Opinion
Christopher P., a minor, through his guardian ad litem (appellant), appeals from an order denying his petition, pursuant to Government
Facts and Procedural History
According to the evidence presented in support of the petition for relief, 11-year-old Christopher was sexually molested by a District teacher, Curtis Jacquot, during a school field trip on November 9, 1989. After the incident was over, Jacquot told Christopher “not to tell anyone because ‘it was not supposed to happen.’ Mr. Jacquot said this in such a way that I felt afraid of what Mr. Jacquot might do to me.” As a result, Christopher did not report the incident until May 16, 1990, when he was questioned by sheriffs’ officers who were investigating another sexual abuse complaint against Jacquot. Christopher continued to fear Jacquot might physically harm him even after he reported the molest, although there is no indication Christopher had contact with Jacquot after the molestation.
Jacquot pleaded guilty to a sexual molestation charge on February 13, 1991. Christopher’s father, John, believed the court would order Jacquot to pay restitution to Christopher. After Jacquot was sentenced, John realized Christopher would not be compensated through the criminal proceedings and, on April 26, 1991, he retained legal counsel for Christopher. Counsel applied for leave to present a late claim on May 13, 1991. The District denied the application on May 17, 1991.
On November 18, 1991, appellant sought relief from the claims presentation requirements on the grounds of his minority and estoppel, relying on
John R.
v.
Oakland Unified School Dist.
(1989)
Discussion
Is the District equitably estopped from asserting appellant’s noncompliance with the claims-presentation statutes because its employee’s conduct prevented timely pursuit of the claim?
Under the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages against a public entity unless a written claim has first been presented to the defendant and rejected. (§§ 905, 945.4.) Claims based on
The court may also grant relief if it finds the public entity should be equitably estopped from asserting plaintiff’s noncompliance with the claims-presentation statutes.
(John R.
v.
Oakland Unified School Dist., supra,
Appellant’s cause of action accrued on November 9, 1989, when he was molested.
(DeRose
v.
Carswell
(1987)
Standard of Review
The trial court exercises broad discretion in granting or denying petitions for relief under section 946.6 and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
(Ebersol
v.
Cowan, supra,
Estoppel
A public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the claims statutes where its agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely claim by some “affirmative act.”
(John R.
v.
Oakland Unified School Dist., supra,
Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim.
(Rand
v.
Andreatta
(1964)
John R. was sexually molested on one occasion in February 1981 by his ninth grade mathematics teacher. When John voiced an intent to report the acts, the teacher threatened to retaliate against him if he revealed what had taken place. As a result of the threats, and his embarrassment and shame at what had happened, John did not disclose the incidents to anyone until December 1981. John’s late-claim application was not presented to the school district until May 1982, 15 months after the assault. (48 Cal.3d at pp. 442, 444.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that John’s late-claim application was made within section 911.4’s allowable one-year period because, under the
Upon review, the Supreme Court doubted that the delayed discovery theory of accrual applied on these facts, but opined the facts could demonstrate the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel. (
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine (1) whether any threats were in fact made by the teacher, (2) when the effect of any such threats ceased, and (3) whether plaintiff acted within a reasonable time after the coercive effect of the threats had ended. (
The trial court in this case found appellant did not establish estoppel under the John R. criteria because there was no threat. Appellant’s counsel conceded the absence of an express threat but argued, “. . . I certainly think under the circumstances that the threat can be implied and certainly John R. doesn’t say that the threat has to be expressed.” The following colloquy ensued:
“The Court: What can we imply? What am I expected to imply from that, that the teacher threatened to slit his throat, that by implication that the teacher threatened to physically assault or hurt him or by inference I’m supposed to infer that the teacher had threatened to have him thrown out of school? What? What are we to infer?
“The Court: Not from the fact that the child became fearful. We have to infer something from what the teacher did or said.
“Mr. Fontes: Well—
“The Court: And from what the teacher did or said, I suppose that the child is simply making—giving us a vague unspecified conclusion that because of the way the teacher said it, I was fearful. [][] But in order for us to abide by the holding of John R. versus Oakland, we have to find that a threat was made or we have to at least have some inference that a threat was made. What was the threat? And there is nothing from the evidence in this case that I can see that, Number 1, a threat was made or any evidence from which we can infer that a threat was made. Teacher said one thing and never did another thing all these years and the student said he is fearful. Of course, maybe he is fearful, but I don’t think we can relieve you from the provisions of 945.4 on the basis of unreasonable fear on the part of a minor, on the part of the alleged victim.”
In our view the trial court construed
John R., supra,
too narrowly. A narrow reading of
John R.
is inconsistent with the general theory of equitable estoppel. In
Fredrichsen
v.
City of Lakewood
(1971)
The purpose of the requirement that claims be filed is to provide the public entity with full information concerning rights asserted against it, so that it may settle those of merit without litigation. Therefore, the public entity cannot frustrate a claimant’s ability to comply with the statutes enacted for its benefit and then assert noncompliance as a defense. (6 Cal.3d at pp. 359-360.)
Several circumstances are particularly important in this case. First, the directive not to tell was made by a teacher, a recognized authority figure, to an 11-year-old student. Students generally are expected to follow their teacher’s directives. Second, the statement was made in conjunction with a sexual molestation. A common trait of “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” is the child’s failure to report, or delay in reporting the abuse. The very nature of the underlying tort deters the molested child from reporting the abuse. (See, e.g.,
People
v.
McAlpin
(1991)
Accordingly, we conclude the circumstances presented by this case, if established, are sufficient to support an estoppel. A directive by an authority figure to a child not to tell anyone of the molestation is a sufficient inducement of delay to invoke an estoppel. Whether the District is estopped from asserting as a defense appellant’s failure to comply with the claims statutes presents a question of fact for the trial court. Therefore, we remand the case for a determination: (1) whether a directive or admonition not to tell was made in conjunction with the alleged molestation, (2) when the effect of the admonition coupled with the molestation ceased, and (3) whether the appellant acted within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year, after the delay-inducing effect of the molestation and directive ended.
(John R., supra,
The order appealed from is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Ardaiz, J., and Bianchi, J., * concurred.
Respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 13, 1994. Panelli, J., and Baxter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.