceedings: “There were more than sixty lever-arch files [binders] placed before me, for the purposes of the Applications. The hearing before me lasted six days, and undoubtedly would have lasted considerably longer” had defendants’ counsel not had another engagement and if the court had allowed plaintiffs to continue in proving the merits of their conspiracy claims (CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v Stolzenberg, supra at 79).