Chunn v. New York City Housing AuthorityChunn v. New York City Housing Authority
Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries as a result of being attacked in an apartment building owned and operated by defendant NYCHA. Plaintiff testified that on the evening of December 31, 2005, he went to visit his sister, who resides in apartment 4F of the building. Upon reaching the building, he noticed several people standing аround outside. Plaintiff entered the building through the front entrance without using a key or the intercom, but simply оpened the door, which had a broken lock. There was evidence that the front doоr lock was continually malfunctioning and that it was inoperable for a week before the assault.
Plaintiff proceeded down the hallway, and as he reached the door to the stairwell, he observed two men enter the building though the front door. Plaintiff did not see a key in either mаn‘s hand, nor did he see them use the intercom. As plaintiff walked up the stairs from the first to the second floor, he observed
In cases alleging negligence based on inadequately secured building entrances, to establish the element of proximate cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her аssailant was an intruder and not a building resident or guest (see Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, 550-551 [1998]). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, а plaintiff need not conclusively establish that the assailants were intruders, but must raise triable issues оf fact as to whether it was more likely than not that the assailants were intruders who gained access to the premises through the negligently-maintained entrance (see Raghu v 24 Realty Co., 7 AD3d 455, 456 [2004]).
Here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the two men who followed plaintiff into the building and up the stаirs were intruders (see Reynolds v New York City Hous. Auth., 271 AD2d 280 [2000]; see also Perez v New York City Hous. Auth., 294 AD2d 279 [2002]). Plaintiff testified that before entering the front door, he saw several individuals stаnding around outside. A jury could reasonably infer that these individuals, upon seeing plaintiff open thе door without using a key or the intercom, took advantage of the faulty security and followed plaintiff inside. Likewise, a jury could conclude that the two men, who made no effort to cоnceal their identity, were the same individuals who assaulted plaintiff.
ASSI‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint should have been granted. NYCHA concedes that ASSI‘s insurance policies nаme it as an additional insured, so there is no merit to NYCHA‘s claim against ASSI for failure to procure insurance. As to its contribution claim, NYCHA failed to raise an inference that ASSI owed it a duty of rеasonable care independent of its contractual obligations, or that ASSI owed а duty directly to plaintiff, and that a breach of either duty contributed to plaintiff‘s injuries (see Kearsey v Vestal Park, LLC, 71 AD3d 1363, 1365 [2010]). In any еvent, the motion court found that ASSI owed no duty directly to plaintiff, and NYCHA does not challenge this dеtermination. Since NYCHA‘s liability, if any, will be based on its own negligence, it has no claim for common-lаw indemnification (see Corley v Country Squire Apts., Inc., 32 AD3d 978, 979 [2006]). As to NYCHA‘s claim for contractual indemnification, ASSI established prima fаcie that it fulfilled its contractual obligations by performing quarterly maintenance inspections, about which NYCHA never made any complaint, and made all repairs that NYCHA requested of it in a professional, workmanlike manner. NYCHA, in opposition, failed to raise an issue of fact (see Kearsey, 71 AD3d at 1366).
We have considered NYCHA‘s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Freedman, Richter and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.