Lead Opinion
OPINION
delivered the opinion of the court,
We grantéd this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s decision dismissing this lawsuit involving a dispute over the right to use and control church property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This doctrine derives from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of .religious doctrine and practice. We conclude that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply in this lawsuit. Accordingly,
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Church of God in Christ, Incorporated (“COGIC”) is a national not-for-profit religious corporation established on December 12, 1922, under the laws of Tennessee, with its principal business office located in Memphis, COGIC has adopted a hierarchical structure of governance for its member churches.
According to the allegations of the second amended complaint, Gospel Center Temple COGIC (“Temple COGIC”), located át Í6885 Highway 57, Moscow, Fayette County, Tennessee, was founded “many years ago.” At the time of its founding, Temple COGIC “assumed the vows of membership with [COGIC] and declared it[s] willingness to submit to and abide by the government of [COGIC],” including The Official Manual. In return, COGIC issued Temple COGIC “[a] certificate of membership”
L. M. Haley, Jr. founded Temple COG-IC and served as its duly appointed pastor until his death on October 10, 2009. Thereafter the Jurisdictional Bishop for THEJ, Bishop J.O. Patterson, Jr., “declined to name a pastor and temporarily assumed the pastorship of [Temple COGIC],” as
Bishop Patterson died in June 2011, and Bishop David A. Hall thereafter .was appointed Jurisdictional Bishop for THEJ. Like his predecessor, Bishop Hall chose to serve as pastor of Temple COGIC rather than appoint someone else to the position. Unfortunately, not everyone at Temple COGIC was satisfied with Bishop Hall’s decision, and in October 2011, those dissatisfied with the decision sought the advice of a lawyer, also an elder in COGIC, about their options. In a letter included in the record on appeal, this attorney summarized the advice he had given, explaining that the members of Temple COGIC had an “absolute right to vote to move to another [Ecclesiastical] jurisdiction” but cautioned that, “if they [were] to remain in COGIC[,] they must, follow the church’s polity, including accepting the Bishop’s appointment of Pastors.” He explained that, “if they desire[ed] to fellowship with another [Ecclesiastical] jurisdiction [of COGIC], they should present their petition to the General Board requesting a vote of the membership.”
Thereafter, the General Secretary of COGIC received a letter advising that a majority of the members of Temple COG-IC had voted to transfer to another Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction.
However, on December 16, 2011, a corporate charter was filed with, the Tennessee Secretary, of State’s Office creating Gospel, Center. Temple Church Moscow, Inc. (“Moscow Church”). The Moscow Church’s corporate charter listed, its business address as 16885 Highway 57, Moscow, Fayette County, Tennessee, the same address as Temple COGIC. Neither the corporate charter nor any other document in the record on appeal indicates that the Moscow Church was organized as a member church of COGIC. Another Tennessee corporation, L. M. Haley Ministries, Incorporated (“L. M. Haley Ministries”), had been formed previously by the founding pastor of Temple COGIC and had also listed 16885 Highway 57, Moscow, Fayette County, Tennessee, as its .registered office and principal place of business. Nevertheless, according to a September 17, 2000 deed, the grantees for the real property located at this address were Temple COG-IC, Ella Mary Cox, Milton E. Holt, Sr., Lonnie M. Haley, Janice Murphy, John W-Arnett, and Erskine J. Murphy, Trustees for the use and benefit of Temple COGIC [and] its assigns. Neither the Moscow Church nor L. M. Haley Ministries was
Real estate or other property may be acquired by purchase, gift[,] devise, or otherwise, by local churches. Where real or personal property is acquired by deed, the instrument of conveyance shall contain the following clause, to wit;
The said’ property is held in trust for the use and benefit of the members of -thé Church of God in Christ with National Headquarters in the City of Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee, and subject to the Charter, Constitution, Laws and Doctrines of said Church, now in full force and effect, or as they may be hereafter amended, changed or modifies [sic] by the General Assembly of said Church.
This same language is repeated, verbatim, in another part of The Official Manual.
Despite the language of the September 17, 2000 deed' and that of The Official Manual, on December 29, 2011, Barry C. Turner, Erskine J. Murphy, and Milton Holt, Sr., “holding themselves out to be the sole Trustees of [Temple COGIC] executed and recorded a Quit Claim Deed attempting to transfer” the real property located at 16885 Highway 57, Moscow, Fayette County, Tennessee to the Moscow Church. On January 2, 2012, four days after the quit' claim deed was executed, Bishop Hall attempted to hold services at Temple COGIC, but he was barred from entering the premises. A Fayette County Sheriffs Deputy allegedly called in by those associated with the Moscow Church advised Bishop Hall “that he should either leave or be arrested.”
A month later, on February 2, 2012, this lawsuit was filed. Bishop Hall filed the initial complaint, individually and on behalf of :Temple COGIC. After the complaint was amended once, the defense filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that Bishop Hall may have lacked standing to file the lawsuit on his own, but it granted him permission to file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint, from which this appeal arises, was filed on July 29, 2013, by COGIC, Bishop Hall, individually and on behalf of Temple COGIC, and Temple COGIC, by and through its duly appointed trustee, John Arnett (collectively “the Plaintiffs”). Named as defendants in the second amended complaint were: (1) L. M. Haley Ministries; (2) the Moscow Church; (3) L. M. Haley, III, (4) Jeremiah R. Haley; (5) Ulysses C. Polk; (6) Barry C. Turner; (7) Milton Holt, Sr.; and (8) Erskine J. Murphy (collectively “the Defendants”).
In the second amended complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that the. Moscow Church and L. M. Haley Ministries, by and through their directors, had “unlawfully assumed control of [Temple COGIC’s] real property.” As factual support for this assertion, the Plaintiffs alleged that Bishop Hall, Temple COGIC’s duly, appointed pastor and Jurisdictional Bishop, had been barred from entering Temple COGIC on threat of arrest by a Fayette County Sheriffs Deputy. The Plaintiffs also alleged that one of the Defendants, Erskine J. Murphy, had removed church documents from Temple COGIC, including the checkbook and financial records, and that, by doing so, had deprived Bishop Hall of access to materials needed to fulfill his responsibility to administer and supervise Temple COGIC.
In their answers to the second amended complaint, the Defendants denied that Bishop Hall was the lawful pastor of Temple COGIC.
On December 6, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
In a December 6, 2013 memorandum of law opposing the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants, by refusing to comply with the November 23, 2013 Ecclesiastical Council ruling, had forced the Plaintiffs to seek civil remedies “to resolve this impasse over property rights.” The Plaintiffs acknowledged the ecclesiastical abstention .doctrine, but they asserted that it does not apply here because this case involves a church property dispute over which civil courts have jurisdiction, not a dispute about ecclesiastical matters,
On February 3, 2014, the Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, relying on materials previously submitted. The Defendants asserted, despite the decision of the Ecclesiastical Council, that “the gravamen of this' case still requires the [c]ourt to engage in a review of ecclesiastical doctrine and determine who should pastor and manage [Tehple COGIC] simply to control the church’s personal and real property.”
On May 7, 2014, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and alternatively asked the court “to make such findings of fact and conclusions as is proper under the premises.” Defendants apparently did not respond to the motion for summary judgment, or if they did, the response .is not included in the record on appeal.
On June 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a supplement to their original memorandum of law in opposition to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs adopted and incorporated by reference affidavits from: (1) Bishop Hall; (2) COGIC’s General Counsel; and (3) COGIC’s General Secretary, all of which had previously been submitted. In his affidavit, Bishop Hall essentially reiterated the, allegations of the second amended complaint and described the Ecclesiastical Council’s ruling. In his affidavit, COGIC’s General Counsel stated, among other things, that Bishop Hall “was duly appointed as Jurisdictional Bishop of the Tennessee Headquarters Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of [COGIC] of which [Temple COGIC] is a member church.” The General Counsel also stated that, at the time of Bishop Hall’s appointment, no pastor had been appointed' to Temple COGIC, and therefore, Bishop Hall became the pastor of Temple COGIC upon his appointment as Jurisdictional Bishop, pursuant to The Official Manual. The General Counsel stat
On February 18, 2015, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment without a hearing and without requiring the Defendants to respond, explaining that the Plaintiffs had failed to set out “a separate and concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial,” as required by Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. In doing so, the trial court emphasized that its ruling was based on the allegations of the pleadings alone, and that it had not considered any of the other materials the parties had submitted. The trial court explained the basis for its decision to grant the motion to dismiss as follows:
The Court finds that this lawsuit deals with ecclesiastical issues. The Plaintiffs have been very careful to couch their lawsuit and prayer for relief by alleging that this lawsuit concerns property rights. However, this lawsuit is actually about control, and who makes the decision concerning the control of the church and the church funds. These are denominational and ecclesiastical issues. The Court [] does not have jurisdiction to declare the Quit Claim Deed to [the Moscow Church] void or to restructure the deed at the present time because the congregation has not withdrawn from the COGIC denomination.
The Plaintiffs appealed. In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second amended complaint. Church of God in Christ, Inc. et al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc. et al., No. W2015-00509-COA-R3-CV,
The Defendants filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, We granted the' application, and in the order doing sp, directed the parties to brief and argue the following issues, in
1. Whether, in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, [565 U.S. 171 ],132 S.Ct. 694 ,181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), this Court should no longer treat the ecclesiastical' abstention doctrine as a bar to subject matter jurisdiction, and instead should’ treat the doctrine as an affirmative defense which may be raised by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief Can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. If the answer to issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether the record establishes that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, such that [the P]lain-tiffs-have failed'to state a claim 'upon which relief can be granted.
3. If the answer to issue 1 is in the negative, whether this Court should abandon the analytical distinction between facial and factual challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, see Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis,363 S.W.3d 436 , 445-46 (Tenn. 2012); and if so, whether in the absence of that analytical distinction the record establishes that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies and that the trial court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Church of God in Christ, Inc. et al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc. et al., No. W2015-00509-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016) (order granting Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application). To answer the questions presented in this appeal, we must review the principles that courts have developed and applied, albeit not always consistently, to resolve church property disputes.
II. Analysis
A. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine: Subject Matter Jurisdictional Bar or Affirmative Defense?
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, also commonly known as the “church autonomy doctrine,” Redwing,
We asked the parties to brief this question because, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court held that another doctrine derived from the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment—the ministerial exception—constitutes an affirmative defense, not a subject matter jurisdictional bar. Hosanna-Tabor,
Notably, however, the Supreme Court did not address the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Hosanna-Tabor. Although both concepts derive from the First Amendment, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine predates the ministerial exception by almost a century. Compare Watson,
A recent example of . a Tennessee decision applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar is Anderson v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., No. M2004-01066-COA-R9-CV,
No language in Hosanna-Tabor alters the well-established principle stated in Watson that civil courts have no jurisdiction over matters purely ecclesiastical in character. In the absence of any express language overruling Watson, and given that Hosanna-Tabor cites Watson with approval, we decline to interpret Hosanna-Tabor as abrogating Watson’s characterization of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional bar. Hosanna-Tabor,
That being said, however, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine certainly does not apply in every legal dispute involving religious organizations. As this Court explained in Redwing in refusing to dismiss the tort- claims there alleged against the religious organization, “the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not necessarily immunize religious institutions from all claims for damages based on negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. Tennessee’s courts may address these claims, as long as they can do so using neutral principles of law and can refrain from resolving religious disputes and from relying on religious doctrine.”
The same is true of church property disputes. Like the other causes of action identified in Redwing, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not require dismissal of every church property dispute. As the Supreme Court has emphasized:
There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve [disputes about the control and ownership of church property]. The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of property can be determined conclusively,
Jones v. Wolf,
B. Facial Versus Factual Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Before determining whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, however, we must first decide whether the-distinction drawn in prior decisions between facial and factual challenges to subject matter jurisdiction should be aban
In contrast, factual challenges to subject matter jurisdiction do not attack the allegations of the complaint as insufficient. Id. at 543. Rather, a factual challenge admits that the alleged facts, if true, would establish subject matter jurisdiction, but it attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the alleged jurisdictional facts. Redwing,
Having considered the relevant authorities, we decline to abolish the distinction between facial and factual challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. This distinction has been adopted by a majority of state and federal courts, 5B Federal Practice & Procedure Civ. § 1350, and remains helpful in analyzing challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, where it is applied properly.
Unfortunately, the trial court failed to apply it properly in this case. Here, the Defendants raised the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in both a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (1), (6). In dismissing the second amended complaint, the trial court considered only the factual allegations of the pleadings and refused to consider any of the other materials the parties submitted in support of and opposition to the motion. The trial court erred by limiting its consideration to the factual allegations of the complaint, rather than considering all the materials the parties submitted relevant to the assertion that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars resolution of this property dispute. Here, the Defendants mounted a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, and the Plaintiffs attempted to satisfy their burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by submitting materials showing that the alleged ecclesiastical question had already been resolved by the highest judicatory of COGIO. The trial court should have considered all of these materials when ruling on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This analysis applies to motions alleging the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as a jurisdictional bar under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1), as well as to motions • brought under 12.02(6) alleging the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as an affirmative defense. In both circumstances, the trial court should consider all of the materials provided on the subject, and not just the allegations Of the complaint.
We need not remand this matter to the trial court, however, because, even considering the additional party submissions, the material facts are not in dispute.
(7. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine & Church Property Disputes
As already noted, civil courts have general authority to resolve church property disputes and have “an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of property can be determined conclusively.” Jones,
1. Rule of Hierarchical Deference
The Supreme Court announced the rule of hierarchical deference in Watson v. Jones in 1871. For 150 years preceding Watson, the English rule, articulated. in Craigdallie v. Aikman, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820), had been the dominant approach for resolving such church property disputes. See Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 399, 408 (2008) [hereinafter 35 Pepp. L. Rev. at -]; Michael W. McConnell and Luke W. Goodrich, On Resolving Church Property Disputes, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 307, 311 (2016) [hereinafter
In Watson, the Court declined to adopt the English rule as the law in this country. Watson involved a pre-Civil War dispute between antislavery and proslavery factions over control of the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, in Louisville, Kentucky.
The Supreme Court explained why the English rule would not be applied to decide the dispute in Watson, stating;
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.
Id. at 728 (emphasis added). Rather, said the Watson Court,
[r]eligious organizations come before [civil courts in this country] in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.
Id. at 714.
The Supreme Court then categorized religious organizations as either independent congregations or members of a hierarchical church. Id. at 725-26. For independent congregations, the Supreme Court explained, rights of competing factions to the use and possession of church property “must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations,” Id. at 725. If an independent congregation agrees to be governed by majority rule, “then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property.” Id. If an independent congregation vests officers .with the powers of control, “then those who adhere to ..the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property.” Id.
For hierarchical religious organizations, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was “bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control; and is bound by its orders and judgments.” Id. at 726-27. The Supreme Court stressed that,
[t]he right to organize j voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations and officers within the general association,' is unquestioned. All ivho unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied'consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
Watson,
Applying the rule of hierarchical deference, the Supreme Court in Watson deferred to the determination of the highest judicatory of the Presbyterian Church about whieh faction was entitled to the possession and control of the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville. Id. at 734; see also Hosanna-Tabor,
2. Neutral-Principles Approach
For almost a century, the rule of hierarchical deference Watson announced was the only analytical approach to receive the Supreme Court’s imprimatur as acceptable under the First Amendment for resolving church property disputes arising in hierarchical religious organizations.
Responding to this statement, the Georgia Supreme Court early on adopted the neutral principles of law approach. See Jones,
In its Jones decision, the Georgia Supreme Court had applied the neutral-principles approach and had awarded the
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a five-to-four decision, endorsed Georgia’s neutral principles of law approach, “[a]t least in general outline,” as consistent with the constitutionally circumscribed role civil courts play in resolving church property disputes. Id. at 602,
Despite the advantages of the neutral-principles approach, the Jones Court acknowledged that its application would not be “wholly free of difficulty.” Id. at 604.
The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.
On balance, however, the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in application. These problems, in addition, should be gradually eliminated as recognition is given to the obligation of States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions. We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute.
Id. at 604,
The dissent in Jones also argued that compelling civil courts to defer as a faat-ter of constitutional law would ensure that religious freedom is protected from governmental interference in matters of religious doctrine. Id. at 616-17,
At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust’ in favor of 'the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.
Id. at 606,
Although the Jones Court endorsed the neutral-principles approach, it remanded to the Supreme Court of Georgia to determine whether the neutral-principles approach had been constitutionally applied. Id. at 609-10,
any rule of majority representation can always be overcome, under the neutral-principles approach, either by providing, in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, that the identity of the local church is to be established in some other way, or by providing that the church property is held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it. Indeed, the State may adopt any method- of overcoming the' majoritarian presumption, so long as the use of that method does*167 not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.
Id. at 607-08,
In summary then, under the neutral-principles approach, courts decide church property disputes based on the same neutral principles of law applicable to other entities, while deferring to the decisions of religious entities on ecclesiastical and church polity questions. Jones,
3. Current Approaches Adopted by States for Resolving Church Property Disputes
The Supreme Court has not rendered a decision involving a church property dispute since Jones.
Most litigation has arisen in cases, such as this one, where a hierarchical religious organization includes a provision in its constitution and/or other governing documents providing that local church property is held in trust for the hierarchical organization and a local church fails or declines to include the trust provision in deeds or other documents of conveyance.
a. Strict Neutral-Principles Approach
Under the strict approach, courts only give effect to provisions in church constitutions and governing documents of hierarchical religious organizations if the provisions appear in civil legal documents or satisfy the civil law requirements and formalities for imposition of a trust.
b. Hybrid Neutral-Principles Approach
Most states apply the hybrid approach. See
Neither version of the neutral-principles approach dispenses entirely with the principle of hierarchical deference, however. As the Supreme Court explained in Jones, civil courts applying the neutral-principles approach still must “defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”
k. Tennessee’s Approach to Resolving Church Property Disputes
Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court has not addressed a church property dispute since Jones. However, in another context—an appeal involving breach of fiduciary duty and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims against the- Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis—this Court has stated that the neutral-principles approach applies “[w]ith regard to external affairs of religious institutions.” Redwing,
Moreover, the Court of Appeals expressly adopted the neutral-principles approach in an appeal involving a church property dispute four - years before the United States Supreme Court decided Jones. See Fairmount Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Holston of the Presbyterian Church of U.S.,
The Court of Appeals most recently applied the neutral-principles approach in Saint Andrew’s. In that case,'“[a]n'Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to disassociate from the Diocese of Tennessee, resulting in the Diocese to file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the Diocese or the local congregation owned and controlled the real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped.”
Having reviewed prior Tennessee decisions, as well as the relevant precedent from the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, we agree with the Court of Appeals that courts in Tennessee should apply the neutral-principles of law approach when called upon to resolve church property disputes. We also conclude that the hybrid approach is most consistent with the analysis the Supreme Court reviewed and approved as constitutionally permissible in Jones and also most consistent with the analysis courts in this State have ■ previously used when resolving church property disputes. In applying the hybrid approach, Tennessee courts may consider any relevant statutes, the language of the . deeds and any’ other documents of conveyance, charters and articles of incorporation, and any provisions regarding property ownership that may be included in the local or hierarchical church constitutions or governing documents. But under the neutrahprinciples approach that Jones approved as constitutionally perrnis-sible, and which we adopt, a civil court must enforce a trust in favor of the hierarchical church, even if the trust language appears only in the constitution or governing documents of the hierarchical religious organization. See Jones,
5. Application of the Hybrid Neutral-Principles Approach
Having clarified the governing analysis, we now consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s dismissal of this lawsuit. We begin with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that because Temple COGIC had not formally withdrawn from COGIC, this appeal involves only an ecclesiastical question rather than a dispute over church property. We have found no support for this proposition in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court or this Court.
Here, the allegations of the second amended complaint clearly—indeed overwhelmingly—establish the existence of a church property dispute. The second amended complaint alleges that Bishop Hall, the duly appointed pastor of Temple COGIC, was barred from entering the facility and was threatened with arrest by a law enforcement officer should he remain on the premises. Additionally, persons purportedly acting as trustees for Temple COGIC executed a quit claim deed conveying the property to the Moscow Church, an entity not affiliated with COGIC. Thus, a property dispute clearly exists requiring a civil court to determine whether Temple COGIC property was held in trust for COGIC. As in Jones, the deed to the disputed property does not include language creating a trust in favor of COGIC. Rather, the property was conveyed to the trustees of Temple COGIC. Nevertheless, and also like Jones, the governing documents of the hierarchical church, here COGIC,
As in Jones, the second question that must be answered in this appeal is which faction of Temple COGIC constitutes the faction entitled to the possession and use of the property that is held in trust for COGIC. The Defendants argue that this is an ecclesiastical question beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts to decide because it requires a determination of whether Bishop Hall is the duly appointed pastor of Temple COGIC. The Plaintiffs agree that whether Bishop Hall is the duly appointed pastor of Temple COGIC is an ecclesiastical question that civil courts may not answer. However, the Plaintiffs point out that this question has already been resolved by the Ecclesiastical Council’s judgment and that civil courts need only defer to this binding and final judgment of the Ecclesiastical Council when resolving the underlying church -property dispute. We agree with the Plaintiffs.
Again, Jones teaches that a court may constitutionally apply the ’ neutral-principles approach to resolve a property dispute so long as the civil court avoids deciding ecclesiastical matters and defers to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of the hierarchical church. Jones,
In light of our conclusion that Temple COGIC held its real property in trust for COGIC and the Ecclesiastical Council’s determination, to which we must defer, that Bishop Hall was the duly appointed pastor of Temple COGIC, we conclude that the Plaintiffs' are entitled to summary judgment on ■ their claims- regarding the real and personal property of Temple COGIC. Nevertheless, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and for any further proceedings and orders that may be necessary to afford the’ Plaintiffs possession and control of Temple COGIC’s real property, including an order invalidate ing the quit claim deed, if necessary, and any further proceedings that may be necessary to address and resolve the Plain
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed. The Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted. This matter is remanded to the trial court for any further proceedings and orders that may be necessary to fashion appropriate remedies to afford the Plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled under this decision. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Defendants, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Holly Kirby, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Notes
. See Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Middle City Church of God in Christ,
. The second amended complaint, from which this appeal arises, states that "The Official Manual, as amended, is incorporated herein as if set forth in its entirety,” but The Official Manual actually is not included in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, the relevant provisions of The Official Manual are quoted in the second amended complaint. The parties do not dispute the accuracy of these quotations,- and we will accept these quotations as accurate for purposes of this appeal.
. Temple COGIC’s certificate of membership is not included in the record on appeal.
. According to allegations in the second amended complaint, Bishop Patterson exercised this option "because of a conflict between various members of the family of L, M. Haley, Jr., over which of them should be named pastor of [Temple COGIC].” The rationale for Bishop Patterson’s decision is not relevant to the issues in this appeal.
. The second amended complaint alleges that notice of the election was provided only to Temple COGIC members favoring a transfer and that members "who were believed to oppose a transfer were not informed of the election or given an opportunity to vote on the issue. Any dispute regarding these allegations is not relevant to the dispositive issues in this appeal.
. According to the second amended complaint, the quoted text appears in Part I, arti-ele III, section D.9 and is repeated verbatim in Part III, section A.8.
. The Moscow Church, Jeremiah R. Haley, Ulysses C. Polk, Barry C. Turner, Milton Holt, Sr., and Erskine J. Murphy jointly filed an answer by and through counsel on August 13, 2013. L. M. Haley Ministries and Lonnie M. Haley, III, jointly filed an answer through counsel on August 21, 2013.
. On November 14, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court to stay the proceedings until after "an ecclesiastical trial to resolve the issues in the instant case involving property rights, local church leadership, and local church management” By a separate motion, the Plaintiffs asked the trial court to refer the case to mediation. The Defendants filed a response opposing the reference to mediation. If the trial court ruled on these motions, the trial court's rulings are not included in the record on appeal.
.According to the Ecclesiastical Council’s decision, the complainants were Bishop Hall on behalf of COGIC and Temple COGIC, and the respondents were Temple COGIC, Jerry E. Murphy, Joyce A. Murphy, Barry C. Turner, Clementine Turner, Barry D. Turner, Milton Holt, Sr., Annie Holt, Elizabeth Houston-Ar-nett, and Randy Arnett.
. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to 'the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U,S. 296, 303,
. Unlike Justice Kirby; we do not view the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
We also do not share Justice Kirby’s belief that the Supreme Court's citation of Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado,
Because' the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine ultimately does not apply in this property dispute case, our conclusion that the doc
. Were the facts disputed, a remand would be necessary, because this Court’s jurisdiction is appellate only, and "this Court cannot itself find facts.” Davis v. Gulf Ins. Grp.,
. The trial court correctly noted that the Plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the moving party to provide "a separate concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial” along with the motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. While we do not sanction this noncompliance, we will not deny summary judgment on this basis because the record clearly establishes that no material facts are in dispute. See Miller v. Wyatt,
. Because there is no dispute here as to the hierarchical organization of COGIC, we need not discuss further the analysis applicable to independent congregations.
. As already noted, in 2012, the Supreme Court discussed the ministerial exception. See Hosanna-Tabor,
. We note that both this Court and the Court of Appeals have declined to impose trusts in favor of hierarchical religious organizations where deeds conveying disputed property include language clearly vesting control of the disputed property in the local churches, rather than the hierarchical religious organization, and where no language of trust appeared in documents of the hierarchical church. See, e.g., Ward v. Crisp,
. The only support the Court of Appeals provided for its determination that withdrawal was a condition precedent to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction was language used in a prior Court of Appeals’ opinion to state the issue presented in that case. See Church of God in Christ, Inc.,
. The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon an earlier decision involving COGIC as a basis for declining to resolve the property dispute in this appeal. In the prior case, the Court of Appeals also declined to rule, citing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Church of God in Christ, Inc.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring separately.
I am pleased to concur in the well-written majority opinion but write separately bn the question of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction or an affirmative defense.
For now, I concur in'the majority’s conclusion, that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction, because the courts of this State have consistently viewed it as such and the United States Supreme Court did not hold to the contrary in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.,
As explained by the majority, the-ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the ministerial exception both derive from the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Hosanna-Tabor, the ■ United States Supreme Court held that the younger of the two siblings—the ministerial exception—is an affirmative defense, not a subject matter jurisdictional bar. Id. at 195 n.4. The majority surmises that there would be a different result as to the ecclesiastical, abstention doctrine, based on two things. First, the majority appears to interpret Hosanna-Tabor’s holding on the ministerial exception as premised in part on the fact that jurisdiction in that case was based on federal civil rights statutes, as opposed to other 'bases for jurisdiction. Second, the majority appears to read Watson v. Jones,
First, the difference between the basis for jurisdiction in Hosanna-Tabor and the basis for jurisdiction in this case seems to be of no moment. Jurisdiction in Hosanna-Tabor arose from federal civil, rights statutes, while jurisdiction in the instant case is rooted in state courts’ common-law jurisdiction over property disputes. The majority does not explain why this variance would cause the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to be treated differently from the ministerial exception. The state courts’ historic common law jurisdiction over property disputes, •. dating back to English common law, is certainly as solid a basis for jurisdiction as any federal statute. On this issue, I view the differentiation in basis for jurisdiction as a distinction without a difference.
Second, in a case that applies Watson, it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is not a bar to subject matter jurisdiction,
The archbishop interposes here, as he did below, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. He insists that, since the chaplaincy is confessedly a collative one, its property became spiritual property of a perpetual character subject to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical forum, and that thereby every controversy concerning either the right to appointment or the right to the income was removed from the jurisdiction of secular courts. The objection is not sound. The courts have jurisdiction of the parties. For the archbishop is a juristic person amenable to the Philippine courts for the enforcement of any legal right; and the petitioner asserts such a right. There is jurisdiction of the subject-matter; for the petitioner’s claim is, in substance, that he is entitled to the relief sought as the beneficiary of a trUst.
The fact that the property of the chaplaincy was transferred to the spiritual properties of the archbishopric affects not the jurisdiction of the court, but the terms of the trust. Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 , 714, 729,20 L.Ed. 666 . The archbishop’s claim in this respect is that by an implied term of the gift, the property, which was to be held by the church, should be administered in such manner and ■ by such persons as .may be prescribed by the church from time to time. Among the church’s, laws, which are thus claimed to be applicable, are those creating tribunals for the determination of ecclesiastical controversies. Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although1 affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as. conclusive, because the parties in interest, made them so by contract or otherwise.
Id. at 15-16,
The precedential value of Gonzalez is muddied somewhat by the fact that dicta in the Gonzalez opinion, not pertinent to our appeal, was later rejected by the Supreme Court. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
In framing the question of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a subject matter jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense, the majority comments:
Hosanna-Tabor held that the ministerial exception “operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’ ” Hosanna-Tabor,
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor offers little basis for prognosticating that the Court would treat the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine differently from the ministerial exception. Indeed, the footnote in Hosanna-Tabor that holds that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense blurs the line between the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the ministerial exception. One of the cases cited in footnote 4 in Hosanna-Tabor, cited to demonstrate the split of authority among the circuits on whether the ministerial exception is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction, in fact appears to discuss the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Footnote 4 to Hosanna-Tabor cites Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado,
Here, St. Aidan’s Church raised the church autonomy defense on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion would more appropriately be considered as a challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiffs claims under Rule 12(b)(6). If the church autonomy doctrine applies to the statements and materials on which plaintiffs have based their claims, then the plaintiffs have no claim for which relief may be granted.
Id. at 654.
The majority asserts that the United States Supreme Court “has described the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in a manner that suggests it constitutes a subject matter jurisdictional bar, where applicable.” In support, it cites a passage in which
“[Wjhenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.”
Watson,
This sounds like failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thus, true to its name, under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court chooses to “abstain,” or stay its hand, if reaching the merits on a controversy before it would require the court to wade into ecclesiastical matters. Moreover, the majority’s reliance on this language in Watson does not take into account the Supreme Court’s later decision in Gonzalez, which cites Watson. Gonzalez,
For all of these reasons, it is far from clear whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction or whether it is considered an affirmative defense, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For now, however, I will concur in the majority’s decision to continue to view it as a subject matter jurisdictional bar.
. Watson was decided "before judicial recognition of the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the First Amendment against state action.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,