Christopher Gade
Rory N. Butler of Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Toohey, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Cohen and Waples, JJ., and Corbett, Supr. J., Specially Assigned
¶ 1. EATON, J. This appeal involves the enforcement of a premarital agreement entered by husband, Christopher Gade, and wife, Erin Gade, that designated their assets as separate property and required husband to pay wife for the increased value of the martial home upon divorce. Although both parties sought to enforce the agreement, husband asked the family division to offset wife‘s share of the marital home‘s appreciation by the damage she allegedly inflicted on the home and to address alleged breaches of the premarital contract. The family division granted wife‘s motion to enforce the agreement and did not consider the merits of husband‘s arguments, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over any assets it could award husband in the event that it found a breach. We conclude that in the context of the divorce proceeding, the family division
¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Prior to the parties’ marriage in 2018, they entered into a premarital agreement, which provided a comprehensive division of their assets in the event of divorce. Under the agreement, each party‘s assets and anticipated inheritances were categorized as separate property to be retained “free from any claim by the other Party” should the parties divorce. The agreement was structured such that no property owned by either party was joint marital property except the marital home.
¶ 3. Husband owned the marital home prior to the marriage. The agreement provided that, in the event of a divorce, wife was “entitled to FIFTY (50%) PERCENT of the increase in the appraised value” paid by husband “in monthly installments amortized over thirty (30) years with a balloon payment at the end of five (5) years from the date of the first payment.” The agreement required husband to begin payments the month after the home appraisal was completed.
¶ 4. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the agreement also required the parties to contribute to the living expenses in proportion to their incomes, and provided that if the parties filed joint tax returns, they each would be responsible for paying all taxes associated with the income from their separate property and earned income. Finally, the agreement stated that if either husband or wife breached any provision in the premarital agreement, the breaching party was responsible for any reasonable legal fees incurred by the other party in seeking to enforce the agreement.
¶ 5. Husband and wife separated in October 2021, and husband filed a complaint for divorce in February 2023. Extensive motion practice concerning enforcement of the premarital agreement followed. Initially, husband asked for “relief” pursuant to the agreement, and wife also
¶ 6. In response, husband agreed that husband and wife should “receive their Separate Property at the time of a divorce” pursuant to the agreement. However, husband alleged that wife had severely damaged the marital home following its appraisal and that this complicated the division of assets. Husband further asserted that wife had not met her obligations to assist in paying for household expenses during the marriage.
¶ 7. Following unsuccessful mediation, wife renewed her motion to enforce the premarital agreement in August 2023 and added a claim for attorney‘s fees. Supporting her request, wife asserted husband failed to pay her the required monthly installments for the increase in the home‘s equity.
¶ 8. Husband responded, requesting a final hearing on both the issue of the damage to the home and the motion to enforce. Husband argued that the amount husband owed to wife for the equity in the marital home should be offset by the amount wife owed to husband for the damage she caused to the home.
¶ 9. Following a status hearing and further motion practice, the family division granted wife‘s motion to enforce. The court noted that the agreement “precludes the Court from even considering separate property in dividing whatever portion of the marital estate is within its jurisdiction” and made no mention of recouping unpaid household expenses or accounting for depreciation in the value of separate property caused by the other party in the event of divorce. Thus, the family division concluded that husband could not seek satisfaction of his claims under the agreement because the family division is a court of limited jurisdiction with authority to allocate the marital estate and no authority to award damages. The court mentioned, however, that it would be possible for husband to pursue his claims against wife for the damage done to the
¶ 10. Husband filed a motion to reconsider, adding a claim that wife had not met her tax obligations pursuant to the agreement. The court denied husband‘s motion, once again stating that the family division was limited by its jurisdictional mandate and therefore had “no authority to award damages for breach of contract.”1 This appeal followed.
¶ 11. On appeal, husband argues that the trial court erred by enforcing certain premarital agreement terms—namely, the attorney‘s-fees provision—while also refusing to enforce other provisions—the household-expenses provision, taxes provision, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Husband argues that the family division came to an erroneous conclusion when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims. Wife argues that the civil division, not the family division, was the proper forum for husband‘s claims.
¶ 12. We conclude that the family division has jurisdiction over husband‘s claims that wife breached the premarital agreement according to the plain language in
¶ 13. A challenge to a court‘s jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo. Aither v. Est. of Aither, 2006 VT 111, ¶ 4, 180 Vt. 472, 913 A.2d 376. The jurisdiction of the family division is governed by statute, and “[w]hether the family court properly construed the controlling statutes is a question of law that we review de novo.” Heffernan v. Harbeson, 2004 VT 98, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 239, 861 A.2d 1149. “When the statute‘s scope and meaning are readily apparent, no construction is necessary, and we apply the statute according to its terms.” Id.
¶ 14. The family division has exclusive jurisdiction “to hear and dispose of . . . [a]ll annulment and divorce proceedings.”
¶ 15. Regarding premarital agreements specifically, this Court, as with other jurisdictions across the country, has recognized that parties to a marriage may enter into enforceable agreements which reflect their desired disposition of marital property in the event of a divorce. See Stalb v. Stalb, 168 Vt. 235, 241, 719 A.2d 421, 426 (1998) (describing premarital agreements as enforceable contracts); 5 Williston on Contracts § 11:8 (4th ed. 2025) (“[P]remarital agreements, so long as they do not promote divorce or otherwise offend public policy, are generally favored as conducive to the welfare of the parties and the marriage relationship.” (emphasis omitted)). When parties enter into such agreements, the family division has jurisdiction over the enforceability and interpretation of those premarital agreements, including claims alleging breaches of the provisions controlling the disposition of property. See Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353, 362, 593 A.2d 82, 88 (1991) (holding that premarital agreement at issue “violate[d] public policy and should not be enforced“); Lacroix v. Rysz, 2025 VT 16, ¶ 17, __Vt.__, 336 A.3d 321 (remanding to “family division to assess wife‘s arguments that husband breached the expectations in the agreement“).
¶ 16. Consequently, given the plain language in
¶ 17. We have explained that in “the absence of evidence of fraud or unconscionable advantage taken at the time of execution, the parties themselves are bound according to the terms of the contract” and that “[o]ur courts will override their provisions only to enforce duties imposed by law sought to be avoided by contract, or, in particular, to protect the interests of children involved.” Padova v. Padova, 123 Vt. 125, 129, 183 A.2d 227, 230 (1962). The general requirement to enforce the terms of a premarital agreement, however, does not affect the court‘s ultimate jurisdiction over the property allocated in an agreement. See
¶ 18. The parties devote substantial portions of their briefs to a disagreement about the applicability of the different reasoning expressed by the two concurrences in Allen v. Allen, 161 Vt. 526, 527-43, 641 A.2d 1332, 1333-42 (1994). In Allen, the Court was divided over whether the family division had jurisdiction over a claim of interest on a loan that the wife made to the husband during their marriage. Id. at 527, 641 A.2d at 1333 (Dooley, J., concurring). Two members of the Court articulated that they would hold that the family division did not have jurisdiction over a debt claim not incorporated into a postnuptial agreement between the parties. Id. at 533-34, 641 A.2d at 1336-37. Those justices supported their conclusion by pointing out that “the family court is a court of limited jurisdiction,” and as such, any other type of proceeding like obligations arising out of a separate contract between the parties “may not be brought in that court.”
¶ 19. We need not resolve the question posed in Allen because those facts are distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike in Allen—where the loan agreement and interest at issue had not been formed in anticipation of a divorce and was a separate contract from the parties’ postnuptial agreement—the issues brought by husband here concern the parties’ premarital agreement.2 See id. at 527-28, 641 A.2d at 1333-34 (Dooley, J., concurring) (describing loan agreement as separate contract from postnuptial contract between husband and wife). On appeal, husband maintains that he was “asking the Family Division to enforce the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement that Wife had breached, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent to all contracts.” Specifically, in the family division, husband argued that “[p]ursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Agreement, in the event of divorce, the parties are each entitled to retain all of their separate property as defined in the provisions of Paragraph 4” but described that “[t]his is not possible because [wife] essentially took [husband‘s] separate property by damaging and destroying parts of the house and many items of personal property.” Similarly, husband asserted that “[c]ontractually,” each party “had a clear obligation to avoid taking, damaging, destroying or
¶ 20. In declining to address husband‘s claims, the family division pointed out that husband‘s requests were confusing in that he was both seeking to enforce the agreement and seeking damages for its alleged breach. Husband was not, however, afforded an opportunity to clarify his position and to articulate what remedy he was seeking for the alleged breaches.
¶ 21. The family division also expressed that it did not have jurisdiction over the parties’ separate property, which had been allocated in the premarital agreement. As explained above, the family division has jurisdiction over all property allocated as part of a divorce. Supra, ¶ 14. In addition, while the family division may not have jurisdiction over a freestanding breach-of-contract claim, it has authority to adjudicate the division of property and to interpret and enforce the parties’ premarital agreement. Compare supra, ¶ 15 (describing that family division has jurisdiction over enforceability and interpretation of premarital agreements), with Maier v. Maier, 2021 VT 88, ¶ 35, 216 Vt. 33, 266 A.3d 778 (holding “the family division does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an action to enforce a contract between the parties that is untethered to a
¶ 22. Ultimately, we do not reach the question of whether husband‘s claims have any merit. The family division is better suited on remand to create a more fully developed record regarding the alleged breaches, determine if they are material, and consider any remedies, including any potential waivers of the contractual provisions. Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121, 370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977) (“It is the tradition of constitutional common law that the establishment of legal doctrine derives from the decision of actual disputes, not from the giving of solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues.“).
¶ 23. We remand to the family division to address whether wife materially breached the premarital contract as husband alleges and, if so, to determine appropriate remedies applying contract principles consistent with our precedent regarding premarital agreements.
Reversed and remanded.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice