This case presents the question whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment as to the government’s liability for breach of contract solely in order to create a “predicate” for suit to recover damages in the Court of Federal Claims. We hold that district courts do not have such jurisdiction because the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000), to adjudicate breach of contract claims for money damages in excess of $10,000, and Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for such suits in district courts.
Here, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, lacked jurisdiction to issue such a “predicate” judgment, and the “predicate” judgment was void. It follows that the Court of Federal Claims was not bound by this earlier judgment.
On the merits, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment. We agree that the contract between the government and the appellants was unenforceable against the government because of a material breach by the appellants predating the government’s alleged breach.
BACKGROUND
I
The National Housing Act was designed to “assist private industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families and displaced families.” 12 U.S.C. § 17151(a) (2000). It authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to insure mortgages used to construct certain low-income housing.
Id.
§ 17151(b). Owners of such properties were also entitled to certain tax benefits.
See Chancellor Manor v. United States,
The appellants, Christopher Village, L.P. and its managing general partner, Wilshire Investments Corp., owned a federally subsidized low-income housing complex known as Mockingbird Run Apartments (“Mockingbird Run”). Mockingbird Run was built in 1970 with an insured 'mortgage obtained under the National Housing Act, id. §§ 1701-1750g (2000). In accordance with National Housing Act requirements, the appellants entered into a standard regulatory agreement with HUD concerning Mockingbird Run (the “Regulatory Agreement”). The Regulatory Agreement required the appellants to “maintain the mortgaged premises ... in good repair and condition.” Regulatory Agreement ¶ 7 (App. at 2002). See also 24 C.F.R. § 221.530(b) (1995). The agreement authorized HUD to regulate rents. Regulatory Agreement ¶ 4(f) (App. at 2001) (“The rent charged for each unit shall not exceed the upper limit of the range shown for such type of unit on the rental schedule approved in writing by the Commissioner [of HUD] ....”); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1747c (2000) (“[T]he investor shall not charge or collect rents for any dwellings in the project in excess of the appropriate rents therefor as shown in the latest rent schedule approved pursuant to this section.”). According to HUD regulations, HUD-approved rent schedules were meant to “compensate for any increase in ... operating and maintenance costs over which owners have no effective control....” 24 C.F.R. § 886.112(b) (1995). The Regulatory Agreement also stated that the landlord could not increase “the amount of the gross monthly dwelling income for all units ... unless such increase is approved by the Commissioner.” Regulatory Agreement ¶ 2(g) (App. at 2001); see also 24 C.F.R. § 886.112(b) (1995).
The appellants also entered into a Housing Assistance Payment contract (the “HAP Contract”) with HUD pursuant to the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000). (App. at 2100.) That Act authorized HUD to enter into contracts with landlords to subsidize rental payments of tenants living in private, low-income housing.
See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group,
II
By 1995, the physical condition of Mockingbird Run had substantially deteriorated, necessitating approximately $2 million worth of repairs. Finding that the appellants had allowed the complex to deteriorate in violation of the Regulatory Agreement and the HAP Contract, HUD informed the appellants in April of 1995 that their failure to refurbish the property could lead to a default of the Regulatory Agreement and loss of the HAP Contract rent subsidies.
Thereafter, on June 23, 1995, the appellants requested a twenty-nine percent rent increase from HUD, claiming that the current rent revenue was inadequate to cover operating costs as well as maintenance and
*1323
repairs. HUD sent the appellants a letter on August 25, 1995, explaining that the Regulatory Agreement and HAP Contract imposed an absolute obligation on the appellants to maintain the property. The letter did not decide the appellants’ rent increase request, but it instead demanded that the appellants deposit approximately $2 million in escrow to fund Mockingbird Run’s needed repairs. The appellants did not deposit the $2 million. On September 6, 1995, HUD sent the appellants a second letter explaining that it would not entertain the appellants’ request for a rent increase unless they deposited the $2 million in escrow as the August letter demanded. The appellants again refused to pay the $2 million, and on September 14, 1995, HUD informed the appellants that they “had violated ... the Regulatory Agreement by not maintaining the mortgaged premises in good repair and condition [and that] HUD would proceed without further notice to take whatever remedies are appropriate.”
Christopher Vill., L.P. v. Retsinas,
Ill
In October of 1995 the appellants brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against HUD, the Secretary of HUD, and the Director of Multifamily Housing Management of the Houston Area Office of HUD, seeking mandamus, injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2000) (“APA”).
Christopher Vill, L.P. v. Cuomo,
No. Civ. H-95-5005,
The appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. While the case was pending in the Fifth Circuit, HUD sold the property in a foreclosure sale, and it was razed.
Christopher Vill.,
On the merits, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that HUD decisions regarding requests for rent increases were indeed unreviewable under the APA because “Congress committed to HUD full discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a rent increase request.” Id. However, the Fifth Circuit found that both the Regulatory Agreement and HUD’s own regulations required “HUD at least to entertain a rent increase request.” Id. at 316 (citing Regulatory Agreement ¶ 4(g), stating that HUD “will at any time entertain a written request for [a rent] increase” and 24 C.F.R. § 886.312(b), stating that in response to a request for a rent increase, HUD “shall approve a rental schedule ... or shall deny the increase stating the reasons therefor”). The court held that HUD “violated its contractual and regulatory duty to consider the rent request ... [thereby] rendering] suspect HUD’s other actions.” Id. The Fifth Circuit further stated that the appellants’ duty to properly maintain Mockingbird Run “was not absolute” and that the appellants’ “cost of operating and maintaining the property, in addition to the cost of complying with the Regulatory Agreement, must be paid for out of the regulated rental revenues.” Id. at 316-17. Although the Fifth Circuit found that “HUD could understandably refuse to provide financial assistance to an owner that has misappropriated funds, mismanaged the property, taken a profit instead of maintaining the property, or been negligent in its management in some other regard,” the court held that there was no evidence establishing that any of these things had occurred. Id. at 317-18.
The Fifth Circuit accordingly reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. It found that “HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to abide by its legal obligation to consider a rental increase request from a non-negligent owner and instead demanded a $2 million cash infusion and then declared the property in default for those very reasons.” Id. at 319. The court ordered that “[u]pon remand, the district court should issue [the appellants’] requested declaratory judgment.” Id. HUD did not seek further review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Neither, apparently, did the appellants seek a declaratory judgment from the district court as provided by the Fifth Circuit.
IV
On September 21, 1999, the appellants filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract, seeking certification of a class of similarly situated entities. Appellants contended that they were entitled to a finding of liability against HUD as a matter of law because the Fifth Circuit’s ruling barred the government from relitigating the issue of breach of contract under the doctrine of res judicata.
Initially, the Court of Federal Claims denied the appellants’ motion for class certification on October 26, 2001, finding that the appellants did not satisfy the
Quinault
requirements for certification,
see Quinault Allottee Ass’n v. United States,
In 2001, while the damages action was pending in the Court of Federal Claims, criminal litigation regarding a fraudulent insurance scheme related to HUD projects was settled in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. This litigation involved the Management Assistance Group, Inc. (“MAGI”), a company that shared a president and sole shareholder with Wilshire and was a limited partner of Christopher Village. The settlement of this criminal litigation on March 30, 2001, was effectuated through a plea agreement (“the Plea Agreement”). In the Plea Agreement MAGI pled guilty to engaging in an illegal insurance kickback scheme, which involved Mockingbird Run as well as other HUD projects. Although neither Wilshire nor Christopher Village was a party to this Plea Agreement, Wilshire was a party to both the Consent Agreement and the Administrative Agreement, which, while not admitting any wrongdoing by Wilshire, barred future government claims against Wilshire.
HUD required MAGI to procure insurance for its affiliated properties, including Mockingbird Run. MAGI admitted that it required illegal kickbacks from the insurance company that covered its affiliated properties in order to retain its insurance business. The insurance company in turn inflated the true costs of insurance for these HUD-project properties, and it invoiced MAGI’s affiliated properties, including Mockingbird Run, for the kickback costs as well as the actual insurance costs. These inflated insurance charges were then included as an expense item in documentation that the appellants subsequently submitted to HUD in 1992, 1994, and 1995 in order to justify rent increase requests for Mockingbird Run. See generally HUD Housing Handbook: Multifamily Asset Management and Project Servicing, Chapter 7: Processing Budgeted Rent Increases and Fees for Commercial Space & Services in Insured, Direct Loan and Non-Regulated HUD Project (Doc. No. 4350.1), available at http://www.hudclips.org. The appellants also submitted a “Certification as to Purchasing Practices and Reasonableness of Expenses” with each of these requests, in which the appellants certified that “[a]mounts paid to individuals or companies having an identity-of-interest with the owner or the management agent were not excess of the costs that would have been incurred in making arms-length purchases on the open market.” (App. at 2577.) HUD granted the appellants rent increases in 1992 and 1994 for Mockingbird Run.
Subsequent to these events, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the Court of Federal Claims entered summary judgment in favor of the government.
Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States,
The court rejected the appellants’ argument that it was bound by the Fifth Circuit’s decision, reasoning that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel prohibited it from considering the government’s prior breach defense. The court concluded that “res judicata presumes that the first court had jurisdiction over the claim ... [and the] Fifth Circuit clearly recognized that it was up to this court to rule on the contract question.” Id. at 188. The Court of Federal Claims further explained that “[a]l-though collateral estoppel bars the government from challenging HUD’s breach [for failure to consider the appellants’ rent increase request], collateral estoppel does not bar the government from defending that breach based on prior material breach” because the Fifth Circuit did not decide the issue. Id. at 189. On the merits, the court found that the appellants committed a prior material breach that protected the government against liability for HUD’s subsequent assumed breach because the appellants had not provided any evidence to rebut “the fact that Mockingbird Run Apartments were involved in the [MAGI] scheme ... [and] that Wilshire Investments, the general partner in the Christopher Village Limited Partnership, was part of the fraud.” Id. at 187 n. 4. The court concluded that “the fraudulent conduct of MAGI and Wilshire, in connection with the rent requests for the Mockingbird Run Apartments, constitutes a pri- or material breach of the HUD contracts which justifies HUD’s termination of the plaintiffs’ contract for default.” Id. at 190. The court held that this prior material breach excused HUD’s assumed subsequent breach, “even though the U.S. government was not aware of the facts at the time of the foreclosure at issue in this litigation.” Id. at 189. Finally, the court held that there was no settlement bar to the government’s defense of prior material breach. Id. at 191.
Christopher Village and its managing general partner, Wilshire, appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment without deference.
Agwiak v. United States,
I
Appellants argue first that the Fifth Circuit’s decision “is res judicata” and precludes the government from challenging its liability for breach. (Appellants’ Br. at 32.) Appellants therefore contend that the Fifth Circuit’s decision entitles them to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim. We disagree.
Initially, we must determine whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to issue a judgment as a “predicate” to a suit in the Court of Federal Claims.
See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, at 13 (1982);
see also id.
at 19. As we recently reaffirmed in
Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc.,
*1327
In order for a district court to have properly had jurisdiction, the government must have waived sovereign immunity to suit. As the Supreme Court recently noted in
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
The APA waives sovereign immunity for suits to “set aside agency action ... found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2000), when the suit calls for “relief other than money damages,”
id.
§ 702, but only if “there is
no other adequate remedy,” id.
§ 704 (emphasis added). This limits the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity to situations in which “no other adequate remedy” exists.
Bowen,
We held in
Consolidated Edison
that a litigant’s ability to sue the government for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims is an “adequate remedy” that precludes an APA waiver of sovereign immunity in other courts.
Our sister circuits have come to the same conclusion.
See, e.g., Deaf Smith County Grain Processors, Inc. v. Glickman,
The Fifth Circuit itself has repeatedly emphasized the limited nature of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity where there is an adequate remedy in the Court of Federal Claims. For example, in
Warner v. Cox,
[T]he APA does not provide for review under such circumstances. Specifically exempted from review is agency action for which there is some “... other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Suit under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims has been held such an adequate remedy.... Congress’ judgment seems to be that Tucker Act relief is adequate ... and to that judgment we defer.
Id. As such, the Fifth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, stating, “[w]e are in Court of Claims country where we do not belong.” Id. at 1307.
In
Drake v. Panama Canal Commission,
There is no question that the appellants here could have originally sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims to recover for breach of contract. Indeed, that is the very premise of the Fifth Circuit’s “predicate” decision. Under these circumstances we must conclude that the Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the action for declaratory judgment because the APA did not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity for such a suit in district courts.
II
However, the fact that a court did not have jurisdiction over a suit in which it issued a decision does not automatically strip that decision of preclusive effect. In most circumstances a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that the original tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction, even if the is
*1330
sue of subject matter jurisdiction has not been litigated in the first action.
See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
Kalb v. Feuerstein,
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that “considerations as to whether the issue of jurisdiction was actually contested in the County Court, or whether it could have been contested, are not applicable.”
Id.
at 444,
The Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judi *1332 cial power is void. The failure of officials to seek review cannot give force to this exercise of judicial power. Public policy forbids suit unless consent is given, as clearly as public policy makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of the legislative body.
Id.
In
Durfee v. Duke,
Ill
Respect for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is no less important than respect for the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in Kalb or that of the Indian Territory courts in Fidelity & Guaranty. The history of the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction over suits under the Tucker Act emphasizes the importance that Congress ascribed to the exclusive nature of that jurisdiction. In 1887, Congress amended the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction to include “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). This provision has come to be known as the Tucker Act. 4 The 1887 Act also included a provision known as the Little Tucker Act that gave district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims over, suits against the government in certain instances. 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)). 5 As the Supreme Court has held, the obvious implication of these acts is that Congress intended the Court of Federal Claims to have
exclusive jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States for money damages exceeding $10,000 that is founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or *1333 any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages, in cases not sounding in tort ... unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.
See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel,
In the light of this history, we see no basis for distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Kalb
or
Fidelity & Guaranty.
Although we are reluctant to conclude that one of our sister circuits has acted beyond its jurisdiction, we find that it plainly did so here. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling, like the ones at issue in
Kalb
and
Fidelity & Guaranty,
did not merely exceed the court’s jurisdiction, it “directly implicated] issues of sovereign immunity” and is therefore void.
See Int’l Air Response,
IV '
We turn now to the question whether the Court of Federal Claims correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the government on the appellants’ contract claim. The Court of Federal Claims correctly declined to afford res judicata effect to the Fifth Circuit’s decision, but it erred in ascribing collateral estoppel effect to the contract issues decided by the Fifth Circuit. Those issues should have been decided de novo by the Court of Federal Claims. However, while we doubt the correctness of the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the government breached in refusing to consider the appellants’ rent increase request, we are reluctant to address the question of the government’s breach on the current record. The government did not move for summary judgment on that ground.
See Christopher Vill.,
When “a party to a contract ... is sued for its breach [it] may ordinarily defend on the ground that there existed, at the time [of the breach], a legal excuse for nonperformance....”
Coll. Point Boat Corp. v. United States,
The appellants urge that MAGI’s Plea Agreement cannot establish a prior material breach by the appellants because neither Christopher Village nor its general partner Wilshire was a party to the Plea Agreement; because the government has not established that the appellants intended to defraud HUD when they submitted inflated rent requests; because any breach that the appellants may have committed through these false submissions was immaterial; and because, even if these false submissions constituted a material breach by the appellants, the government was unaware of them at the time HUD breached.
We think that the documentation submitted by the government on its motion for summary judgment did not support the Court of Federal Claims’ finding “that Wil-shire Investments, the general partner in the Christopher Village Limited Partnership, was part of the [MAGI] fraud.”
Christopher Vill,
*1335 While the government has not established that Christopher Village and Wil-shire specifically intended to defraud HUD, proof of fraudulent intent by Wil-shire or Christopher Village is not necessary to establish the appellants’ breach in this case. The appellants’ contrary contentions are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the government’s prior material breach defense. The appellants claim that the plaintiffs intent to defraud must be proven under 28 U.S.C. § 2514, a statute providing that a plaintiffs fraud can cause a forfeiture of its claim against the government. 8 This statute, however, is not the basis for the government’s argument, and the government never mentioned the statute in its brief. The Court of Federal Claims did not hold, and the government did not urge, that the appellants’ inflated rent requests caused the appellants to forfeit their breach of contract claim against the government. Rather, the question is whether as a matter of contract law the government can defend against a subsequent breach by pointing to the appellants’ prior breach.
The contract law question is whether the appellants’ established arid uncontro-verted breach was sufficiently material so as to justify the government’s subsequent breach. The appellants correctly cite our decision in
Thomas v. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
At the outset, we note that our case law holds that any degree of fraud is material as a matter of law.
Joseph Morton Co., Inc. v. United States,
Although the appellants may not themselves have participated in the fraud *1336 on HUD, .their false submissions were unarguably a function of MAGI’s fraud, and MAGI and the appellants were commonly controlled. It was uncontested at summary judgment in the Court of Federal Claims that MAGI and Wilshire had the same president, the same sole director, and the same sole shareholder. (Defendant’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, No. 99-775C (Fed.Cl.) (citing, among other things, the appellants’ 1992, 1993, and 1995 rent increase requests, which listed MAGI as a limited partner of Christopher Village).) We think that the submission of false data generated by companies under common control with the contractor constitutes a material breach as a matter of law at least when the commonly controlled company generated those data in a conscious effort to defraud the government.
Case law regarding the materiality requirement under the False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000), is instructive in this respect. This Act imposes a criminal penalty on “whoever ... knowingly or willfully ... makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations” to a government agency.
Id.
Courts are generally in agreement that the Act only imposes liability for material misstatements, and that “[t]he test of the materiality of a statement is whether a statement has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.”
United States v. DiFonzo,
The appellants also contend that the MAGI illegal kickback scheme cannot form the basis of a prior material breach by the appellants because the government was unaware of this scheme at the time of HUD’s alleged breach. Our precedent, however, clearly supports the Court of Federal Claims’ finding that the appellants’ prior breach excused HUD’s subsequent breach “even though the U.S. government was not aware of the facts at the time of the foreclosure at issue in this
*1337
litigation.”
Christopher Vill.,
V
Finally, the appellants argue that even assuming that the MAGI illegal kickback scheme constituted a material breach on their part, two other agreements that were part of the MAGI settlement prohibit the government from relying on that breach as a defense in the present litigation. While Wilshire was not a party to the Plea Agreement, it was a party to the Administrative Agreement and the Consent Judgment, executed at the same time. In support of this contention, the appellants urge that both agreements bar the government’s defense. The appellants point to the provision of the Administrative Agreement that states, “HUD will not seek civil money penalties ... for any conduct alleged as the basis for liability in the civil or criminal action, for the financial defaults resulting in the foreclosure of HUD properties prior to the date of this Agreement.” (App. at 253.) The appellants also highlight the provision of the Consent Judgment that states that the Government agreed to “release All Defendants from any administrative monetary or civil monetary claim that the United States or HUD has or may have under ... any ... statute[s] or common law theories creating causes of action for civil damages or civil penalties for submitting or causing to be submitted claims to the government, for the Covered Conduct.” (App. at 234-35.) We disagree. The Court of Federal Claims properly held:
[Wjhile the United States agreed to forego taking any further affirmative enforcement actions — to either seek further penalties or to continue to press affirmative suits — against Wilshire, the Global Settlement says nothing regarding the government’s ability to defend itself from claims levied by parties involved in the action.
Christopher Vill.,
We conclude that the Court of Federal Claims correctly decided that the appellants engaged in a material breach of the Regulatory Agreement and the HAP Contract prior to HUD’s assumed breach. We also agree that the Court of Federal Claims correctly decided that this breach barred the appellants from recovering on the government’s breach of contract.
VI
Finally, there is the question whether the Court of Federal Claims properly denied class certification. As we held in
Greenbrier v. United States,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment in favor of the government.
AFFIRMED.
COSTS
No costs-
Notes
. These factors include: (1) whether the class is large but manageable; (2) whether there is a question of law common to the whole class; (3) whether the common question of law predominates over individual questions of fact; (4) whether the plaintiffs claim is typical of those claimed by the class; (5) whether the government’s action is generally applicable to
*1325
the class; (6) whether the claims of the class members are too small to be pursued individually; (7) whether the plaintiff will adequately represent the class; and (8) whether individual actions would create the risk of varying adjudications.
Christopher Vill.,
. In
Consolidated Edison,
we explained that this conclusion was consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Bowen.
In
Bowen,
the Court held that the Court of Federal Claims does not always present an "adequate remedy” to defeat APA jurisdiction in suits for monetary relief, reasoning that it was "not willing to assume, categorically, that a naked money judgment against the United States will always be an adequate substitute for prospective relief....”
. A similar automatic stay provision exists in the current Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
. When asked to clarify the purpose of this grant of exclusive jurisdiction, to the Court of Federal Claims, Congressman J.R. Tucker, the namesake of the act, explained that ''[u]pon full consideration by the committee it was thought that where a claim exceeded $10,000 it would be better and safer for the Government it should be where the head of the Department may be present to protect the Government.” 49 Cong. Rec. 624 (1887).
. The Little Tucker Act reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of ... [a]ny ... civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort....
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
. To be sure, jurisdiction is only exclusive if the Court of Federal Claims can . award full relief. The jurisdiction is not exclusive where " § 702 of the APA is construed to authorize a district court to grant monetary relief” as part of broader relief, and the "purely monetary aspects of the case could have been decided . in the Claims Court.”
Bowen,
. The Court of Federal Claims also properly held:
*1335 The undisputed facts establish that [the appellants] violated the following Regulatory Agreement provisions: (1) the prohibition on disbursement of project funds for anything other than "reasonable operating expenses and necessary repairs”; and (2) the requirement that "payment for services, supplies, or materials shall not exceed the amount ordinarily paid for such services, supplies or materials in the area where the services are rendered.” In addition, these illegally-inflated insurance charges violated the [appellants'] HAP contract, which required justifications of the reasonableness ... of those expenses.
Christopher
Vill.,
. The statute reads:
A claim against the United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance thereof.
In' such cases the United States Court of Federal Claims shall specifically find’ such fraud or attempt and render judgment of forfeiture.
28 U.S.C. § 2514 (2000).
. The appellants contend that MAGI's illegal scheme cost Christopher Village, and in turn HUD, "roughly $1,500 per year.” (Appellants' Br. at 47.) The government, however, challenges this, arguing that the appellants cite "no evidence” for the $1,500 figure. (Br. of Def.-Appellee at 42).