The opinion of the court was delivered by
The defendants justify the taking of the plaintiff’s sow for which the action is brought, under an execution in favor of the defendant Fairbrother against the plaintiff, the other defendant Taylor being a deputy sheriff and having the execution for collection, It appears that the plaintiff had no other hog at the time of the levy and had not the entire meat of one swine. It is not
The referee reports that a short time before the levy the plaintiff had a sow and pig. That when the defendants went on the 10th of February to make the levy they found the sow but did not find the pig, and on inquiry of the plaintiff he informed them he had killed the pig a few days before. Fairbrother then asked the plaintiff what had become of the meat of the pig, telling him that if he had the meat of the pig on hand that he, Fairbrother, had the right to take, and should take, the sow on his execution. The plaintiff replied that the meat was safe and where they could not get it, and insisted as matter of law that his one live hog was exempt from attachment and levy, no matter how many dead ones he had on hand. At one time during this conversation when Fairbrother was pressing the plaintiff to tell him where the meat of the pig was, the plaintiff replied that it was probably in the pork barrel. After discussing the point of law for some time, each adhering to his own opinion, Fair-brother said to the plaintiff, do you insist upon keeping the meat of the dead hog? for if you do, I shall order the officer to take the sow on the execution. The plaintiff replied, I shall like to see you get it. I’ve got it and shall keep it; but no matter how many dead hogs I have got, you have no right to take the sow.
Now it is evident that the plaintiff had no fraudulent intent to misrepresent the facts for the purpose of misleading the defendants and inducing them to make the levy. He protested throughout against their right to levy, and there is no ground to suppose the
It appears that the plaintiff had let his father have the hams and some other portions of the lean meat to be paid for in kind when his father should kill his pork; that the plaintiff had salted down the part usually salted, the most of which he had still on hand, and that he had consumed in his family most of the lean meat which his father did not have. If the plaintiff is to be estopped, it must be either for not telling the defendants that the plaintiff’s father had a portion of the meat, or for not informing them that he, the plaintiff, had consumed a portion of it in his family. If the right of the plaintiff to hold the live hog exempt from attachment depended on the fact that the plaintiff’s father had a portion of the meat of the pig, there would be some plausibility in the argument that the plaintiff ought to have informed the defendants of the fact in connection with, or as a qualification of his general statements that the meat was probably in the pork barrel; “ I’ve got it and shall keep it.” All the defendants can ask from the plaintiff’s omission to communicate this fact, is to be put in the same condition as if the fact did not exist. But this does not render the live hog attachable, for it appears that aside from what the plaintiff let his father have, he had consumed in his family one-fourth of the meat of the pig. The plaintiff cannot be estopped by reason of the omission of the plaintiff to communicate this latter fact. The defendants might reasonably have presumed the plaintiff had consumed some portions of the pig in his family, and the plaintiff had no reason to suppose the defendants would un
We are unable to see that the plaintiff made any representations that in law or justice estop him from showing the truth.
Judgment of the county court affirmed.
