*1 deliberately failed rules, have interpretation of the ous delays occasioned language. Previous plain comply with their postpon- already resulted by disputes had over the record in- year, and it was hearing appeal for over ing on the diligence to reasonable upon appellants to exercise cumbent delays. avoid additional Appeal therefore, District Court of appears,
It denying ap- well within its discretion acted the limits of open- pellants failing to file their relief their default ing brief on time.
Every reviewing court, court, particular every and in bears heavy handling responsibility prompt and efficient discharge only if business, responsibility its and it can permitted it is its a reasonable discretion and control over designed Appeal affairs. The new Rules on to secure speedy (see 53(a)) determination appeals rule and to that appellate end each given supervisory power court is over the procedural steps taking appeals. Supreme Court should not undertake to reexamine the various considerations that enter discretionary into the grant determination to deny relief from default. appellate courts cannot suc- cessfully carry out their duties such determinations are subject independent to an review reconsideration Supreme Court. A. No. 19081. In Bank.
[L. June 1945.] CHARLES E. CHRISTOPHER, Petitioner, THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
J. Simpson E. for Petitioner.
Henry F. Respondent. Prince for THE proceeding COURT. This isa to review the recom- mendation of the Board of Governors of the State Bar that petitioner be from the practice of the law for the period of six months. petitioner was admitted to the bar of this state on 18,
March 1927. From January, 1935, 1943, to January 5, he peace of San Gabriel Township in Los Angeles County. May 26, On 1943, he received a notice to show why cause he disciplined should not be unprofes- for sional conduct in attorney that he acted as plaintiff in an action filed on July 7, justice’s 1939, court San Gabriel Township and prosecuted thereafter the action to judgment aat time when he prohibited by section 171 the Code of Civil Procedure from practicing court; law that petitioner and that the conduct of the premises involved moral turpitude. petitioner had theretofore acted as for
Linda Sandoval and and had others received from them payable promissory note to himself on $85 account of legal except services unpaid rendered. The note as to assigned $10. The the note to his Acting wife. as prepared en- complaint to be attorney he caused a wife’s al., in Christopher titled Linda Sandoval et Winnie W. interest, sought $75 which it was to recover the sum with signed the com- $20 costs fees. The filed be plaint attorney for and caused plaintiff 1939, August justice’s 2, On July 7, on 1939. said defendants he an the default of the caused order to enter plaintiff judgment in favor of the be filed and to be entered in the com- demanded the defendants the sums secretary plaint. day the same he notarized the oath of On plain- attorney for the August 25,1939, cost bill. On in the tiff, judgment to be recorded he an abstract of caused 15, county. On March county office of the recorder of said ceased to months after he had two and one-half about re- township personally be a said issued prepared quested that a writ of execution attorney’s fee, and $107.99, including $20 the total sum of directed that the writ be executed.
In response notice cause the filed show answer which he did deny the commencement prosecution of the action as outlined in the notice *3 to show cause but denied steps that those had been taken “knowingly willingly” alleged and charged; affirma- tively (1) signed that he complaint plaintiff and as a notary public took and subscribed to complaint oath verifying through wife in inadver- tence and steps leading that the other including entry during were taken his absence on vaca- tion knowledge; (2) and without his that the notice show which, cause did not state true, facts if would involve moral (3) alleged that if the turpitude; facts constituted offense against justice kind it would be an offense his officeas peace, The that of California was with- jurisdiction against petitioner out over the acts committed office; that (4) that in 1939 the district of Los Angeles County presented alleged in all of the facts the notice grand jury to show cause of that county duty whose investigate public including justices was to offenses of officials appeared peace, of the the result that the be- petitioner with body. fore, by, but no action taken was petitioner appeared hearing The at the before the local jurisdictional by point, presented committee. once proceeding him, sustained a vote of to one. was two was certified to the Board There- of Governors for dismissal. after the jurisdiction hoard in decided favor of and referred hearing matter to the local committee for a and recom- mendation in hearing due in Novem- course. After a full held ber, 1943, the local found had petitioner committee that the inadvertence, alleged committed through the acts as and not turpitude but failed to find involved. It rec- public findings ommended a reproval. adopted The board of the local con- and in addition concluded that the committee charged place duct and found to have taken involved moral turpitude meaning the State within of section peti- Bar Act, and recommended to this court period tioner be for a of six months. questions
On review three 1. are involved: Did The State against disciplinary proceedings Bar have to take findings ? supported by ? 2. Are the evidence charged and 3. Do the acts and found to have been committed disciplinary cause action? constitute question On the first his con reiterates charges, true, tention that the constituted offenses justice peace, his office of and not offenses of the law. Section 171 of the Code of Civil provides: Procedure “No justice, judge of a court of . practice record . . shall law any court of this state . . office; . his continuance in any justice nor shall peace practice jus- law before tice’s court county which he resides.” As a member of the bar the petitioner had prac- tice law all of the courts of this excep- state with the sole provided tion is, that he could practice in any justice’s Angeles court in County Los while he awas peace county. During the time practicing lawyer thát he both a and a acting dual capacity corresponding with and re- ciprocal obligations to the profession. courts and the He was just as much controlled section 171 in *4 he curtailed professional law as was in his jus- activities as a general peace. tice of the As a law of this state section 171 meaning has the same provided and effect as it “no attorney practice justice’s at law shall law in any court in county justice he resides while he a peace which is of the ’’ county. Practice of the law in violation of that sec- against an law, tion is of the and offense an proceedings disciplinary offending subject to attorney so though it Bar Act even through the medium State against the offend also might thereby he be said that would a is determined justice peace. office When been activities relating professional law of the to his state by review should law, violated an court on be- consequences of his act him astute to from the relieve an penalty some other might cause forsooth he suffer permitted judicial office; nor should he be offense his consequences from judicial use his officeto shield at law. delinquency state, The laws both statutory, constitutional and unremitting have been in an safeguard endeavor to ad- ministration of from apparent both actual and the conflict of practitioner. interest between court and Justices judges and prohibited practicing of courts record are from law state section 18 of article VI of the They Constitution. from membership excluded in The State Bar Act. Justices peace prohibited certain cities are practicing law “in or out of court” their (Code continuance office. Proc., 103g.) Civ. Notwithstanding right peti- § tioner to law practice during his office, continuance in he was injunction bound to the statutory observe practice be- any justice’s fore court in county which resided. In he practice the conduct of his was his duty support “to ’’ Constitution law of and the United States State, and of this respect justice” “to maintain due to the courts (State Bar Act, (a) (b)). subds. § Section 171 was binding on the both as a lawyer. By as a violating that statute he nurturing conflict interest the fundamental statutory law prohibited. practice Since continued, processes remained amenable of The State Bar. seeks to sustain his juris- contention on the point on Hardy dictional reliance (State case Bar v. Superior P. Court, 432]). Cal. 323 That case can sought be of no to him. assistance There State Bar judge prosecute count, proceedings superior record, alleged contrary court of of the law obligation legal to his as a profession. member of This The State Bar court held that was without to so *5 prac- proceed for the the accused to reason that the provision tice law was constitutional under a member continuance in that as he was not officeand disciplinary The amenable to its State he was not processes. the
The of the offense was therefore within the decision of accusatory powers Bar, of The State and the point correct. Board Governors on the was sufficiency of the evidence question On the Board support and of the findings the the local committee sup that the evidence petitioner of Governors the contends he was did not know what ports only the conclusion that he plain doing signed complaint attorney for the when he the as as appended thereto, and tiff, the verification of his wife signed by inadver notary bill; they were so on the cost litigation subsequent steps in the tence, and that the support knowledge. record does taken without the contention. secretary petitioner’s legal
Miss Ellen Neilan C. was the February, 1937, April, 1942, assis- when she became tant clerk justice’s Township court of San Gabriel later, in November, occupied 1942, clerk, position she the hearings time the in proceedings before The Bar. June, 1939, She testified that in the latter part of petitioner request handed her promissory note with the prepare complaint that she based name of thereon Christopher Mrs. plaintiff as her file and instructed justice’s complaint court. Before prepared she was had a in which petitioner conversation with she called brought his attention the fact could not be that the action municipal Angeles de- parties court of Los because the fendant were Township. residents of San Gabriel She testi- fied that she had no recollection of a conversation told, by she petitioner, claimed to file com- as plaint justice’s his name court. Christopher and her complaint Mrs. verified notary public.
oath was subscribed to complaint proceed- copy A an exhibit certified that he ing. contention of the support he re- signed by inadvertence complaint and verification it was her cus- Miss Neilan that lies on fact as testified appro- signature on the ready clip pages tom to back for his did not notice that he priate page, and his statement own stated verifying signature. that he was Miss Neilan his wife’s did she not remember whether she followed this Christopher occasion, on that but that she recalled that Mrs. Christopher signed on her desk and that Mr. verification note, signed there at the time and the endorsement on complaint plaintiff, and the verifica- notary; July 1939, tion as a left about *6 complaint July 7th; the on month’s vacation and she filed signed peti- in that custom the accordance with her usual she judgment; the that tioner’s name to the order to enter default signed costs, she which her own name to the memorandum of August petitioner prior the on his return 2nd. notarized judgment The default cost filed was entered the bill was August 2, prepared on 1939. testified that she the writ She March, 1943, of execution it in when she was clerk and issued petitioner. court, request the of the personal at The petitioner testified that he instructed Neilan Miss commence on suit the Christopher’s note in Mrs. name in the municipal court in Angeles; Los that the following con- concerning versation the impropriety filing complaint the in the municipal he jus- court instructed her to file it in the tice’s court in his own name. signature on He admitted his complaint as attorney plaintiff, on another page his signature public as notary on the affidavit of veri- signed by fication signed his wife. He he stated that the com- plaint and verification there, affidavit when his wife was but that he had no distinct signing recollection of the same because it the practice papers was secretary prepare his signature and stack requiring those his on folded his desk only signature back and clipped page so that appeared; case; that was in followed he and that did complaint not observe time that the was entitled in the plaintiff; name of thereupon departed his wife as that he on July, during vacation for the month of which time another justice of county in in the San sat Gabriel Town- complaint signed ship that after a court; prac- was was in through tice his officefor his to follow the secretary matter cases; signature notary public appeared default that on the memorandum of costs disbursements filed after his return from but that did vacation, not notice at that time involved; action that the what was endorsement to his wife on side of the note not cancelled the reverse was because that question attention; the first never came to that time he
had notice the facts when the matter came before the was grand jury 1939, following in October, no proceedings body. inquisitorial taken him by were finding The local committee “it made a true promissory on at the time suit filed said note Christopher through filed W. inad- name Winnie complaint vertence, filed said but that said named plaintiff the name of therein with the full knowl- Similarly the edge found petitioner. of” the committee causing filed the order the acts of judgment including attorney fees, enter $20 default including memorandum of and disbursements $1.00 costs performed petitioner, notarial as fees for services through inadvertence with the full knowledge not done but Likewise as to the abstract petitioner. August 25, 1939, for record filed on committee found that were not inadvertent the acts but were with knowledge. his full
It is obvious Board of the local committee and light Governors evidence believed record testimony testimony of Neilan Miss and refused to believe the questions An exam- on involved. the vital transcript proceeding ination and the exhibits *7 supports the- that is a basis for conclusion there sound testimony petitioner. according full credit the of transac- The that at the time admitted provisions in of sec- question he familiar with the tions and that he 171 of the of Procedure knew tion Code Civil any- on of appear behalf improper for him to as His claimed inadver- in filed in his own court. one an action plaintiff, complaint attorney for signing as in tence notarizing his notarizing particularly the cost bill and negatived complaint persuasively of is verification wife’s complaint exhibits. The shows by an examination immediately above plaintiff as signed it he showing relationship. His wife typewritten words signature petitioner’s is almost verification. The signed the signature his wife. very near the of immediately opposite arising implications from his action as from other Aside credulity is taxed place, claims it took as he notary public, notary signed he that when breaking point to believe of his taking the verification he was not know did he custom the asserted make circumstances facts wife. of inad- pages support his claim clipping back dubious He vertence. admitted that when he obtained the writ surrounding in March, 1943, execution he all of the facts knew grand jury investigation. personally he obtained Since say that writ he should not be heard that he did not know attorney’s specifically item of fees was included not, through therein. if it Even be assumed that he did in- appreciate advertence, attorney’s that the item of fees was sought allegations by the prayer complaint, knowledge he cannot avoid of the inclusion item in of that the writ of execution. Since he must have known such inclusion, he likewise must have known he was not en- titled an attorney’s if prosecuting fee he was the action plaintiff. name own if Certain it is that he believed that the action had been prosecuted name, his own should steps have taken judgment to relieve his clients, former case, debtors in unjust from the payment exaction of an attorney’s steps. unauthorized fee. He took no such It must therefore be concluded that the evidence is sufficient findings support local committee and Board improper, and that it would be Governors under all of the case, court, exercising super- circumstances of the for this its visory powers matters, state bar to find contrary to those findings. On point the final contends that
facts not, as found would if true, turpitude disclose moral on part. presence of moral turpitude justify sufficient to suspension disbarment or may be disclosed varying under circumstances. example, For an attorney convicted of felony involving or misdemeanor turpitude the record him.. conviction is conclusive a.final (State Act, 6101.) Bar The commission § of an act moral turpitude, dishonesty corruption, whether committed the course of his relations as attorney or otherwise, is suf suspension ficient cause for (State disbarment. Act, 6106; Bar, Jacobs § Cal. 401].) P.2d of. provisions undoubtedly Such included in the State Bar *8 Act it because was realized that the acts of attorney an 1'aw, violation of aside from breach of duty his as an attorney, might upon reflect his integrity and fitness as an require suspension attorney and his or disbarment. But prescribing an the duties of imposing penalties and thereof, for a not breach was considered that moral tur- 672
pitude, as a dishonesty corruption discovered should be - separate pro- itWhen was and distinct element of the act. vided in Bar Act that . section of the State . such by him, violation duties as of the oath taken or of suspension,” attorney, disbarment or constitute causes for support dis- a such violation to be deemed sufficient was dealing case ciplinary We not here with the proceeding. applying public a law a violation of traffic or other attor- of an general no relation to duties and which specially ney. one law violated adherence faithful his observance and directed to for attorney, violation of an justice peace and as as a bring into courts and would tend to a does say the violation such disrepute. To naught a discipline be to set at grounds for constitute would safeguard pub- designed legislative salutary enactment relationships. professional lic as well as the prac- knowingly be held that the Since it must governing duties a statute in violation ticed law duty respect a breach of his lawyer his conduct main- and laws of this state and to Constitution support the Act, (State Bar courts of respect tain due to the oath of violation of It also a §6068(a) (b)). 6067 of the Act. attorney prescribed by section discipline pur- for cause therefore constituted conduct Such act. suant Board of the recommendation with accordance prac- suspended from the hereby is Governors, com- period of six months in this state the law tice of filing after the date days mencing thirty opinion. CARTER, majority opinion J. I dissent. The in this case disregards evades material issues pertinent authori- disposition ties which should control the of the case. While giving lip Hardy (State service the so-called case Bar v. Superior Court, 432]), P. utterly Cal. disre- gards holding that case and emasculates doctrine therein even enunciated. It fails to mention the numerous cases which violation relating hold that a of a statute to the duties of judicial an offense legal profession office of law. attempt It suggest any does not to differentiate or basis
673 the peace of the of justice by a distinction between a violation and a Procedure provisions of section 170 of the Civil of Code fails that It provisions code. violation of section of acts in- holding suggest petitioner’s basis for its any to turpitude. volved in vio- justice peace my opinion of a of
In the offense Procedure, proven, if lating 171 of Code of Civil subject him may in officeas would amount such misconduct to by law. It is provided manner to removal from office majority places peril him in now held it also proceedings eligibility practice his may destroy his to profession membership in The State or remove him from his disqualification accomplish by indirection Bar and thus hold, hence, necessarily, from officefor which his removal Legislature direct, exclusive, up mode of has set a not procedure. (Pen. seq.) justice peace A Code, 758 et § (Code law. Civ. township a Class A must be an Proc., 159a.) § Superior Court, State Bar v. P. 432], Cal.
sought distinguished to be majority opinion, attention dangerous directed foregoing to the and untoward conse- quences. It was there held that The State Bar was without proceed against judge a superior the reason that judge of such law was suspended during his continuance office. In course ‘ opinion this court stated: ‘There would seem to exist many reasons, public why rooted in policy, public and, this may said, well powerful be corporation, considering its membership and the relation thereof to the administration of justice through judicial government arm the state should lightly not be power held to be invested with the and author- ity judicial over sought officerswhich in the instant case it has to exercise.” Notwithstanding declaration, I disposed am to hold justice inasmuch peace may act capacity lawyer of a with may certain restrictions it be desir- able that The State Bar be completely regulatory shorn of powers over However, him. I agree majority, cannot with the that this court should not be astute heed demarcation between an offense against judicial committed office one may committed of an system at law. In our government, independence the judiciary is fundamental. It is essential all courts judges who appointed or elected to. administer the law protection of it under the permitted
should be administer freely, favor fear. law, independently and without any district, ridding proper people method municipal officer, of- county, for misconduct township, or seq. A the Penal Code. fice set forth in 758 et sections protection similar is in need of disciplinary proceeding judge hence, justice, other should I us, peace come before do incumbent from consid- instant decision want to be foreclosed *10 holding in propriety ering applicability and Superior Court, regulatory supra, case Bar that the of State v. deemed power justice Bar a of be The State over practice suspended, least, extent that to the charged against Thus, suspended. if what is has been it would not be a matter for suspension, is a violation his qualifica- the matter Bar leave action, State but would manner provided tion to be determined to hold office by law. logical sequence a jurisdictions as
In some
it is held
disciplined,
lawyer,
judge
a
rule that
cannot be
a
misconduct,
can
acts
that such
his tenure of officebecause
proceedings afterwards.
disbarment
not be made the basis of
Meraux, 202
(In
; In re
675 dent, disciplined Bar, be is that should pursuant to 6106 and Professions Code of the Business (State attorney may dis Act), Bar be provides that an any act involv barred or ing commission of “for the corruption, turpitude, dishonesty moral whether act an is committed in relations as the course of his ’’ conclu vigorously otherwise. attacked the Petitioner has ma turpitude. sion that his constitutes moral conduct jority opinion as afore makes meet this attack but no effort to arrive necessity said seeks to In order to obviate the thereof. .disciplined at their irre petitioner may conclusion spective separate discovery turpitude “as act,” majority by-passed have distinct element of the numerous an offense distinctly authorities which hold that charged such against petitioner offense judicial holds, only, office and not an offense which he Superior (State Bar v. or the law. Court, Court, ; 207 323 Baird v. Justice’s Cal. P. [278 432] 11 Cal.App. 259]; 439 P. M. Co. Ins. Connecticut [105 Life Silkman, 39 88 Most, Cal.App.2d ; re P.2d [103 1013] App.Div. Strahl, App.Div. 1025]; In N.Y.S. re [84 385].) N.Y.S. Superior Court, State Bar v. supra, application involved an by The *11 for a compel writ of mandate to Superior Angeles County Court of Los require to Hardy, Carlos a judge thereof, testify before a committee of the Board of of him investigating charges Governors The State Bar against involving practice acceptance of $2,500 law and of in fees judge Superior while a Angeles Court of Los County. VI, Article section of the state Constitution provided then judge that: “No of a of practice court record shall any law in court of this state his continuance in office.” The writ During was denied. the course opinion this court attorney stated: “An and may counselor at law who be the judicial incumbent of office, by essaying a practice law, by doing any particular does not so violate principle legal of ethics to which our attention has been directed. This is shown by occupants judicial fact that of positions in record, courts of this not of eligible state who are otherwise so do, may practice and most instances do law without suggestion doing they violating that so either former or existing defining laws regulating and practices the ethical of legal profession. judge The offense of a of a of rec-
ord foregoing provision who violates the -of the constitution ’’ against is not an offense his profession, his but office. In Court, justice’s Baird v. Justice’s a a supra, of ‘‘ court ordering police judge practicing a law disbarred from in the Justice Township, long Court of Riverside shall so as he ’’ remain Judge city, Police ground of annulled. said was One police decision was had judge that if as a matter of fact the by engaging violated the his profession before same peace, a when at the time he judicial occupying judicial that a position, a his offense is subjected officer attorney, and an he and himself penalty by misconduct, reason of it was provided office). by (removal 758, Penal Code Silkman,
In York urged In it that the New supra, re Supreme Court, Appellate power had “inherent” Division, Judge discipline lawyers, by an committed a and “that offense an offense practicing, is likewise commit prohibited, when in exercise as a lawyer, ted which calls accused violated that if the “has power.” herent It was held injunction has offended as surro Constitution, gate, attorney. not as an As surrogate that it only undoubted, and practice law is is the violation of the it follows questioned, is or can be committed violated, has been Constitution, if been professional in his official, rather than judicial him in or Strahl, re holding made A similar capacity.” App.Div. N.Y.S. 385]. place occupied by section 171 in Pro- of Civil Code similarly disqualification it is prohi-
cedure or discloses judges bition the conduct of was never intended regulating attorneys to be the conduct of as such. a statute heading: chapter “Disqualifications is under the It found Judges.” immediately preceding, and The section of the code chapter, commonly same is the more known sec- part “jus- grounds disqualification of a 170, prescribing tion in- interest, peace” personal tice, judge, bias relationship, prior service as terest 171 is containing 170 and chapter sections prejudice. ‘ ‘ I titled, Courts I, title II of the code. Part part part title, Justice,” II bears “Judicial Officers.” and title *12 chapter I I, part title V of the Code hand, On other attorneys as related originally enacted to Civil Procedure “Attorneys at heading, Counselors bore such and part for the most have therein contained The sections Law.” & chapter the Business IV of repealed been and reenacted These “Attorneys.” heading, Code, Professions under en- originally being the codes as headings part or titles in inter- Legislature may consulted be acted or amended given may be they codes, so that preting the sections of the Sharon, 75 (Sharon v. import. according true effect their 332, Cal.App. Forthmann, 118 ; In 1, 16 P. re Cal. [16 345] 772.) ; p. P.2d 23 Cal.Jur. 472] § foregoing It is manifest from the authorities and what been said that does of the Code Procedure Civil regulate lawyer. not Its purport duties of obvious purpose is prevent reciprocity jus- in the administration might justices county tice in the same result practice allowed law before each other. The conse- quences far-reaching. decision If a instant peace may disciplined for a be State Bar viola- Procedure, may tion of section 171 of the of Civil then he Code similarly disciplined sitting a ease which he interested violation of of that section 170 code. charges against amounting to an offense law, disciplinary
proceedings against him justified are not unless his conduct falls within section 6106 of Code, the Business & Professions provides attorney and may counselor be dis barred or for “the commission of involv act ing moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether act is committed in the course of his relations as an ’’ or otherwise. A consideration of the record before leads us inescapable conclusion that the additional finding and conclusion of the Board of (not Bar Governors made local administrative committee), “committed involving acts turpitude, dishonesty and corruption within meaning of section 6106 of Act,” The State Bar cannot be According sustained. to the uncontradicted evi hearings dence adduced at the before the local administra committee, tive promissory upon note sued given just legal claim, unpaid the amount for. sued attempt No was made to show note, makers brought upon defendants the action it, had, time they had, believed a defense action. The notice to show allege cause showing does even facts com *13 678 to the makers detrimental any
mitted acts which were contrary by any advantage obtained note or that 322 Bar, 21 Cal.2d legal obligations. In v. State their Wallis petitioner borrowed 531], appeared it P.2d [131 in promising occasions, of money client a number from a on speculative in in to make large bonuses, and order terest not regard the investments in Representations vestments, peti possession of in the any information warranted that be contended client. It was tioner made to the were should representations petitioner making these cause of the if the client held that even We six months. attorney under against the fraud action for had a cause of disciplinary Code, 1572 of the Civil in section the rule stated justified action no intent was not because there had been 21 P.2d (Cf. Bryant, 285, mislead. re Cal.2d [131 ; 3 p. 727.) Cal.Jur. 122, 523] § At the time of the filing complained 7, of, the suit July 1939, petitioner actually sitting was not in court, but was vacation, on copies and remained on vacation while service of the complaint and summons were made on defendants and beyond the time which defendants were directed to answer. visiting A justice from township petitioner’s another sat during July, entire month 1939. Petitioner did any upon act issue or fact on matter, but contrary any that if testified issue fact or law arose while sitting he was he intended to disqualify himself and call justice. another being action in contract for the amount of $75, parties all the residing within San Gabriel Township, being justice’s and the payable note the township, within township proper court of that was the court for institution (Code of the action. (1937), 395.) Civ. 112, Proc. As here §§ stated, alleged tofore it was not or shown that ulterior mo prompted bringing tive action, or that the makers of the deprived note have beent of a defense. At the time of issuance execution, being justice had ceased peace, conforming the Board of Bar finding Governors made no allegations to the the notice to show cause had the issuance of the caused writ of execution and deliv knowing ered it “full judgment to the constable well rendered in said action theretofore no wholly and of void legal (Connecticut effect.” The was not void. M. Most, 1013].) Cal.App.2d Ins. P.2d Co. Life except levy herein the issuance matters concerned, execution, of 1939 occurred the summer May, respondent repeated, yet until no action was taken re- being 1943. Petitioner ceased There- January, 1943. turned the full time of law in been caused fore, delay instituting proceedings may have doubting by respondent’s whether or not had although peace, while continued to be a power argument in had the proceeding according its investigate At proceedings at all times. and maintain every- rate, in the minds of when the matter was fresh Angeles County investigated grand one, Los it was *14 an accusation jury, a body power present that had “for willful removing petitioner office, directed toward seq.), corrupt Code, et which (Pen. misconduct” §758 no action. hearing witnesses, took body, summoning and after committed, offense, if Evidently opinion that the was of the I in office.” corrupt misconduct did not “willful include turpitude not involve moral equally am convinced that it did dismissed. should proceedings and that therefore these support apparently attempt some to derive majority opinion, that from a statement made toward the close justify turpitude sufficient to disbar “The of moral presence varying circum under suspension may ment or be disclosed felony if convicted of example, stances. For involving turpitude the record of or a moral misdemeanor (Sec him. final of conviction is conclusive signifi Act.)” the intended 6101, Whatever tion clearly application no to the cance of statement not been convicted of of this Petitioner has facts case. opinion state basis for majority fails to crime and the turpitude. involving For holding moral guilty of acts O’Connell, In 184 Cal. turpitude re see definition of Rothrock, In supra; ; Craig, re P. re 1010] [194 907,131 A.L.R. 226]. Cal.2d P.2d opinion Hardy, majority The effect of the is to overrule the cases, Baird and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance and also case, giving without consideration to Rothrock the reason- ing formed of those decisions. Certainly the basis be overruled, these are to some mention cases should be made opinion majority and some basic reason should them anyone challenge I action. to read exist for such the last cited expressed major- cases and reconcile the views therein with ity opinion in this case. foregoing opinion dissenting in the I have
From what said petitioner should proceeding that the it is obvious be dismissed.
Sehauer, J., concurred. rehearing application July 26, for a Petitioner’s was denied Carter, J., Sehauer, J., rehearing. 1945. voted for a A. 19108. In No. Bank. June
[L. 1945.] GRUPE, JR., Respondent, GEORGE G. FRED P. GLICK al., Appellants.
et