23 Vt. 663 | Vt. | 1851
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Upon the trial in the court below, exceptions were taken to the admission of the depositions of Moses True, Jr., and Cyrus Dearborn, upon the ground that the deponents were interested in the event of the suit.
But it is claimed, that the interest of the witness was discharged by the plaintiff’s release, which was attached to the deposition. The release is in due form, and purports to have been executed by the plaintiff, and is broad enough in its terms to divest the interest of the witness. The fact, that the release is attached to the deposition by the witness, would seem to be sufficient evidence, that he had it in his possession at the time of making the deposition; for if subsequently acquired, it could not have been inclosed in it. Indeed, the release being directed to the witness and being in his possession is prima facie evidence, that it was duly delivered. It seems to us, that the only question in relation to the release, about which there could have been any controversy, was, whether it was executed by
This result renders it unnecessary to inquire, whether True was competent to prove the execution of the discharge. The case of Fay et al. v. Green, 1 Aik. 71, would seem to be an authority opposed to his competency.
The objection to the witness Dearborn is also founded upon his supposed interest in the suit. We are unable, however, to discover any disqualifying interest in this witness. He was in no manner connected with or interested in the business transactions of the plaintiff and True. Dearborn was the post master at Salisbury, in whose office the letter containing the money was deppsited by True, to be forwarded by mail. But this, we apprehend, did not render him an incompetent witness. The same objection might with equal propriety be urged to every post master upon the mail route between Salisbury and Waterbury. The letter is shown to have reached the latter office, and Dearborn is in no manner implicated in its loss. We cannot regard him as possessing that certain, direct and immediate interest in the event of the suit, which disqualifies the witness.
The' case shows, that the letter of True to Christy was received at the office of the defendant by due course of the mail; and there is no evidence tending to show, that the defendant delivered the letter to Christy, or to any other person. Indeed, the fact of the reception of the letter by the defendant seems not to have been controverted at the trial, but was treated as a matter, that was satisfactorily established, and doubtless the evidence was sufficient to warrant it.
Exception was taken to the charge given to the jury and the refusal of the court to charge as requested. It appears, that all the requests for particular instructions to the jury were complied with, but the second and sixth. The second required the court to instruct the jury, “ that, in order to establish the fact of want of ordinary diligence, the plaintiff must show some particular act of negligence in relation to the letter, and that the loss was the direct consequence of that particular negligence.” We do not think, the defendant was entitled to the particular charge requested. The declaration charges, in general terms, that the defendant “ carelessly and negligently lost the letter.” Had the plaintiff alleged some particular act of negligence, by which the loss of the letter was occasioned, he doubtless must have proved the particular act of negligence stated in his declaration. But he was not bound so to declare, but was at liberty to declare generally, that the loss was occasioned by the defendant’s carelessness and negligence. And under such a declaration, any general proof of negligence, tending to show, that the loss was occasioned thereby, and which satisfies the jury, that it was so occasioned, is sufficient to sustain the issue for the plaintiff. We are therefore of opinion, that the charge upon this point was unexceptionable.
The sixth request required instructions to be given to the jury, that the post master was not liable for the negligence of his deputies, unless he was guilty of negligence in appointing unsuitable persons.
The judgment of the- county court must therefore be affirmed.