*1 lаwyer had competent, been minimally he prejudice means actual prejudice in an trial,47 would have tried the case on the “shoot- actual opposed as imaginary prej- theory out” instead of Phillips the alibi in an udice imaginary trial. majority insisted on. Then the assumes people The of California did not sen- hypothetical trial that never tence Phillips to death he had a happened Phillips’ girlfriend pros- and the lawyer. bad They him to sentenced death given ecutor would have exactly the same his crimes on December I
testimony about her deal. The idea is that dissent. in that trial hypothetical Phillips would have been prejudiced imagi- because the
nary perjury would prevented have him
from impeaching girlfriend’s testimony,
and that would have weakened his never-
presented “shoot-out defense” and his de-
fense that did he not kill the men to rob them, only but money stole their inciden- Christopher DILLINGHAM, John tally, as afterthought, when he was Petitioner, stealing their Chutzpah identification. in- deed! IMMIGRATION AND
Phillips’ prejudice cumulative thеory has SERVICE, NATURALIZATION a fatal flaw in addition to failure pass its Respondent. straight face test: prejudice only happened in an imaginary case which No. 97-71038. Phillips would have supposedly presented United States Court of Appeals, defense,” “shoot-out actually the case Ninth Circuit. tried. The prejudice claimed hap- never pened, because the case presenting a Argued and Submitted Feb. “shoot-out defense” never happened. Sept. Filed Thus the for which case the “I’m expecting testimony consideration” supposedly was
prejudicial perjurious never was tried.
Materiality prejudice must occur in tried,
the case that was in an imagi-
nary case.
Who what knows might witnesses have
testified how they might have been
impeached Phillips if had told the truth?
A habeas petition has to be based on con-
stitutional occurred, error the trial that
not a trial that prevented by the de-
fendant’s
perjury.
own
requirement
See,
Ahrahamson,
e.g.,
Brecht v.
507 U.S.
("Even
Paul A. Munger, Tolies & Olson LLP, Angelеs, California, Jimmy Los W. Go, Laster, Portland, & Oregon, Go for the *5 petitioner. Hall, Department Justice,
Matthew R. of DC, Washington, respondent. for the FLETCHER, Before: B. FERNANDEZ, PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
FLETCHER;
by Judge B.
by Judge
Dissent
FERNANDEZ.
FLETCHER,
BETTY B.
Circuit Judge:
case,
In this
we consider whether
right
equal
alien’s
protection is vio
if, in
lated
proceed
course of removal
ings,
Immigration
and Naturalization
(“INS”)
Service
refuses to recognize the
effects of a
expungement1
British
statute
Throughout
opinion,
statutes,
we use the term
rehabilitative
as well as the British
"expungement”
generally
to refer
to the effect
case).
statute at issue in this
Such distinc
of
prior
a rehabilitative statute on a
convic-
tions are irrelevant under both Ninth Circuit
whether,
regardless
procedural
as a
tion—
Lujan-Armendariz,
and BIA case law. See
matter, the statute allows for a deferral of the
(9th Cir.2000);
222 F.3d
735-36
Gar
itself,
conviction
judgment
such that no
INS,
berding
(9th
v.
Cir.
(as
FFOA),
ever entered
judg-
under the
or a
1994);
Manrique,
Matter
Int. Dec. 3250
ment of conviction is entered but lаter re-
(BIA 1995).
(as
moved from the books
under various state
Act
1974. Under
Offenders
offense
drug possession
simple
aon
Act, a
is treated as
of the
conviction
terms
first of
federal
qualified for
have
would
with his
complies
if an
“spent”
offender
in the
had it occurred
treatment
fender
of a subse-
and is not convicted
case,
sentence
in this
petitioner
The
States.
United
In
years.
within five
such
quent offense
year-
Dillingham, is 37
Christopher John
cases,
offend-
requires that the
the statute
Britain. He
and citizen Great
native
old
in law as a
purposes
treated “for all
er be
July
States
the United
entered
committed or been
who has not
person
visa,
and,
his visitor’s
overstaying
after
for or convict-
prosecuted
with or
charged
legal
adjustment of status
for
applied
offense,” except
ed of or sentenced for
May 1993.
resident
permanent
convic-
resulting from the
any penalty
(“BIA”)
Appeals
Immigration
Board
five-year
beyond
pe-
tion that extends
ineligible
Dillingham ruled
unaffected,
of the
evidence
riod is
prior
of a
convic
adjustment
in a subse-
may be introduced
conviction
possession
simple
Britain
Great
tion
proceeding.2
criminal
quent
cocaine, in
spite
marijuana and
expunged
had been
the conviction
fact that
years after
seven
September
statute
to a British
pursuant
(and
rehabilitation
years after
conviction
two
drug
his
that,
conclude
We
for first-time offenders.
rehabilitation), Dillingham married his
in Gar
holdings
in accordance with our
Although
wife.
his conviction
U.S.-citizen
(9th
Cir.
berding v.
F.3d 1187
him
to the United
inadmissible3
rendered
(co-
Paredes-Urrestarazu
1994),
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)
§
INA
States
Lujan-Ar
(9th Cir.1994),
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)),4
F.3d 801
U.S.C.
dified at 8
INS,
On June the Board ruled dis- IJ Dillingham’s missed Manrique appeal did not with respect extend to reha- adjustment bilitation the denial statutes and denied applica- of his status. *7 adjustment tion for One BIA of status. He also member dissented on the Dillingham ordered dеported6 grounds and denied that the Board’s decision conflict- voluntary departure. The IJ found Dill- ed with its earlier cases and violated Dill- ingham to be “deserving of ingham’s favorable dis- process due right equal pro- cretion” “undoubtedly a worthy eandi- tection.
5.The Manrique BIA’s decision in pursuant followed order to a state rehabilitative statute holding our Garberding and constituted a deferring either dismissing or the criminal reversal of policy recogniz- its former of not proceedings. ing, for purposes, the effects of state rehabilitation laws that were not the Interestingly, 6. Dillingham the IJ did not find counterparts exact of the FFOA. Under Man- deportable ground on the that he was an alien rique, the BIA four-part a created test for excludable at entry, ground but rather on determining expungement pursuant when an that he had overstayed his visa. to a state rehabilitative statute should be rec- (1) ognized: offender; (2) the alien ais first appeal The Service did finding not the IJ’s pled the alien guilty has been or found aof Dillingham deportable due to his offense; simple possession the alien has inadmissibility entry. at time of not been accorded offender first treatment law; (4) court has entered an (9th Cir.2000); INS, 847, 849 206 F.3d review of for petitions now Dillingham INS, at Lujan-Armendariz court. in this BIA’s decision Cir.2000). Thus, have authori we. II. issue in this case— ty to review the central namely, Dillingham whether still stands matter, consider we must initial As an “having committed a [con convicted of court, have whether, appellate as following the offense” substance] trolled Dillingham’s petition. review jurisdiction to simple possession of his 1984 deportation proceed- initiated The INS Britain. offense Great BIA and the ings on November on deportation final order of a entered contending that we lack In addition to a timely filed Dillingham August Dillingham’s expunged jurisdiction due Septem- court on review this petition for conviction, the eleventh hour the Service jurisdiction is therefore 1997. Our ber that we are divested argument raised the transitional rules by governed the so-called admit- jurisdiction Dillingham 309(c)(4) (codified at § 8 U.S.C. IIRIRA offi- facts of his conviction to INS ted the 1252). § the Service contends Specifically, cers. (codified 212(a)(2)(A)(i) § INA that under pro transitional rules Notably, the 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)),9 apart § even at 8 U.S.C. “discretionary deci a appeals from hibit conviction, an alien who admits his from Board, adjustment of such as sion” substance committed controlled having 309(c)(4)(E). status, § to IIRIRA pursuant statutorily inadmissible rendered offense is ad However, for Dillingham’s application adjustment of status. ineligible denied as was not justment of status discretion, because of statu but matter terms of that under We believe Hence, Dillingham does ineligibility. tory 212(a)(2)(A)(i), however, the fact § discretiоnary denial the Board’s appeal is prior offense Dillingham “admitted” status, adjustment application of his than the convic- greater consequence of no that he BIA’s determination rather the but IIR- language of Tellingly, itself. tion such discre statutorily ineligible to seek 309(c)(4)(G) for aliens § is identical IRA tionary relief. as for deemed inadmissible Thus, the inter- deportable. deemed those transitional
Pursuant 212(a)(2)(A)(i) § and IIR- INA rules, jurisdiction pretation deprived we are 309(c)(4)(G) byus pressed upon IRA deportation for final orders of review Lujan- require overturning would sub Service of certain controlled aliens convicted every case in Armendariz as well as other However, we held as stance offenses.8 the transitional we have held under which Magana-Pizano v. *8 guilty to first- plead that aliens who (9th rules Cir.1999), jurisdiction to de we have may nonetheless offenses possession relevant to our time thе facts termine whether rehabilitation themselves of domestic Aragon-Ayon also avail jurisdiction exist. See committed, who admits 309(c)(4)(G) having or admits "there shall § reads: IIRIRA the essential committing an alien which constitute appeal permitted in the case of acts no by (or deportable conspiracy or reason who is inadmissible of of ... a violation elements having violate) a criminal offense-cov- regulation of committed of attempt law or to or 212(a)(2)....” ered in section [INA] country relating to a controlled ... a ... is inadmissible.” substance reads, 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) per- § U.S.C. 9. 8 of, who part: "convicted or an alien tinent 1004 expunge
statutes to
their convictions. Put
ambiguous statutory
of
provisions that
way, pursuant
posi-
by
another
to the
were intended
Congress
INS’s
be left to
tion,
agency’s
cases,
In
every
pled guilty
time an alien
to a
discretion.
such
deference is owed to the
simple possession charge, whether in the
BIA’s reasonable
abroad,
interpretations
provisions,
long
he
so
U.S. or
would be unable to avail
they
as
do not contravene other
himself of the Federal First Offender Act
indications
(or
congressional
Aguirre-
intent.
v.
equivalents),
INS
appellate
state law
415,
Aguirre,
1439,
526 U.S.
119
jurisdiction
S.Ct.
143
panels
stripped
would be
(1999);
L.Ed.2d 590
Chevron USA Inc. v.
petition.10
review his
Council,
Natural Resources
467
Defense
reject
position
We
conclude that
837,
2778,
U.S.
104 S.Ct.
III.
(1974)).
L.Ed.2d 389
The Supreme Court
In cases where the Board has
defines
right
the constitutional
“equal
power
exercised its
to conduct a de novo protection of the
“personal
laws” as a
decision,
only
review the IJ’s
review right,”
Pena,
Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Yepes-Prado
the decision of the BIA.
200, 227,
515 U.S.
115 S.Ct.
Cir.1993).
(1995);
Shelley
L.Ed.2d 158
v. Kraem
cf.
findings
er,
BIA’s factual
are
reviewed under
68 S.Ct.
92 L.Ed.
(1948) (“The
the substantial evidence standard. Pa
rights
by
created
redes-Urrestarazu,
1005
(“FFOA”).
FFOA,
applies
which
ex
deci-
previous
our
we have based
fact that
drug offenders who
clusively to first-time
upon
progeny
its
Garberding
sions
only
simple possession,
serves
guilty
are
unamended
right,
protection
equal
(after the suc
expunge
such convictions
considerations
ancillary constitutional
peri
completion
probationary
of a
cessful
Furthermore, we
sovereignty.
as state
od)
intended to lessen the harsh
and was
person-
in its
why
right
reason
find no
convictions,
drug
consequences of certain
Dillingham
not extend
al nature should
including
deportation pro
their effects on
previ-
in our
to the claimants
just as it did
222
Lujan-Armendariz,
ceedings. See
ous cases.
FFOA,
legal
no
at 735.
F.3d
Under
analy
equal protection
Under
may
imposed following
consequences
involving fun
sis, “a classificаtion neither
of the defendant’s
expungement as a result
along
proceeding
rights nor
damental
conviction. 18 U.S.C. 3607.
former
strong pre
lines is accorded
suspect
rejected on
Garberding,
Doe, 509
validity.” Heller v.
sumption
policy
the BIA’s
equal protection grounds
2637,
319,
125
S.Ct.
113
only expungements under exact state
(1993).
review such
We
257
L.Ed.2d
recog
could be
counterparts to the FFOA
whether
to determine
classifications
proceedings.
We held
deportation
nized
by a rational basis. See
supported
are
with the
policy was
that this
inconsistent
319-320,
Further
2637.
at
113
id.
S.Ct.
guarantee,
equal protection
Constitution’s
in immi
more,
authority
federal
because
rational basis for
there was “no
because
federal classi
plenary,
matters is
gration
guilty
found
treating
persons
two
groups
differentiating between
fications
differently
on the
conduct
based
identical
scrutiny.”
subject
“relaxed
aliens arе
statutes
of the rehabilitation
breadth
Mauclet,
1, 7 n.
Nyquist v.
states,
persons
when both
respective
their
(1977);
Gar
53 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
under their own
eligible for relief
were
classifica
F.3d at 1190. Such
berding, 30
had
have been
state’s law
both would
ir
“wholly
held valid unless
tions will be
counterpart of
law
an exact
the state
been
Mathews,
83, 96
426 U.S. at
rational.”
Lujan-Armendariz,
Act.”
the federal
1190;
1883;
Garberding, 30 F.3d
S.Ct.
Garberding).
(explicating
at 738
F.3d
McMahon,
Sudomir
argued
its differential
The INS had
(9th Cir.1985).
apply these es
We
obtaining expunge
persons
treatment
our discussion be
principles in
tablished
counterparts of
under exact
ments
low.
obtaining expunge
persons
FFOA
rational
was
ments under broader statutes
A.
goals and results”
“of the differing
rule,
the BIA
general
compared
as
As
under the FFOA
that obtain
of con
expungements
Garberd
recognize
does not
more lenient state
statutes.
rejected this as
for federal im
ing, 30 F.3d at
We
trolled substance offenses
A-F,
treatment
basis for differential
purposes. See Matter
a rational
migration
(1959). However,
persons seeking
similarly
between
situated
I N Dec. 429
&
of whether
exception
deportation, regardless
a narrow
to avoid
Congress carved out
with con
BIA’s decision
consistent
when
en
simple possession offenses
id.11 The Con-
objectives.
gressional
Act
See
First
the Federal
Offender
acted
particular
Furthermore,
distinguish
way
between
no
our
was in
decision
sovereignty
thereby frustrating
statutes
upon
the BIA could not
the idea
based
*10
concerned with the differential
could not receive the benefits of the state
stitution is
statutes;
persons
treatment of
not
immigration
rehabilitation law for federal
justified
government’s rationale that was
purposes.
refusing
give
effect to state statutes
Finally,
Lujan-Armendariz,
we con
than
reflecting
purposes
different
those of
sidered whethеr the IIRIRA-amended def
provide
not
a rational basis
the FFOA did
inition
“conviction” nullified the effect of
persons.
for the
treatment of
differential
drug pos
state rehabilitative statutes on
Thus, Garberding
the rule that
established
for immigration purposes.
session offenses
“persons who received the benefit of a
We concluded that because IIRIRA did
subject
state
law were not
(in
FFOA,
repeal
part)
not
whole or
they
deportation
long
as
as
could have
equal protection principles mandated that
received the benefit of the federal Act if
aliens whose convictions
been ex
had
they
prosecuted
had
federal
been
under
punged pursuant
law
state
were still
Lujan-Armendariz,
law.”
222 F.3d at
entitled to the same treatment as those
738.
expunged
whose convictions had been
un
Paredes-Urrestarazu,
recognized
Contrary
der federal law.
to the INS’s
rule that persons
guilty
converse
found
position,
Garberding
we clarified that
drug
of a
offense who could not have bene
princi
Paredes-Urrestarazu
stand for the
fited from the FFOA were not
entitled
ple
equal protection requires
“that
that
treatment,
receive favorable
expunge
the INS treat federal and state
if they qualified
even
un
rehabilitation
similarly.”
ment statutes
Id. at
n.
Paredes-Urrestarazu,
der state law. See
significantly,
Most
we reached this conclu
viction, however, require did not meet the Id. for expungement ments under the FFOA. Had petitioner been entitled to relief We conclude that the petition FFOA, appeal would have er’s case is controlled our decisions merit, Paredes-Urrestarazu, had since there would be no reason Garberding, Lujaiv-Armendañz. to reach different results due to “the Together, mere these state, fortuity that the and not the federal cases proposition three stand for the broad (and government, prosecutes an par alien for a long absent rational basis as as short, ticular extant), offense.” Id. In “it would may the FFOA remains the INS give ‘anomalous’ to effect to the federal not against discriminate aliens convicted of expungement statute while giving simple possession ef offenses whose subse fect to its counterparts.” Lujan-A quent qualifiеd conduct would have them rmendariz, rehabilitation, (quoting Pa for FFOA but for the fact redes-Urrestarazu, 812). 36 F.3d at How were convicted and rehabilitated ever, because Paredes-Urrestarazu was sovereign. under the laws of another Put FFOA, eligible for relief under way, equal he another protection eonsider- law, over tire administration of state precept supremacy. criminal constilutional of federal Const, VI, precluded by
since such a claim would be See U.S. art. cl. *11 reason, For this we find that the treat- government the from prohibit ations categorical recog decision not to have committed Board’s differently aliens who ing foreign expungements simple con- nize for have had their offenses and identical of the did simply drug possession because offenses indeed result expunged, victions they peti under which treatment between the the statute differential origin of lawfully persons rehabilitated. tioner and whose federal and were of identical expungements crimes BIA were honored the INS. The erred
B.
that “the
when
found
Dillingham’s con
We evaluate
conviction is akin to a for
[Dillingham]’s
the re
challenge according to
stitutional
and is therefore
eign pardon
ineffective
law.
equal protection
quirements
our
immigration purposes.”
Ignoring
for
peti
challenge,
on his
order to succeed
prior equal protection decisions
Gar
treatment
must establish
tioner
Paredes-Urrestarazu,
and Lu
berding,
similarly
that of
situated
differed from
ruled that
jan-Armendariz,
the Board
Living
v. Cleburne
persons. See Cleburne
satisfy the fourth cri
Dillingham failed to
Center, Inc.,
105 S.Ct.
Manrique,
terion of
because he was reha
(explaining
L.Ed.2d 313
(as
foreign
opposed
under a
to a
bilitated
equal protection di
guarantee
that the
state) statute,
general
as a
similarly
“all
situated
persons
rects that
recog
matter the Board has never
policy
alike”);
v.
see also United States
treated
of moral
foreign pardons
nized
crimes
Armstrong,
S.Ct.
By
foreign expunge
turpitude.
likening
(1996) (denying criminal
simple drug possession offenses
ments of
challenge to
equal protection
defendant’s
moral tur
foreign pardons
of crimes of
drug offenses due
prosecution for
selective
for which
pitude
category of crimes
—a
failure to establish that sim
to defendant’s
re
Congress has not enacted
domestic
of other races were
ilarly
persons
situated
analogous
to the
habilitation statute
prior
Our
subjected
prosecution).
improperly
Board
skirted
FFOA —the
similarly
persons
situat
cases dictate
treat
constitutional
issue of differential
equal
pur
petitioner
protection
ed to
case.
ment
drug
convicted of
of
poses
persons
are
the Board’s
Unfortunately, as a result of
upon
for which
fenses based
conduct
glean
can
little of use
comparison,
false
we
eligible for relief under
would have been
all of the cases
FFOA,
opinion. Virtually
were
from its
and whose convictions
BIA relied concern
on which the
ultimately expunged by
sovereign
turpitude.13
of crimes of moral
pardons
imposed them.12
Moreover,
Manrique,
adjudicated.”
dissenting
conduct was
agree with
original).
(emphases
Int. Dec. 3250 at 20
noted that “Gar-
member of the Board who
application
way
berding ...
in no
limits
exception
13. The one
— Mullen-Cofee
principle
statutes
which it establishes to state
Cir.1992)
con
disputably
e.g.,
substantial.
INS
Cardoza-Fonseca,
421, 449,
ley, although “[procedure by presumption
480 U.S.
107
(“Depor
always cheaper
S.Ct.
is
than
and easier
individu
measure.”);
always a
determination,”
656-67,
tation is
harsh
alized
at
405 U.S.
Wixon,
Bridges v.
65
we
that
govern
S.Ct.
find
the
(1945) (“Here
S.Ct.
Significantly, is alien expungements to unacceptably over- demonstrating who bears the burden of broad, in light of an alien’s substantial eligible that he or she is for admission into in avoiding deportation, interest United States. The alien also as well as bears (or nonexistent) demonstrating government’s the burden of minimal that he or eligible adjustment she is of status. incremental burden in that verifying his or Any long 15. assertion foreign dispositions by that BIA is without the considered look- ability comparison to make such a is without ing analogues.” Manrique, to their federal merit, for, dissenting as the member of the Int. Dec. 3325 at 20-21. case, Board noted in this the Board "ha[s] Thus, interpretation statutory expunged. we sonable” conviction was her 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). language in- 8 U.S.C. government’s purported hold that the Aguirre-Aguirre, See 526 U.S. at convenience does in administrative terest However, argument for distin- S.Ct. legitimate constitute a basis not again by Lujan-Armendariz. foreclosed whose illic- Dillingham, aliens like guishing There, rejected a similar claim rehabilitation we subsequent it conduct and (but Board’s definition of the IIRIRA-amended British soil who would occurred on term “conviction” should control. We held qualified have for relief under otherwise (in IIRIRA FFOA), repeal convictions did from aliens whose FFOA, part) whole domestically or the statute expungements place took ambiguous precluded gov- was not procedures. result, interpretation. ernment’s As a continue to heed of the We take Chevron deference was warranted. distinguish fact that federal classifications Lujan-Armendariz, 748-49. subject to ing among aliens are relaxed case, reasoning applies Similar to this ren- authority scrutiny, plenary because of the dering position the BIA’s meritless. government the federal holds over immigration. Nyquist, matters See Conclusion However, at 7 n. S.Ct. finding Dillingham statutorily clarify that this is no more true must *15 status, ineligible adjustment for of the BIA case, present petitioner where the has animating failed to consider the central subjected treatment been to differential underlying holdings our in principle Gar and ex prosecuted because his crime was Paredes-Urrestarazu, Lu berding, than state or punged under rather understood, Propеrly jan-Armendariz. law, previous in federal than has been holdings proposition these stand for the government cases where the drew a dis government bars the equal protection expungements granted tinction between against from aliens who discriminating different states. Ulti under the laws of substantially identical of have committed that Dill mately, purposes for our the fact and have had their convictions ex fenses place conviction took on British ingham’s substantially identical stat punged under country his arrival in this prior soil utes, solely because of where the offense to a British reha expunged pursuant was in government’s purported occurred. The to a distinction bilitative statute amounts efficiency terest in administrative does equal protection a without difference. The justify a constitute a rational basis driving controlling rationale our cases re distinction. stated, Simрly mains unaffected. no Dillingham we hold that Because case, no rational the facts of this there is longer stands “convicted” of controlled eligi from precluding Dillingham basis for offense, jurisdiction we exercise substance status, bility adjustment per while him petition'and merits of his find over the domestically of mitting aliens convicted discretionary grant seek a eligible to (and rehabilitated under identical offenses permanent adjustment legal of status to rehabilitative similar state and federal peti- accordingly grant the resident. We statutes) to seek such relief. remand to the BIA for such tion and V. determination. AND RE-
Finally, argues BIA that Chevron PETITION GRANTED MANDED. to its “rea- deference should be accorded
1012 tion;
FERNANDEZ, Attorney has so decided. Judge, General Circuit Dissenting: protection grounds, we have ex equal On expungements tended that to under state that as a matter of Dillingham argues INS, 222 v. Lujan-Armendariz laws. See expungements in all law constitutional (9th Cir.2000); 728, 737-38 Garberd the world must be treated the countries of (9th 1187, ing v. 30 F.3d Cir. expungements in manner as the same 1994); v. see also Paredes-Urrestarazu anything within the United States (9th Cir.1994). 801, equal 36 F.3d One principle less would violate the disagree. I protection. question Attorney could the idea that the required by is the Constitution to General could, doubt, no Congress While so de in the expungement treat state statutes cree, compelled it is not to do so way Garberding same he treats the FFOA. equal protection Constitution. As other that, say although it itself did not did claims, what we must ask is whether there Attorney decide that when General a rational for the choice made basis Dukes, exact determines he will treat City New here. See Orleans 303, 2513, 2516-17, 297, counterparts way 427 U.S. 96 S.Ct. of the FFOA he (1976); Gomez, itself, Madrid v. he then treats the FFOA must treat Cir.1999); Cecelia expungement other state statutes a sim Packing Corp. Dеp’t v. United States course, purposes ilar manner. Of (9th Cir.1993). Agric., 10 F.3d case, that neither here nor there. area, ap And that is it, cry stating As I see that is a far from plied in an even more relaxed manner than Attorney equally that the General is re- Mauclet, Nyquist usual. See quired to treat the statutes 8,n. 7 n. 97 S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d from all of the countries of the world in the (1977). That is because federal authori manner same that he treats the FFOA ty in plenary. this area is See Mendoza v. *16 and, by extension, expungement stat- (9th Cir.1994). INS, 335, 16 F.3d 338 utes. It that fortuity” foreign is no “mere preclude judicial “The reasons that review in prosecuted offenders are their own political questions ... dictate a narrow Paredes, countries not here. See 36 standard of review of decisions made foreign expungement F.3d at 812. Nor do Congress or the President in the area “ anything laws have to do with ‘uniform immigration and naturalization.” Math Diaz, 67, 81-82, application [оur] ews v. 426 nationwide 96 S.Ct. ” (1976). (citation omitted). fact, We will laws.’ Id. In only if overturn a classification it is “whol foreign ways countries and their are not 83, ly irrational.” at Id. S.Ct. at 1893. necessarily, particularly, or even the same country ways. as this and its A much I in nothing see irrational a determina- complex placed upon more task is tion that we will not treat aliens who ob- shoulders of an agency administrative expungement tain drug offenses in other only when it told that it is must not review way countries the same that we treat varying ways and means of expunge- those who obtain of offenses world, full ments all over the but also the course, country. in this Of under the Fed- admittedly records of aliens who have com- Act, eral First Offender 18 U.S.C. offenses, mitted not to mention the simple drug possession some convictions are, can difficulties that can encountered in au- expunged. they they be When be predicate depоrta- thenticating accuracy are not used as a of those records. will say it do to that burden Nor will step in this The next on the alien.
be WELCH, Thomas James Petitioner- a claim that the likely be will most process Appellant, rec get actual expected cannot be alien v. country origin. See Abo from his ords (9th INS, 978-79 219 F.3d vian Anthony NEWLAND, Warden, C. Cir.2000); Ramos-Vasquez Respondent-Appellee. Cir.1995). (9th And, 857, 862-63 00-15366. No. requirements authentication special even countries, where from other for documents Appeals, United States Court as rampant, are treated forgery may Ninth Circuit. Khan v. circuit. See suspect Cir.2001). Argued July Submitted That impossible it say that will be is not Sept. Filed requires rang system which administer manner —we the world ing all over just can live virtual people
know that as environment, ultimately can any
ly just about
live with and administer how difficult. system,
kind of no matter rational say perfectly
But it is to process.
to decline to undertake does not have to take on
Attorney General the rules and dealing with
the burden country in the world sim every
records of because, root, ignore he decided to
ply expunged under FFOA.
convictions fine, does not re- equal protection have here: progression
quire
recognition of FFOA expungements, statutes,
recognition of similar state and, fi-
recognition of all state statutes *17 all
nally, recognition of enactments that, say the world. To does
over country, although it does rec-
enisle this nation. separate that we are a
ognize concept, a fine but it is
One world is yet imperative. Not constitutional
anyway.
Thus, respectfully I dissent.
