38 N.C. 535 | N.C. | 1845
There is no controversy at this time between these parties, as to the title of Buckner Davis, the grandfather of the plaintiffs, to the negroes in question, or as to the character in which they were held by the defendants, Peter R. and Stephen Davis, his executors. Upon a former occasion, the Court has declared in this case that they did belong to Buckner Davis, and not to his children, and that the executors held them in trust for Mrs. Elizabeth Christmas, during her life, and after her death, in trust for the plaintiffs. The questions now presented for our determination are: First. Is Peter R. Davis a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of the plaintiff's equity. Secondly. Is the plaintiffs' claim barred by the statutes of limitation. And thirdly. Was Leonidas Christmas, at the time he came of age, an idiot or lunatic, or person of insane mind, so as (540) to come within the exceptions contained within the acts.
Upon the last point the plaintiffs have produced in evidence the inquisition of a jury, duly ordered by the County Court of Warren, and duly summoned by the sheriff, who say that "we believe him to be a man of unsound mind," etc. This inquisition is imperfect, in not stating when the mind of Leonidas Christmas became unsound — whether it was before he came of age or after. They do not find him an idiot; which, if unexplained, might be considered as existing with his birth, but of unsound mind, which may be produced by various causes, and exist at different periods, and is not, when it does exist, permanent in its character. It is therefore insufficient in itself, and does not decide one important point referred to the jury. But if there were no objection to the inquisition, it would still be open to be rebutted by the defendants by contradicting *426
evidence. It is itself, but presumptive evidence to the Court, of the fact it alleges. Armstrong v. Short,
The next inquiry is, do the statutes of limitation protect the defendant? The evidence shows that Leonidas Christmas was the oldest of the children of Elizabeth C. Davis; and that he was born 20 November, 1817, and of course that he came of age 20 November, 1838. At October Term, 1842, of Warren Court of Equity, leave was granted to plaintiffs to amend their bill; and the present bill, called in its captain an amended bill, was filed; at which time Leonidas had been of age near four years, and is consequently barred by the statutes.
According to the same evidence, Buckner Christmas was born 30 June, 1819, and became of age 30 June, 1840. Of course not more than two years and four months had elapsed after he came of age before this bill was filed, and the other plaintiffs are younger than he is. They then are not barred, because at the time the defendant, Mitchell, purchased they were infants; and the statute had never commenced running against them or any person, under whom they claim. The defendant, Mitchell, contends, that this is not an amended bill, but an original one, and that the statutes of limitations must be computed from the filing this, and not of the former bill. The plaintiffs contend it is an amended bill, and constitutes, with the original, one suit. In the view we have taken of the subject, it is not of much importance to decide this question. We are of opinion, however, that it is an amended bill. But it introduces new matter, or rather, a new charge against the defendant, Mitchell. It is true that the deed of release or bargain and sale, executed by the executors, *428 Peter R. and Stephen Davis, was an exhibit in the original (543) bill, and constituted a part of it; but the object of the bill was to obtain from Mitchell and White he reconveyance of the land mentioned in the deed, and prayed no relief against Mitchell, as to the negroes. This bill makes this charge, and prays relief against him upon this ground. When a bill is amended, the defendant may make such defense as he thinks proper. Red. P., 323. So far, then, as this bill seeks relief against Mitchell on account of these slaves, it is an original charge brought against him for the first time, and he is entitled, as to the statute of limitations, to consider it an original bill. But we repeat, it is an unimportant question here, because it introduces a new charge against the defendant, Mitchell.
It is lastly insisted on by the defendant, Mitchell, that he is a purchaser for a full and valuable consideration, without notice of the equity of the plaintiffs. If this be so, he will be entitled to be quieted in his possession of the slaves; for in that case his equity will be equal to that of the plaintiffs, and they will not be entitled to the aid of the Court.
It can not be questioned that Thomas H. Christmas, from whom he, the defendant, Mitchell, purchased the negroes, knew of the equitable claim of the plaintiffs, and was a mere volunteer, and therefore held the negroes precisely as Peter R. and Stephen Davis did, in trust for the plaintiffs, but it does not therefore follow that the defendant, Mitchell, who is a purchaser for a valuable consideration, knew of their equity. And, indeed, his case is so far stronger than Thomas H. Christmas's, that he is not a purchaser from an executor, but from an individual, who was in the quiet possession of the slaves, claiming them as his own. Notwithstanding this, however, if he purchased knowing the fiduciary character, in which his vendor stood to the plaintiffs, or under such circumstances as ought to have put him on his guard and caused him to make inquiry, he will be held as a trustee for the plaintiffs. The defendant, Mitchell, admits that, at and before his purchase of the negroes in dispute, he had understood and believed they had been in the possession of Buckner Davis, and were (544) so at his death, and passed with the rest of his property into the possession of his executors, and that from common rumor he had understood that Buckner Davis had appointed Peter R. and Stephen Davis his executors, and had given them the whole of his property, and left his children entirely dependent upon them; but of the nature of his title he had no more knowledge than of the contents of his will. He further admits, that before and at the time of his purchase, he had understood and believed *429 that the said executors had delivered said negro slaves to Thomas H. Christmas, and that they were in his possession, but upon what consideration, or whether they were conveyed by deed or merely by delivery, he did not know, but doubted not that, as executors, they had by law full power to dispose of them.
It has been argued before us, that as Thomas H. Christmas dealt with and took from the executors the negroes in dispute, Mitchell had a right to suppose the executors were rightfully disposing of them. There can be no doubt but the power of an executor over the assets is very large, both at law and in equity. And it is so, to enable him to execute the trust committed to him, and to prevent the inconvenience and danger, which would result to those dealing with him. If, therefore, the transaction is nothing more than a sale of a part of the assets for money advanced at the time, the vendee can never be affected by the fact that it was the intention of the executors to appropriate the money to their own use, or that they did actually misapply it. McLeod v. Drummond, 17 Ves. Jr., 153; Kean v. Roberts, 4 Mad., 190. In other words, the purchaser is not obliged to look to the application of the purchase-money. But here, Thomas H. Christmas is not a purchaser, but a mere volunteer, and held the negroes in trust for the plaintiffs. Peter Mitchell denies he had notice, in fact, of the equity of the plaintiffs. Do not the circumstances, admitted by him in his answer, together with others appearing in the case, fix him with implied notice; are they not such as would have put a man of ordinary prudence upon an inquiry as to the title of the property he was about to purchase? Among the exhibits filed in the case, is a deed of trust given by Thomas H. (545) Christmas to Thomas Bragg, dated 9 March, 1827, to secure to Peter Mitchell and John White a debt due to them. In the answer to the original bill filed by the defendant, Mitchell, he admits that this deed was made by his request. It conveys a tract of land, which is described by metes and bounds; the deed then as a further description states, "which land the late Buckner Davis, by his last will and testament, left to the use and support of his son, Peter M. Davis." Although, then, the general rumor in the neighborhood was, that Buckner Davis had willed to his executors all his property, and left his children dependent on them, here was direct notice to the defendant, Mitchell, that such common rumor was false, that Buckner Davis had not acted the unnatural part attributed to him; that he had not devised all his property to his executors, and left his children destitute; that he had placed his land in their hands as trustees for Peter M. Davis, one of the children. We will not say this *430
deed was notice to Peter Mitchell of all the trusts in the will, but we do say, it was sufficient to put him on his guard, and impose upon him the duty and necessity of inquiring into the title of his vendor and of the executors. Maples v. Medlin,
The defendant, Peter Mitchell, in his answer, calls upon the defendant, Peter R. Davis, to file two certain deeds executed to him by the plaintiff, Buckner Christmas. Two have been filed by him, and we are to presume they are those called for, as no suggestion to the contrary has been made. We have examined them, and find they have no effect or bearing upon the case now before us.
There must be a reference to the Master, to take an account of the hires of the negroes in the possession of the defendant, Mitchell, and in taking said account he will allow the defendant all just charges for raising the young negroes, also the hire of Tom, to the time of his sale, the price at which he sold, and the expense incurred by the defendant in making the sale; the bill is dismissed as to White with costs.
PER CURIAM. DECREED ACCORDINGLY.
Cited: Parker v. Davis,
(549)