Nos. 20,393—(212) | Minn. | Jul 20, 1917
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment in favor of defendant entered pursuant to a decision after a trial by the court without a jury.
Plaintiff contends that the findings of the trial court do not sustain the conclusions of law or judgment. The facts, as stipulated and found by the court to be true, omitting those that are not material on this appeal, are as follows:
Plaintiff is under contract to transport mails from the stations in St. Paul and Minneapolis to the post-offices, and in performing this contract uses a large number of automobiles. June 30, 1915, defendant issued to plaintiff its policy of insurance, by which it agreed to indemnity plaintiff against loss or damage to any of said automobiles from fire or theft, and also to indemnify plaintiff against loss from liability imposed by law for damages on account of bodily injuries, including death, by reason of the use of the automobiles, for the period of one year. As originally issued the policy did not insure against liability on account of injury to or destruction of the property of others, the printed provisions in the policy applicable to this kind of insurance being marked “void.” November 9, 1915, in consideration of an additional premium, a “rider” was executed and attached to the policy. This revived the provisions of the policy so marked void, and insured plaintiff until the policy expired against loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon plaintiff for destruction of or injury to property of others
“The company’s liability * * * is limited to the actual intrinsic value of the property damaged or destroyed at the time of its damage or destruction, which shall not be greater than the actual cost of the repair or replacement thereof, and in no event in excess of the sum of one thousand ($1,000) dollars for one accident resulting in damage or destruction of property whether the property of one, or more than one, person.”
November 11, 1915, one of plaintiff’s automobiles collided with an automobile owned by one Brown, resulting in damage to Brown’s car. Defendant paid Brown the sum of $104.90 in settlement, and took a receipt which recited that the amount was received from the insurance ■company and plaintiff “in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims for property damage sustained by Meyer Brown to his automobile on or about November 11th, 1915, for which it is claimed J. S. Christison is liable.” Then followed this; “It being expressly understood and agreed between the parties hereto, that Meyer Brown does not release any other claim for damages growing out of said accident by reason of depreciation in the value of his said automobile or by reason of his loss of the use of the same while being repaired.”
In February, 1916, Brown brought an action against plaintiff to recover $200, alleged to be his loss by reason of depreciation in the value of his car on account of the accident, and the same amount for the loss of the use of the car while it was being repaired. Plaintiff immediately notified defendant of the bringing of this action and demanded that it undertake the defense thereof. Defendant declined, and plaintiff defended the action, which resulted in a verdict of $100 in favor of Brown and against plaintiff herein. Under the charge of the court in the case referred to, the recovery was for depreciation in the value of the car by reason of the accident, over and above the amount paid Brown by defendant. Judgment was entered on the verdict for $114.30 and was paid by plaintiff. It is to recover the sum so paid, with $65 attorney’s fees incurred, that the present action was brought.
The amount paid by defendant insurance company to Brown, $104.90, was the amount of the charges made against Brown by mechanics for
The decision of the trial court that plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this action was based upon the quoted condition df the policy that the company’s liability “is limited to the actual intrinsic value of the property damaged or destroyed * * * which shall not be greater than the actual cost of the repair or replacement thereof.” Plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding this limitation, defendant is liable for depreciation in the value of the automobile caused by its having been in a collision. This depreciation in value is over and above the cost of all repairs that it is possible to make. A car that has been in an accident that makes repairs necessary depreciates in value, although all broken or damaged parts are repaired or replaced and the car is apparently as good as ever. At least this was the basis of Brown’s recovery in his suit against plaintiff, and is conceded to be the fact. The receipt given by Brown for the payment of the bill for repairs by the insurance company shows quite clearly what the question is, but is of little importance otherwise, save as it indicates that the question was left open.
We appreciate that the question is important, though the amount involved is small. Counsel for plaintiff argue that the policy promised indemnity from liability imposed by law upon the assured for the destruction of or injury to the property of others, and that the limitation clause should be construed liberally so as not to defeat recovery for liability imposed by law for all injury to the property of others. It is clear enojigh that Brown’s car was injured over and above the cost of the repairs made. It is also clear that this injury could not be remedied by repairs, but it was nevertheless an injury to Brown’s property for which the law imposed liability upon plaintiff. But for the limitation clause there would be no doubt of the liability of the insurer. Was it intended by the limitation clause to preclude liability when the insured was compelled to pay for injuries that could not be remedied by mechanical repairs? Is this clause so free from ambiguity that it is necessary to so construe it? To repair an automobile means to restore it to a sound or good state after injury or partial destruction, to restore it to its original condition. “Replacement” has much the same meaning, but as used would seem to refer to cases where property is destroyed rather than
Judgment reversed, with directions to amend the conclusions of law in accordance with this opinion, and to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount claimed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the view of Mr. Justice Bunn.