Christine KELLAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROCARE SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13-10716
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 31, 2014.
360-361
Summary Calendar.
B. Failure to Train or Supervise
To establish Section 1983 liability under the Yaras’ theory of a failure to train, they must demonstrate that (1) a supervisor failed to supervise or train a subordinate; (2) a causal link exists between the failure and the constitutional violation; and (3) the supervisor was deliberately indifferent. Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2005). Mere negligence or even gross negligence is not enough; “a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of [constitutional] violations and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
For Perryton to be liable for the Board‘s failure to train or supervise the school staff, the Board must have actual or constructive notice of ongoing constitutional violations at the school; otherwise the Board‘s failure could not be a conscious or deliberate choice. See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 447 (5th Cir.2011). The Yaras’ failure-to-train argument fails due to the lack of evidence that the Board was aware of Red Ribbon Day. Further, the Board could not have made a deliberate choice to disregard constitutional violations stemming from its failure to train or supervise because no violation had occurred in the first two years of the program. There was no pattern of constitutional violations such that the Board would have been more than grossly negligent for failing to train or supervise the high school staff. See Estate of Davis, 406 F.3d at 381. The district court did not err in concluding that Perryton could not be liable under this theory of liability.
AFFIRMED.
Darian Lewis Howard, Sr., Law Office of Darian Howard, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joel Evans Geary, Kathryn Elizabeth Long, Vincent Lopez Serafino Jenevein, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christine Kellam sued her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, explaining its reasons in
Kellam complained that, while out on family medical leave, she was notified that she was to be terminated because of across-the-board staff reductions resulting from decreased funding. She was given the chance to apply for positions at other locations but did not take that opportunity. She received the full benefit of her medical leave before the termination.
As the district court explained, Kellam has presented no evidence that her termination was for any prohibited purpose or for any reason other than the employer-wide substantial reductions in force. The summary judgment is AFFIRMED, essentially for the reasons carefully stated by the district court.