110 N.Y. 457 | NY | 1888
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *460 We agree with the General Term in the result which it adjudged, and should adopt its opinion but for its discussion of a subject not necessarily involved in the case, and the soundness or unsoundness of which we ought not to determine in the present action. That opinion intimates that the effect of plaintiff's successful re-entry upon a part of the premises leased in fee may be to extinguish the rent upon the remainder. The defendant, however, makes no such claim, but concedes the plaintiff's right to re-enter upon such remainder for rent in arrear, and the whole controversy is simply what amount of such rent should be stated in the judgment, as the basis of a possible redemption. The case, therefore, proceeds upon the assumption that there is rent in arrear which should be stated in the judgment, and that the amount is either the whole unpaid rent, treating the lease as an entirety, or the proportionate share of the sixty acres and of the ten acres, treating the rent as having been apportioned.
These manor leases have been held to create a rent charge rather than a rent service; and while at common law it was said that a rent charge could not be apportioned because it issued out of the whole land, we have held that such an apportionment is possible by the concurring assent or action of both the landlord and the tenant. (Van Rensselaer v. Hays,
But beyond that, the application and operation of the common law has been seriously affected by the statutory provisions for redemption, and those which seem to place it in the power of occupants of separate parcels to compel a severance of the action when the remedy sought is ejectment. It does not here appear that the severance relied upon was by compulsion and against the will of the lessor (Code of Civ. Pro. §§ 1504, 1505, 1507, 1516), and treating it as voluntary and in connection with the actual apportionment made and accepted, we think we are justified in affirming the judgment, without, for the present, going beyond the facts before us.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except PECKHAM, J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed. *463