Aftеr a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of driving under the influence and of underage possession of alcohol. He appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered by the trial court on its findings of guilt.
1. Appellant enumerаtes as error the denial of his motion to suppress.
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It is immaterial that there may have been no articulable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle that appellant was operating, because appellant was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. [T]he Supreme Court [has] specifically indicated . . . that roadblocks [can] be considered a valid alternative to random vehicle stops. [Cit.] The Supreme Court has also indicated . . . that checkpoint stops are to be viewed differently from isolated vehicle stops ‘because the subjective intrusion — the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers — is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.’ [Cits.]”
State v. Golden,
The evidence shows that officers had set up the sobriety checkpoint on a roаd where general complaints had been made regarding intoxicated drivers. The decision to set up the sobriety chеckpoint was made only after the officers had been called at 11:00 p.m. to investigate a complaint regarding a loud party at a residence on the road. The host of the party was warned that those leaving his house in vehicles wоuld have to pass through a sobriety checkpoint which was being set up along the road. In the ensuing two hours, all vehicles travеling along the road past the sobriety checkpoint were stopped. One of those vehicles was being opеrated by appellant, who had been a guest at the house where the party was being held.
We note at the outset thаt the sobriety checkpoint cannot be considered “unreasonable” and unconstitutional “on the basis that it was cоnducted at a time and place conducive to stopping drivers who were leaving [a party] in the area. The рurpose of such roadblocks is to locate and arrest those who are abusing the privilege of driving on public roads by driving while they are intoxicated. It further serves to deter such abuse. It is not unreasonable that such roadblocks would be located where such drivers would be expected to be at a time they might be expected to be there.”
State v. Payne,
In
Golden v. State,
supra at 29 (2), and
Evans v. State,
supra, we addressed several factors in determining whether the roadblocks which were there in issue were “reasonable” and constitutional. However, “[n]either
Evans
nor
Golden
establishes] absolute criteria which must be satisfied before a roadblock is legitimate. Indeed, in
Evans,
this court looked ‘at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the roadblock’ to decide whethеr ‘the factors in
Golden
were satisfied.’ [Cit.] ... As there is no question that [the officers in the instant case] are authorized to enforcе laws on [the operation] of motor vehicles [by drivers under the influence] and using roadblocks for such purposes [is] reasonable and acceptable
([Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,]
supra), the only issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly decided that the evidence established that this roadblock was authorized and that [appellant] was not singled out to [be] stоpfped].”
Mims v. State,
The evidence in the instant case was sufficient to show that, under the totality of the circumstances, the roadblock, as established and implemented by the officers, was “authorized.” “[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis the chоice among . . . reasonable alternatives [for apprehending drunken drivers] remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.” Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, suprа at (6). Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to show that, under the totality of the circumstances, the roadblock was not еstablished and implemented by the officers as a pretext to stop appellant, but as a legitimate law enforсement technique to subject all drivers along the road, including those who might leave the party, to a brief stop so as tо detect signs of intoxication. See generally Mims v. State, supra at 279 (2). Appellant was stopped as the fortuitous result of his oрeration of a vehicle along the road at a time when a sobriety checkpoint happened to be in effect, not as the result of the officers’ capricious decision to stop his particular vehicle at random sо as to determine his sobriety.
It follows that there was no error in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
2. Appellant’s enumeration of the general grounds is without
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merit.
Jackson v. Virginia,
Judgments affirmed.