On July 19, 1988, Tоny Chumbley applied for, and began, work at Fairplay Scoreboards (Fairplay) in Des Moines. Fairplay manufactures athletic event scоreboards. On his third night of employment with Fairplay, Chumbley operated a multipurpose press brake for the first time. The machine was manufactured by defendant, Dreis & Erump Manufacturing (Dreis & Erump). Chumbley successfully operated the machine for forty minutes. Then the ram was activated while Chumbleifs left hand was in the point of operation. The machine severed his fingers.
Fairplay was using the machine to put angle bends in sheet metal. The machine works by placing sheet metal in a V-die bed and then descending a ram into the die, thereby bending the metal to the angle of the die.
At the time Fairplay purchased the press brake from Dreis & Erump the ram could be activated, at the option of the operator, by either a foot treadle or an electrical foot pedal. Dreis & Erump offered dual palm controls as an option. Fairplay, however, did not purchase the palm controls. On the date of Chumble/s accident, the machine was equipped with an operator’s cage and hand *193 tools that would have prevented a worker from placing his hand in the point of opеration. Fairplay did not use these safety devices, and Chumbley was not instructed on their use. The machine had no point-of-operation guard оr protection device. Chumbley was not provided any formal safety training, nor was he given a safety manual or directed to the warning sign located on the front of the press brake.
Chumbley brought suit against Dreis & Krump, alleging it was negligent in the design of the press brake. Dreis & Krump contended Chumbley’s injuries were solely causеd by Fairplay and their failure to incorporate safety devices on the press brake, their failure to properly train and supervise Chumbley, and their failure to provide a safe work place. In the alternative, Dreis & Krump contended Chumbley’s injuries were caused by his own negligencе. The matter proceeded to a jury trial.
Over Chumbley’s objection, the court gave a sole proximate cause instruction to the jury. The court instructed the jury if it found Fairplay was the sole proximate cause of Chumbley’s injuries, then it must find Dreis & Krump’s fault, if any, was not a proximate cause of thе injuries.
The jury found Dreis & Krump at fault; however, it also found Dreis & Krump’s fault was not a proximate cause of Chumbley’s injuries. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Dreis & Krump.
Our scope of review is for the correction of errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.
Chumbley appeals, contending the district court erred in giving the following instruction on sole proximate cause to the jury:
The Defendant claims the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages was the conduct of the Plaintiffs emрloyer. Sole proximate cause means the only proximate cause. In order to prove this defense, the Defendant must prove bоth of the following propositions:
1. The conduct of plaintiffs employer occurred.
2. The conduct of plaintiffs employer was the only proximate cause of plaintiffs damages.
If the Defеndant has failed to prove either of these propositions, Defendant has failed to prove the defense of sole proximate cause. If the Defendant has proved both of these propositions, the Defendant has proved the defense of sole proximate cause and you must find that the fault of the Defendant, if any, was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs damages when you answer the special verdicts.
More specifically, Chumbley argues the district court erred in instructing the jury an employer’s negligence can be the sole proximate cause of injury in a products liability action brought by an injured employee against a manufacturer.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated in
Sponsler v. Clarke Electric Cooperative, Inc.:
“The sole proximate cause defensе has long been recognized in Iowa.”
Sponsler v. Clarke Elec. Coop., Inc.,
In
Sponsler
the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against an еlectrical utility company.
Sponsler,
*194 Thе Iowa Supreme Court has established the standards associated with the sole proximate cause defense:
A plaintiff has the burden to prоve the requisite causal connections between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the injury, but when the defendant asserts that a third party’s conduct or an independent event was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the defendant has the burden of proof on the defense. McMaster v. Hutchins,255 Iowa 39 , 43,120 N.W.2d 509 , 511 (1963).
Sponsler,
There can be more than one proximate cause of an injury or damages.
Id.
at 323. However, there can be only one sole proximate cause.
Id.
“Sole proximate cause is not a comparative fault defense because proof of sole proximate cause insulates a defendant from liability. In these circumstances, the fault of a defendant cannot be a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.”
Id.
at 323-24 (citing Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 700.4 & cmt.);
Klein v. City of Keokuk,
Chumbley contends a sole proximate cause defense is inapplicable where the entity alleged to be at fault, Fairplay, is immune from suit under workers compensаtion laws. The Iowa Supreme Court, however, has held: “The defense is available even when a third party alleged to be responsible for thе injury is not joined in the case.”
Sponsler,
The jury instruction given by the district court in the instant case is closely patterned after Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 700.4. Providing a sole proximate cause instruction to the jury is part of the district court’s obligation to instruct the jury on a party’s theory of the case.
Sponsler,
We hold the solе proximate cause instruction correctly states the law and is supported by substantial evidence. The district court did not err in giving this instruction to the jury-
Costs of this appeal are taxed to Chumb-ley.
AFFIRMED.