*1 v. Mount intentional.” Lester must be Dist., Ark.
Vernon-Enola (citations (Ark.1996) 540, 542 917 S.W.2d
omitted) (alteration original). We find juror could infer from
that no reasonable waive that Lennox intended to
these facts The entries under
its counterclaim. invoice Balance” column on each
“Account still disputed amount was
showing that the that Lennox continued clearly
due indicate More for that amount. payment
to seek
over, no addition proffered and Jones A/C the coun
al evidence of an intent to waive
terclaim, only on the invoices to relying argu waiver
support theory. their Their a matter of
ment therefore fails as reject court did not err
and the district on this
ing proposed instruction
issue. Conclusion
VIII. Tulsa entered on A/C’s reversed, and of contract claim is
breach remanded to the district court
the case is judgment in favor
with directions to enter judgement on that claim. The
of Lennox is af-
entered on Lennox’s counterclaim in full.
firmed WALK,
Christopher Alan
Plaintiff/Appellant, INC., MACHINERY,
STARKEY
Defendant/Appellee, Clay Company, Third
Continental
Party Defendant.
No. 98-2554. Appeals, States Court of
United
Eighth Circuit. March
Submitted 8, 1999.
Filed June *2 an auger,
then fed into which moves the clay trough down the a vacuum and into clay emerges from tube. When tube, bagged vacuum it is and boxed for shipment. clay After each batch of is fin- ished, the sides of the are cleaned clay complete and excess is removed. To process, disengage this Walk would protective and remove the cover on trough. He would then use a push clay the excess toward vacuum He would engage tube. then scrape clay the residual from between blades. MN, Dyck, Minneapolis, ar- Sharon Van 20, 1996, May pug On (John Goetz, brief), gued C. on the for trough, entangled mill Walk’s hand became Appellant. auger, pulled which his arm into the Paul, Haws, MN, argued, Daniel A. St. person- machine. Co-workers medical Appellee. nel were unable to remove Walk’s arm machinery, necessary from the and was FAGG, LAY, WOLLMAN,1 Before: amputate the arm at the site of the Judges. Circuit accident. WOLLMAN, Judge. Chief against Starkey, Walk filed suit alleging action, diversity Christopher negligence liability and strict upon based appeals Alan district Walk court’s2 unreasonably dangerous condition of grant summary judgment adverse of in his mill. pug granted The district court product liability for personal inju- action Starkey’s summary judgment, motion for workplace ries suffered accident. We holding by that Walk’s claim was barred affirm.
I.
II.
Clay
Walk worked for the Continental
(Continental),
Company
clay
as a
loader or
We review a
summary
of
“mixer.” Continental
vari-
mixes
sells
judgment de novo.
Sperry
See
v. Bauer
types
clay
ous
of
for commercial use.
meister, Inc.,
4 F.3d
Cir.
began working
as a
in August
mixer
1993).
doing,
In so
“[w]e must decide
responsible
1995 and was
for mixing
record,
whether the
when
viewed
twenty
thirty
clay per day.
batches of
light
[Walk],
most favorable to
the non-
A
dry
mixer combines
moving party,
material and wa-
genu
shows that there is no
clay.
ter to form
clay
moist
That
is then
Starkey
ine issue of material fact” and that
by conveyor
carried
belt into the trough
is entitled to
aas matter of law.
mill,3
Bone,
the pug
by
which was
(citing
manufactured
See id.
Cole v.
993 F.2d
(8th Cir.1993)).
Starkey Machinery (Starkey).
clay
When the material
Roger
Judge
1.
L. Wollman
clay-working
became Chief
3.A
mill is a
machine that
Appeals
the United States Court of
for the
clay, shaping
removes the air from
final,
it into a
Eighth
April
Circuit on
pug.
usable
called a
form
AIsop,
The Honorable Donald D.
United
Judge
States District
for the District of Minne-
sota.
Ctr., Inc.,
ty
Training
Patrol
peo
and “reasonable
N.W.2d
undisputed,
are
facts
conclusion,
only
assump
(Minn.Ct.App.1988) (finding
one
that a
ple can draw
law for the
question
primarily
is a
volunteer
assumed the risk
tion of the risk
White-Rodgers
465 choosing
Andren v.
“to encounter a well-known inci-
court.”
roofing;
risk of
slipping
falling
dental
*3
roof’);
review the district
diversity
this
we
v. Tryco
off the
Gilbertson
cf.
Co.,
(8th Cir.1974)
958,
of Minnesota law de
interpretation
court’s
F.2d
Mfg.
492
961
Russell,
Regina College
novo. See Salve
(finding
pre-Springrose assumption
1217,
225, 231, 111
113
499
S.Ct.
U.S.
plaintiff
the risk was not
because
(1991); Kaplon v. Howmedi
L.Ed.2d 190
operate
did not choose to
a fertilizer-
(8th Cir.1996).
ca, Inc.,
263, 266
83 F.3d
spraying
knowledge
machine with full
operation
dangerous).
its
in
is
appeal
The sole issue
that his case
argues
analogous
properly applied
court
whether the district
in which primary assump-
to those cases
primary assumption of the
inappli-
tion of the risk has been held to be
“[P]rimary assumption of the risk
Ostrom,
In
cable.
Peek v.
the Minnesota
his or
when a
manifests
applies
employee
found that an
Court
risk and his or her
acceptance
her
of the
primarily
assume the
he
him
risk when
to look out for
consent ‘to undertake
injured his hand
attempting
clean
and relieve the defendant of
self
Co.,
488,
a running
136
mill-saw. 107 Minn.
120
duty.’”
Ingersoll-Rand
Kraft
(internal
(Minn.1909).
(8th Cir.1998)
584,
1084,
quo
finding
N.W.
1085
In
F.3d
586
omitted).
inapplicable,
doctrine
court
applica
tations
The doctrine is
risky
plaintiffs
experience
stressed
limited
with
inherently
ble to
activities. See
at
(noting
v. W.R. Grace
sawmills. See id.
1084
that the
T.H.S. Northstar Assocs.
Cir.1996).
Co.,
injured
day
on his first
66 F.3d
work,
old,
Thus,
involving
twenty years
of cases
an
and had limit-
“[t]he classes
assumption
experience).
of risk are not
ed work
Because the
implied primary
experience,
v. had such limited
the court
many.”
(quoting Springrose
Id. at 176
Willmore,
Minn.
192 N.W.2d
found that he could not have
(Minn.1971)).
1085;
Kraft,
at
pri
“The elements of
the risk. See id.
see also
(weighing
plain-
are that the
that he
He
gas
knew
could
Unlike
Johnson,
ac-
preciated
experienced.
the risk because he acknowl-
Walk was
He
job
clay plant
in 1983
edged
gas prior
cepted
that he smelled
to the
his first
spent approximately
years
ten
explosion. Finally,
plaintiff voluntarily
clay produc-
accept
by lighting
ciga- working
phases
chose to
the risk
different
rette in the
room when he could tion at the time of the accident. He had
gas-filled
position
current
working
have chosen not to smoke. See id. at 105. been
his
than
months.
he had
Legionville
See also Goodwin v.
more
ten
Safe-
sion,
supervisor
majority
co-workers and
bright
observed his
obliterates the
method,
he stated
use the same
ignored
cautionary
line and has
lan-
that no one had instructed
deposition
guage contained in
law.
Minnesota
him to use this method to clean the
pernicious evil
a precedent
of such
will do
mill. He also stated that he knew this
nothing more than confuse the trial bar of
dangerous,
method was
was told
Minnesota.4
dangerous, and that based upon
recognizes
types
Minnesota law
two
experience he believed that
own
and sec
adequately
be
cleaned with
could
risk —
ondary.
White-Rodgers
Andren v.
disengaged.
465 N.W.2d
104 (Minn.Ct.App.1991).
Moreover,
Walk knew that
Primary assumption of
applies
*4
it
capable
parties
“voluntarily
where the
have
en
Indeed,
injuring him.
he acknowledged
tered a
relationship
which
as
fingers
by
that his
had been nicked
the
well-known,
sumes
incidental
As
risks.
to
auger blades on at least two earlier occa-
risks,
those
duty
the defendant has no
to
sions while he was cleaning
the
and,
protect
thus,
plain
the
if the
running.
Kraft,
while the
In
we
injury
tiffs
an
arises from incidental
stated that
the
belief that
the defendant
negligent”
is not
and the
equipment
pow-
was disconnected from its
plaintiff is barred from recovery. Olson v.
er source
significant
was the most
factor
Hansen,
39, 44,
124,
Minn.
299
216 N.W.2d
making primary assumption
(1974).
127
Primary
Here,
assumption of the
inapplicable.
This court and
group
young
Minnesota courts have
a case where a
adults
that primary assumption
found
attended
races
Brainerd International
(BIR).
Zackoski,
in
apply
did not
situations where the plain Raceway
Rieger v.
(Minn.1982).
races,
performed
tiff had
injury-causing
ac N.W.2d 16
After the
past
tion in the
plaintiff, along
without incident or had
with several of his
First,
seen others do it without incident.
spectators,
jumped
friends and other
Corp.,
Piotrowski v. Southworth Prods.
fence to
the racetrack after the races
enter
appreciate
that the
did not
driving sized
non-racers were
had concluded
at 23.
danger.
the track.
Id.
Id.
around
cars
their
by one of the cars
hit
Plaintiff was
discussed
Although several of the cases
argued
at 19. BIR
injured.
Id.
severely
plaintiffs inexperi-
emphasized the
above
of the risk was
finding primary assumption
ence when
recovery because
to bar
applicable
the fact that Walk was
inapplicable,
entered
the fence and
jumped
not neces-
experienced
this case should
rejected this ar-
court
racetrack. The
sarily
that he
mean
secondary assump-
and found
gument
it.
If
voluntarily chose to undertake
to the
applicable
risk was more
tion of
experience
these
anything, his
facts,
saw others
noting
that the
prop-
it was
would reinforce that
machines
the racetrack.
and enter
jump the fence
they
were
er to clean them while
BIR had
found that
at 23. The court
Id.
and others’ routine
it was his
because
access to the
prevent
its
breached
the task. Further-
performing
method
at 24.
racetrack.
Id.
more,
sufficiently “experi-
one is
whether
summary
In granting
a factual
appreciate
a risk is
enced”
emphasized
court
the district
one;
issue,
issue
best left
legal
not a
danger
could have avoided
belongs
to the trier of fact and as such
criticize
employer did not
because Walk’s
exclusively
jury.
ato
machine
turning
for
off the
employees
its
cases,
it should
light
of these
be
criticize
it:
to clean
“Continental
majority’s application of
obvious that the
turning
power
off the
employees
its
of risk is not faithful
testimony that
There is no
auger....
Furthermore,
appli-
its
to Minnesota law.
Mr.
to clean
employer required
slights the factual
cation of this doctrine
engaged.”
mill
*6
circumstances under which the
Inc.,
Machinery,
No.
Starkey
place
lost his arm.
(order
1998)
(D.Minn.
7,May
96CIV1052
auger
directly
his hand and arm
into the
summary judgment).
granting
not have oc-
blades. This accident would
of Minnesota
Again,
Court
using
scraper,
curred if his
which he was
rejected
fact and
has considered a similar
blades,
caught on the
to clean the
had not
assumption of
application
not a risk that
trough. This was
Ostrom,
In Peek v.
107 Minn.
the risk.
any way appreciate.
or in
anticipate
could
(1909),6the court held
tine, co- daily tasks. supervisor
worker and also cleaned with the blades
machine such, incident. it does not
without As. that Walk released the manufactur-
appear or consented to
er of its entangled by arm having
the risk of the machine with running,
it was as he and others had done
routinely past. Under Minnesota court should have allowed the district to decide whether Walk assumed and, so, if sense apportion fault.
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HOSPITALS CLINICS,
AND Plaintiff-
Appellant, SHALALA,
Donna E. in her Ca Official
pacity Secretary Department as Services,
of Health and Human Defen Appellee.
dant -
No. 97-1943. Appeals, Court of
United States
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Dec.
Filed June rather, dropped scraper got caught into the mill. Walk ar- brief, however, gues in his that his accident groove trough. He maintains that he dropped scraper. did not occur because he appreciate this risk. drop scraper, Walk claims he did not but
