506 So. 2d 67 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1987
The appellant in this case, Chrysler Credit Corporation (Chrysler), appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss or to transfer venue. We affirm.
Appellee/plaintiff, a resident of Taylor County, Florida, purchased an automobile from Tallahassee Chrysler-Plymouth and financed it through the appellant, Chrysler Credit Corporation. Appellee later transferred the car to a third person, from whom it was eventually repossessed. On July 23, 1985, appellee filed a complaint against Chrysler Credit Corporation and the Credit Bureau of Tallahassee, Inc., in which he alleged that Chrysler reported to the Credit Bureau that it repossessed the car from appellee, and that the Credit Bureau in turn reported this information to other financial institutions, causing damage to appellee’s credit standing in the commu-mty. The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial Circuit, appellee alleging that he was a resident of Taylor County and that the cause of action arose in Taylor County. Ghrysler’s motion to dismiss or to transfer venue was denied, the trial court stating at the hearing that “whether founded in fact or not, the plaintiff did allege that the cause of action occurred in Taylor County.”
We agree with the trial court’s finding and affirm. It is the plaintiffs prerogative to initially select venue in accordance with the applicable venue statute.
. The allegations contained in appellee's complaint appear to state a cause of action pursuant to section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes. According to section 559.77:
A debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of this part in the circuit court of the county in which the alleged violator resides or has his principal place of business or in the county wherein the alleged violation occurred.