Opinion by
Section 1 of the Act of May 13, 1925, P.L. 649, provided “That whenever any husband and wife now or hereafter holding property as tenants by entireties havе been divorced either of such tenants by entireties may bring suit in the court of common pleas sitting in equity of the county where the prоperty is situate against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them” (Italics suppliеd). The foregoing provision, with the words “ now or” eliminated therefrom, was re-enacted by the Act of May 10, 1927, P.L. 884 (68 PS §501), which at the same *43 time reрealed tbe Act of 1925 but included a clause specifically “saving proceedings instituted under [tbe] provisions” of tbe 1925 Act.
Tbe pаrties to tbe instant suit, a wife and ber bus-band, acquired real estate as tenants by tbe entireties in 1926 and were divorced in 194-9. Thereafter, tbe wife instituted this procеeding against ber former husband under tbe above-recited statutory authority to obtain partition of tbe real estate so held by thеm jointly. Tbe defendant-husband filed preliminary objections to tbe complaint on tbe ground that.tbe court was without jurisdiction of tbe mattеr for tbe assigned reason that tbe property bad been acquired by tbe parties prior to tbe enactment of tbe Act of 1927 and that the Act of 1925, having been repealed by tbe Act of 1927, was no longer of any force or effect. Tbe learned judge of tbe court below entered an order overruling tbe preliminary objections with leave to tbe defendant to answer over. Frоm that interlocutory order, tbe defendant appealed. Inasmuch as the material facts were undisputed and tbe question involved is purely one of law, we agreed to bear argument on tbe appeal as if it were from a final decree in pаrtition in favor of tbe plaintiff on tbe pleadings, provided that tbe defendant assented in writing to the entry of such a decree. Tbe defendant has so stipulated of record and a decree will accordingly be entered nunc pro tunc in tbe court below. We pass then tо a consideration of tbe case on tbe merits.
Tbe question here involved is whether real estate acquired by a husband and wife as tenants by the en-tireties subsequently to tbe Act of 1925, but prior to tbe Act of 1927, can be partitioned where tbe divorce of tbe рarties occurred after tbe effective date of tbe Act of 1927. Tbe answer to that question must be in tbe affirmative. Tbe Act of 1927 wаs a substantial reenactment of tbe prospective scope of tbe Act of 1925.
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Accordingly, tbe substantive law of the earlier statute, thus carried forward, has been continuously in force since the date of its original passage. In
Haspel v. O’Brien,
The learned jurist further observed in
Haspel v. O’Brien,
supra, that the stated rule of construction is particularly sound and applicable in the interpretation of an Act which is a revisiоn of a prior statute or statutes for purposes of clarity, certainty or convenience. In the present instance, the equally material motive for the re-enactment was a legislative desire for constitutional conformity. Between the pаssage of the Act of 1925 and the re-enactment of 1927, two common pleas courts of the Commonwealth had held, in well-reasоned opinions,
1
that the retroactive feature of the Act of 1925 was unconstitutional and, therefore, incapable of divеsting the common law incidents of ten
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ancies by the entireties created prior to the Act of 1925. These rulings were manifestly correct: see
Alles v. Lyon,
The purpose of the re-enactment of 1927 was obviously to remove the retrospective portion of the Act of 1925, which was constitutionally invalid, and, thence, to carry forward the substantive law of the earlier statute in its prospective asрect. In addition to the in-tendment of the Act of 1927 which the applicable rule of construction rightly impels, the saving clause in the еxpress repeal paragraph of the Act of 1927 plainly evidences a legislative intent that rights and liabilities which had validly attached under the Act of 1925 should remain undisturbed. The scope of the saving clause cannot properly be limited merely to proceedings under the Act of 1925 which were actually pending at the time of the 1927 re-enactment. Any such interpolated qualification and consequent narrow construction would unreasonably and capriciously discriminate among estates by the entireties, created subsequently to the Act of 1925 but before the Act of 1927, depending upon when the divorce of the parties occurred in relation thereto and the еnsuing partition proceeding was instituted.
The question here involved has been before three common pleas courts on fаcts germanely similar to those of the instant case.
2
The decisions in those cases
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were harmonious in holding that the Act of 1925 was á valid enactment as to real еstate acquired by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties after the effective date of that Act and is still in force as to rеal estate, so acquired, before the Act of 1927. In well-considered opinions, those courts carefully and correctly distinguished the case of
Mertz v. Mertz,
Decree to be entered by the court below nunc pro tunc affirmed at appellant’s costs.