CHRISTINA TAFT v. PAUL BARRESI, et al.
Case No. 5:24-cv-01930-TJH (DTB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION
April 18, 2025
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Terry J. Hatter, Jr., United States District Judge, under
On September 7, 2024, Plaintiff Christina Taft (“Plaintiff“), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint (“Complaint“), alleging twelve claims against defendants Paul Barresi (“Barresi“) and Adam R. Waldman (“Waldman“) (Barresi and Waldman are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants“). (Docket No. 1).1 The Complaint alleges that after April 2020 and through September 2024, defendant Barresi, a private investigator, and defendant Waldman, the owner of The Endeavor Group and an agent for John C. Depp,2 engaged in coercive conduct, intimidation, and threats against Plaintiff and “potential witnesses,” “interfered with reports to [the] FBI and with the witnesses to attempt to set up certain individuals, intentionally and negligently, to set up the wrong people, with an attempt to frame them for wrongdoing,” utilized interstate communications to further their fraudulent scheme, tampered with evidence “relevant to an ongoing investigation by the FBI and Bureau of Security and Investigation Services through the Department of Consumer Affairs,” tampered with witnesses, victims, and informants “with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to law enforcement authorities,” and conspired to invade the privacy of, use the name or likeness of, harass, neglect, and
intentionally and negligently inflict emotional distress on Plaintiff. (See Complaint
On September 19, 2024, the Court ordered service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendants. (Docket No. 6). On September 26, 2024, Plaintiff served the Summons and Complaint on defendant Barresi. (Docket No. 7). On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an order allowing service by publication on defendant Waldman, which the Court denied on the same date. (Docket Nos. 8-9).4
On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed an “Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (“Motion for Preliminary Injunction“), with four supporting exhibits (Docket No. 15).5
On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint and Continued Injunction Requests. (Docket No. 18). On November 7, 2024, defendant Barresi filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (Docket No. 16). On November 13, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff‘s Motion to Amend the Complaint but did not make any determination on Plaintiff‘s Continued Injunction Requests due to the pendency of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Docket No. 20).
On November 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC“),
On December 13, 2024, defendant Barresi filed an Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Opposition“). (Docket No. 25).7
On December 23, 2024, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation. (Docket No. 28). Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Report and Recommendation (“Objection“) based, in part, on her lack of an opportunity to file a Reply to the Opposition. (Docket Nos. 33, 34). On January 15, 2025, the Court vacated that Report and Recommendation based on the Objection. (Docket No. 35).8
On January 30, 2025 (pursuant to the Court‘s January 15, 2020 Order, Docket No. 35 at 1), Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Opposition (“Reply“) (Docket No. 39 at 1-26), with numerous attached exhibits (Docket No. 39-1).9 On March 12, 2025 (pursuant to the Court‘s February 11, 2025 Order, Docket No. 41), defendant Barresi filed a Sur-Reply to the Reply (“Sur-Reply“) (Docket No. 51), accompanied by the Declaration of Paul Barresi, dated March 12, 2025 [“Barresi Decl.“], with twelve
For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied.
II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Defendant Barresi asserts evidentiary objections to most of the exhibits submitted in the Reply. (See Evidentiary Objections at 2-6).
Defendant Barresi initially objects to the exhibits submitted in support of the Reply based on their non-responsiveness to arguments made in the Opposition. (Evidentiary Objections at 2). Defendant Barresi notes that the Court, in its Order dated January 15, 2025, limited Plaintiff to “rebuttal evidence” in the Reply. (Id., citing Docket No. 35 at 1 [“Pursuant to Central District Local rule 7-10, Plaintiff‘s
Since certain exhibits submitted with the Reply were also submitted with the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, such as the Declaration of Mike McCormick dated October 24, 2024 (see Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26-30; Docket No. 39-1 at 22-26) and a social media post by defendant Barresi on October 2, 2024 (see Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 36; Docket No. 39-1 at 45), the Court agrees with defendant Barresi that such exhibits do not constitute rebuttal evidence. Consequently, defendant Barresi‘s objections to such evidence are SUSTAINED.
However, the remainder of the exhibits submitted with the Reply arguably are responsive to arguments made in the Reply. Therefore, defendant Barresi‘s objections to such evidence are OVERRULED.
Defendant Barresi objects to entire exhibits or portions of exhibits, including objections based on improper expert testimony, inadmissible hearsay, relevancy, and lack of foundation under
A. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction Should be Denied.
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “to protect against ongoing harassment and intimidation from Defendants.”13 (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2; see id. at 3 (alleging a preliminary injunction is being sought “to prevent contact with Plaintiff or legal consultants, stop interference and corrupt persuasion, [] to prevent unauthorized lookups of phone numbers, and to prevent intimidation of Plaintiff, [k]ey [w]itnesses, [p]rivate investigators, individuals, [and] legal consultants“), 5 (alleging that a preliminary injunction preventing improper communication will prevent the potential harm of intimidation and harassment of Plaintiff and witnesses, emotional distress to Plaintiff, increased legal costs to Plaintiff, and delay of legal proceedings), 11 (“Plaintiff respectfully requests an injunction to enforce communication restrictions, as the Defendants are a represented party.“); see also Reply at 4 (“Immediate injunctive relief is warranted by the evidence, which illustrates [defendant Barresi‘s] pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses.“); 17 (“[Defendant Barresi‘s] actions, which include invasive and blackmail-like tactics, have demonstrably caused individuals to fear for their safety and go into hiding. Such conduct is not a legitimate or lawful activity but rather a deliberate attempt to intimidate witnesses and victims, warranting judicial intervention.“), 24 (alleging that the Court “should consider granting that [defendant] Barresi cannot directly contact potential witnesses and/or victims, and that [defendant Barresi] must employ a licensed intermediary for contacting that is
Attached to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction are the following exhibits: (1) A four-page Declaration of Mike McCormick, dated October 24, 2024 (“McCormick Decl.“); (2) an email from Melissa Lerner, defendant Barresi‘s retained attorney, to Plaintiff on October 16, 2024, stating that: “Now that I have been retained by Mr. Barresi, all correspondence related to this matter will be from me or someone else in my office at my direction.;” (3) a document Plaintiff describes as an incoming call which shows “Plaintiff‘s legal consultant firm‘s employees were
Attached to the Reply are the following exhibits (in a different order than presented): (1) An eight-page Declaration of Ian Herndon (“Herndon Decl.“), dated January 10, 2025; (2) a seven-page Declaration of Molly Beaton (“Beaton Decl.“), dated January 13, 2025, with two attached exhibits; (3) a two-page Declaration of Erik Eichler (“Eichler Decl.“), dated November 6, 2024; (4) the four-page Declaration of Mike McCormick, dated October 24, 2024; (5) a four-page Declaration of Michael Kountz (“Kountz Decl.“), dated November 4, 2024; (6) an e-mail from Mario Nitrini to Plaintiff, dated January 4, 2025, stating, in part, that: “It is this post of mine (which included an attachment) where I screenshot [defendant] Barresi‘s post about my son. My son got involved with the wrong crowd. A gang murder took place and my son testified for the prosecution. Because [defendant] Barresi posted his post pertaining to my son and me, some very bad people have been looking for me. I‘m very seriously contemplating filing a criminal complaint on [defendant] Barresi for attempted murder.” (Docket No. 39-1 at 40). Plaintiff describes that email as follows: “Mario Nitrini has provided evidence of
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation omitted; italics in original); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.“) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; see Toyo Tire Holdings of Ams. Inc. v. Cont‘l Tire N. Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).17 The same standard applies to both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Niu v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Stuhlbarg Int‘l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (the standards for issuing a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical” to the standards for issuing a temporary restraining order). A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four
Additionally, where “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), amended by 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Because [the plaintiff] seeks a mandatory injunction, she must establish the law and facts clearly favor her position, not simply that she is likely to succeed.“) (italics in original).
2. Analysis.
a. Likelihood of success on the merits.
Where a plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction based on harassment, such as here, the “merits” does not refer to the plaintiff‘s underlying claims but rather to the plaintiff‘s “ability to establish harassment that justifies injunctive relief.” Jeffrey Katz Chiropractic, Inc. v. iBeat, Inc., Case No. 20-cv-02097-RS, 2020 WL 4459122, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (citing United Artists Corp. v. United Artist Studios, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-00828-MWF-MAA, 2019 WL 6917918, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2019). “[H]arassing speech is not protected [First Amendment] speech.” Doe v. Fitzgerald, Case No. 2:20-cv-10713-MWF-RAO, 2022 WL 423495, at *4 (C.D. Feb. 2, 2022). “‘When determining whether to enjoin a litigant‘s harassing conduct, federal district courts may look to state substantive law on harassment but apply the federal procedural rules under
As proof of defendant Barresi‘s harassing conduct, Plaintiff, in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, essentially relies on two instances. (See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1-2, 10-11). First, on September 30, 2024, after defendant Barresi was served with the lawsuit, defendant Barresi left Mike McCormick, Plaintiff‘s former private investigator (on June 16, 2022 Plaintiff “requested that [he] be her private investigator related to witnesses being harmed as she was alarmed to,” McCormick Decl. at 1), “an aggressive voicemail in which defendant Barresi “cursed [at him] several times stating ‘that PI Juan Brooks,’ and claimed that ‘there could have been a soft landing.‘” (McCormick Decl. at 2). Mr. McCormick perceived defendant Barresi‘s comments as “a direct threat to him, a threat to other private investigators, a threat to witness, and to” Plaintiff. (Id.). Second, although, on October 16, 2024, Plaintiff “received reassurance from [defendant Barresi‘s] own [c]ounsel that all correspondence would be directed to her, and/or someone else at Lavely and Singer‘s office, at her direction” (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, citing Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32 [October 16, 2024 email from Melissa Lerner to Plaintiff which states in pertinent part, “Now that I have been retained by Mr. Barresi all correspondent related to this matter will be from me or someone else in my office at my direction.“]), on October 17, 2024, based on defendant Barresi‘s unauthorized lookup of Plaintiff‘s legal consultants’ telephone number, Plaintiff‘s legal consultant firm‘s employees were called (Motion for
With respect to Mr. McCormick‘s allegation about the September 30, 2024 voicemail, it is not clear that defendant Barresi‘s statements and curses were threats. Mr. McCormick does not provide any context or meaning to defendant Barresi‘s curses regarding private investigator Juan Brooks or to defendant Barresi‘s claim there “could have been a soft landing.” Moreover, the last voicemail left by defendant Barresi for Mr. McCormick apparently was approximately one month before Mr. McCormick‘s Declaration (and approximately two months prior to the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction). In addition, while Plaintiff asserts that Mr. “McCormick has knowledge and information of over 20 potential witnesses within his more than two years related to these matters” and that Mr. McCormick “identifies the harassment and threatening nature of Defendants” (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1-2; see also Reply at 5-8 (extensively quoting and citing to Mr. McCormick‘s Declaration), Mr. McCormick‘s Declaration is replete with conclusory, non-specific, unfocused, and hearsay statements regarding defendant Barresi‘s alleged harassing and intimidating conduct. Mr. McCormick‘s Declaration describes events which appear to have occurred two or more years before the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (See McCormick Declaration at 1-3). Although Plaintiff relies on Mr. McCormick‘s October 17, 2024 email to Plaintiff to support her assertion that Mr. “McCormick received multiple voicemails, calls, and emails spanning more than two years of [defendant] Barresi‘s intimidation campaign, not only one” (Reply at 21, citing Docket No. 39-1), that email does not provide specific information about defendant Barresi‘s allegedly intimidating and/or threatening voicemails to Mr. McCormick, and that email does not resolve the problems, as noted above, with Mr. McCormick‘s Declaration regarding defendant Barresi‘s allegedly harassing and intimidating conduct towards others.
Similar to Mike McCormick‘s Declaration, the Declarations of Ian Herndon and Molly Beaton contain conclusory, non-specific, unfocused, and hearsay statements regarding defendant Barresi‘s alleged harassing and intimidating conduct. (See Docket No. 39-1 at 1-8, 9-15). Moreover, their Declarations describe events that occurred years before the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (See id.).
The majority of the statements in Mr. Herndon‘s Declaration appear to be directed to allegedly harassing and intimidating conduct by defendant Barresi toward someone named Angela, who Mr. Herndon does not identify, and apparently is not a named witness in this case. (See Docket No. 39-1 at 1-6). Other than stating that Angela told him “on numerous occasions that a Hollywood Fixer, believed to be [defendant] Barresi, was sent to intimidate and silence her, and at one point he showed up where she was in person and pointed a gun at her” (id. at ¶ 19)19, Mr. Herndon has not provided sufficient information about defendant Barresi‘s conduct toward Angela. While Mr. Herndon states that he has “witnessed [defendant] Barresi threaten death, mortality, and danger to people” (id. at ¶ 2), that starting in 2022 he observed defendant Barresi begin to “target” Plaintiff (id. at ¶ 37), and that he observed defendant Barresi incite Richard Albertini to “attack” Plaintiff (Docket
In her Declaration, Molly Beaton states that defendant Barresi continues to threaten and harass her, as evidenced by an email defendant Barresi sent her on December 28, 2024. (Docket No. 39-1 at ¶ 1; id. at ¶ 4 (“As recent as December 28, [d]efendant Barresi has contacted me which I see as harassing, dangerous, invasion of privacy, threatening, and malicious. His emails are eerily intimidating manipulative, and controlling. He was trying to force me to say or do things I do not agree with. I’m an innocent victim that was brought in related to victims of sexual assault. [Defendant] Barresi is a criminal stalker.”)).20 Although Ms. Beaton attempts to describe that email (see id. at ¶ 25), the Court, without the actual email, is not able to understand its contents or find that it showed that defendant Barresi engaged in threating and harassing conduct toward her. Attached to Ms. Beaton’s Declaration is an October 22, 2024 email from defendant Barresi to Molly Brown (presumably Molly Beaton) in which defendant Barresi stated: “The alleged victim
In his Declaration, Erik Eichler, a private investigator in Connecticut, states that on October 29, 2024, he drove to the residence of Rebecca M. Berry, spoke to Ms. Berry and Ms. Berry’s mother in the driveway, provided Ms. Berry with a copy of the Complaint in this case and with a letter from Plaintiff requesting a Witness Declaration, that Ms. Berry’s mother asked Ms. Berry, “What is this about?,” to which Ms. Berry responded, “Remember that guy [Paul Barresi] who confessed to me about killing people?”, and that Ms. Berry said she would contact Plaintiff or Mr. Eichler later and ended the interview. (Docket No. 39-1 at 20-21).
Plaintiff ascribes the following meaning to Mr. Eichler’s Declaration: “[Defendant] Barresi’s confession about killing people serves as a clear example of how [defendant] Barresi has intentionally fostered an atmosphere of fear and danger, leading witnesses to believe they could be in physical danger if they cooperate with any legal proceedings. . . . This strategy effectively suppresses witnesses, as they are left fearing for their lives, thus removing their ability to provide credible testimony or aid in investigation. Rebecca Berry’s reluctance to provide a formal declaration stems from her ongoing fear of [defendant] Barresi].” (Reply at 12-13). The contents of Mr. Eichler’s Declaration do not support a finding that defendant Barresi has threatened or harassed Ms. Berry or anybody else. Plaintiff simply speculates that Ms. Berry’s statement about defendant Barresi’s confession about killing people, as well as the text message from Ms. Berry to Plaintiff that named
The Declaration of Michael Kountz, a licensed private investigator in New Mexico, suffers from some of the same issues as the Declarations of Mike McCormick, Ian Herndon, and Molly Beaton. (See Docket No. 39-1 at 27-30). Mr. Kountz states that on May 1, 2023, Plaintiff contacted his company to “interview James Conner21 regarding an audio recording contained in an edited video by [defendant] Barresi which claimed to portray a phone call between [defendant] Barresi and James Conner,” and that in June 2023 he interviewed James Conner, during which James Conner stated that he was not aware he was being recorded during the phone call, that the audiotape was taken out of context, and that he did not give consent to the use of the audio recording. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3-7). Mr. Kountz further states that after the interview James Conner called to tell him that defendant Barresi was “dangerous” and that James Conner was “in fear for his life due to his involvement” and “was flying to his property in Alaska out of fear of reprisal from [defendant] Barresi[.]” (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10). Mr. Kountz also states the audio recording, which Mr. Kountz reviewed, contains alterations that “James Conner was an FBI agent” (James Conner said he was never an FBI agent) and that Plaintiff’s mother “had witnessed a mob murder by the Gottis” and has [defendant] Barresi “discuss[ing] a photo of Amber Heard with Plaintiff [ ] to James Conner, that they were arm in arm, yet at the same time indicating danger to life through comparing to an assailant,” and that “I have information that Plaintiff is still fearful to this day that this audio tape is either to make someone shoot her or shoot Amber.” (Id. at ¶
Relying on Michael Kountz’s statements, Plaintiff makes the following assertions: “The audio appeared to serve a tool for intimidation, targeting Plaintiff with threats of violence, including a possible murder or harm.” (Reply at 15); and “[Defendant] Barresi’s use of imagery, coupled with mafia death threats and false claims about Plaintiff’s mother, Victoria, being an actress who allegedly witnessed a mob hit, shows a deliberate attempt to manipulate.” (Reply at 15). Plaintiff’s assertions are conclusory and speculative. Moreover, Plaintiff’s assertion that she “still fears for her safety due to the content of the tape, which she believes could incite someone to act violently against her” (Reply at 15) does not serve to establish that defendant Barresi engaged in harassing conduct toward Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s apparent reliance on the District Court of the Third Circuit in Hawaii’s grant of Petitioner’s Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order
Finally, the remainder of the exhibits -- the December 9, 2024 email from Mario Nitrini to Plaintiff (Docket No. 39-1 at 40); documents related to Richard Albertini’s September 13, 2022 application for a temporary restraining order against defendant Barresi (id. at 78-86); defendant Barresi’s undated social media statements and/or messages about Mr. Albertini and/or defendant Barresi’s July 1, 2022 in-person statements to Mr. Albertini (id. at 87-91); Mr. Albertini’s undated in-court statement about Plaintiff’s fear of defendant Barresi (id. at 18); defendant Barresi’s December 28, 2024 social media post (id. at 19); defendant Barresi’s two January 2, 2025 social media posts (id. at 32, 38); the enlarged image of the flight path presumably contained in one of defendant Barresi’s January 2, 2025 social media posts (id. at 63); November 2018 coroner’s report for Plaintiff’s mother (id.
Plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to show that defendant Barresi has engaged in harassing conduct.23 Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown either “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person” or a course of conduct “which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.” See
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b. Irreparable harm.
Plaintiff claims that she will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued. (See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21 (“The Defendant’s actions have created a climate of fear and intimidation, jeopardizing Plaintiff’s ability to pursue legal rights.”; and “Given the ongoing nature of Defendants’ intimidation tactics, immediate injunctive relief is necessary to prevent further harm.”); see id. at 5-6 (“If the Defendants engage in improper communications, it may create an atmosphere of intimidation, making it difficult for the Plaintiff and [w]itnesses to participate fully in legal proceedings.”; “Any unauthorized communication may also extend to witnesses involved in the case, leading to potential intimidation or coercion.”; “Unauthorized contact by the Defendants can cause severe emotional distress to the Plaintiff, particularly if such communications are threatening or harassing in nature.”; “Violations of the rules concerning communication can lead to protracted legal battles, requiring the Plaintiff to incur additional legal fees and costs.”; and “Unauthorized communications and failure to adhere to proper service protocols can result in unnecessary delays in the legal process.”); see also Reply at 22 (“The integrity of judicial proceedings is compromised by the actions of [defendant] Barresi, resulting in irreparable harm. These actions have created a climate of fear that discourages attorneys from representing Plaintiff on the public record, thereby depriving her of her due process
“A preliminary injunction may only be granted when the moving party has demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude of the injury.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999). “Suffering irreparable harm is ‘[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.’” Fitzgerald, 2022 WL 423495, at *6 (citation omitted). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must not identify a speculative harm and must show more than the possibility of remote further injury. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 21-22 (rejecting “possibility” standard and holding that the plaintiffs must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction”) (italics in original); Fitzgerald, 2022 WL 423495, at *6 (“Further, the harm identified may not be speculative and Defendant must also show more than the possibility of some remote further injury.”) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 21-22).
Plaintiff has failed to show she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Plaintiff did not file the Motion for Preliminary Injunction until more than three weeks after defendant Barresi’s last “aggressive voicemail” to Mr. McCormick (and substantially longer for much of the other allegedly harassing and intimidating conduct described by Mr. McCormick), most of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff relates to allegedly harassing and intimidating conduct that took place long before Plaintiff filed the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Plaintiff has not submitted competent and credible evidence of harassing and intimidating conduct by defendant Barresi since the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center, 991 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A] long delay before seeking a preliminary
c. Balance of equities.
Plaintiff contends that the balance of hardships tips “decisively” in her favor. (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22; see also Reply at 23-24). Plaintiff claims that “[g]ranting this injunction will not unduly burden the Defendants, while denying it would leave Plaintiff vulnerable to continued harassment and intimidation.” (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22; see also Reply at 23 (“[Defendant Barresi’s] actions have resulted in substantial damage, whereas an injunction would merely avoid the continuation of unlawful conduct.”)).
“In assessing the balance of equities, the court must assess the likely hardship to both the plaintiff and the defendants if the court were to deny the injunction on one hand or grant the injunction on the other.” Macnab v. Gahderi, Case No. 2:09-cv-04498-DDP-RZ, 2009 WL 10671026, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2009).
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As discussed above, Plaintiff’s assertion that without a preliminary injunction she will suffer irreparable harm is speculative. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff has already received from the District Court of the Third Circuit in Hawaii at least some of the relief she seeks in the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, namely, that defendant Barresi is not permitted to contact, threaten, or physically harass Plaintiff (see Docket No. 39-1 at 36). In contrast, if a preliminary injunction is granted, defendant Barresi’s ability to defend himself in this case could be hampered. Based on the evidence before the Court and the arguments of the parties, the Court is unable to find that the balance of hardships weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that the balance of equities tips in her favor.
d. Public interest.
Plaintiff argues that a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest for numerous reasons, such as “maintaining the integrity of the judicial process,” “safeguarding individuals from intimidation and harassment,” and “ensur[ing] that the judicial process remains fair and accessible to all.” (Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11-12, 18-20; see also Reply at 23).
Plaintiff justifies the granting of a preliminary injunction based on lofty public interest ideals. However, Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction appears to be more personal in nature. The allegations in Plaintiff’s pleadings, as well as in defendant Barresi’s pleadings, reflect longstanding animosity between Plaintiff and defendant Barresi. Since Plaintiff has failed to show defendant Barresi engaged in a course of harassment, as discussed above, granting a preliminary injunction in this case would not serve the public interest.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy any of the four criteria for obtaining a preliminary injunction.
III. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
DATED: April 18, 2025
DAVID T. BRISTOW
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations may be subject to the right of any party to file Objections as provided in the Local Rules and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number.