Christina A. Ex Rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg

A., by through and her CHRISTINA Friend,

Parent Next and JENNIFER

A.; B., by thrоugh Patricia and her Friend, Hillary B.; Philip C., by

Next through

and his Parent Next and

Friend, C.; D., by Robert Shannan through

and her Parent Next and D.; E., by

Friend, Melissa Todd Friend,

through Parent and his Next F., by E.; through

Sandra Carl Friend, Hillary B., Appellees,

his Next BLOOMBERG,

Jeff in his ca official

pacity Secretary of the Da as South Department Corrections;

kota Spurrell, capacity in his official

Owen Superintendent Train State

ing Plankinton, School at Da South

kota, Appellants.

No. 01-3698. Appeals,

United Court of States

Eighth Circuit. Oct.

Submitted: 2002. Jan.

Filed:

Rehearing Rehearing En Banc

Denied: March inmates additional for who need

courses assistance. educational parties they the court that notified conducting negotiations were agree presented later a settlement and A. approval. v. Bloom ment for Christina (D.S.D. 00-4036, slip op. at berg, No. 2000). a “fair conducting After Dec. Rule hearing” pursuant to Federal of ness id., 23(e), ap Procedure the court Civil proved and dis the settlement prejudice pursu missed the without Federal Rule of ant Civil Procedure Falls, Moore, argued, Sioux James E. 41(a)(2), retaining jurisdiction “pur for the SD, appellant. for pose enforcing Agree of the Settlement DC, Soler, argued, Washington, Mark I. explic Although Id. at 8. the court ment.” for appellee. itly determined was reasonable, “fair, it incor adequate,” and LOKEN, MELLOY, BEAM, and Before porated specific none of terms and Judges. Circuit agreed upon by parties in conditions BEAM, Judge. Circuit opinion and order. its Dakota inmates at Juvenile the South then of sought The class an award attor- at Plankinton sued Training State School expenses, and and the district ney’s fees at the improve as a conditiоns class granted request. inmate claimed that facility. The class Reform Litigation held that the Prison Act them of deprived the school actions of (“PLRA”) did not limit the amount at- rights their under both constitutional could receive and torney’s fees First Fourteenth Amendments to and fully was to a com- that the class entitled that the used procedures Constitution and and pensatory expense fee award because the Individuals Disabilities violated with positive agreement had a Act, §§ 1400-1487. Education U.S.C. facility, making impact on conditions at the (1) issue, among things, At other were The class prevailing party. class a was methods used the institution’s restraint $302,617.50 attorney’s fees and awarded (2) lengthy confinements employees, $74,019.98in after the expenses, costs and (3) subjected, pro- which inmates were appropriate court made reductions thereof) (or mental health vision lack Secretary of the in the fee award.1 The (5) (4) staff, services, training Department Dakota of Corrections South discipline pun- and “arbitrary” method Train- Superintendent and the State (6) ishment, presence of male staff (7) appeal the district court’s ing School area, in the female shower mеmbers expenses. and and of fees costs vis- award telephone calls and monitoring below, (8) we reverse. its, education For the reasons stated special the lack and expenses attorney’s for reductions in costs court reduced fees make similar 1. The district de- duplicative representation the class at travel. duplicative for interviews, positions court did not but the “[p]rivate 1. DISCUSSION stated that do settlements judicial approval entail the oversight Party Prevailing Status A. involved in consent decrees.” 604 n. de legal review novo the “[WJe 7, 121 If the agreement bе- litigant prevail whether a is a question tween the inmate class and the institution Missouri, 127 party.” Jenkins ing settlement, private is a then it is clear Cir.1997). 1988(b) 709, Section 713 of from Buckhannon that the inmate class is States 42 of the United Code Title allows not a “prevailing party” entitled to attor- attorney’s court to award reasonable ney’s 42 § fees under U.S.C. 1988. “prevailing party.” In to the this ‍‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‍fees case, or with an begin analysis the issue of whether not the in We of the prevailing party is a by way mate class entitled to court’s actions of ratifica centers around a fees recent Su receive tion оf the agreement. Rule decision, preme 23(e) Court Buckhannon Board of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce Home, Inc., Virginia Care v. West & De dure “[a] states that class action shall not Health and partment Human Re compromised dismissed or without the sources, 598, 121 1835, 532 U.S. S.Ct. 149 23(e). approval of the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. (2001). In L.Ed.2d 855 “In settlement, approving a class the dis “catalyst held that theory” Court ‘fair, trict court must consider whether it is ” status is no prevailing party2 longer valid. reasonable, adequate.’ Van Horn v. “catalyst theory,” a party pre Under (8th Cir.1988) 604, Trickey, 840 F.2d 606 brought if vails the lawsuit forth “volun (quoting Grunin v. Int’l House Pan tary chаnge” by the defendant. 532 U.S. cakes, (8th Cir.1975)). 114, 513 F.2d 601, 121 The “catalyst at S.Ct. 1835. theo The district court’s review of the settle ry” inappropriate is for the award of attor ment agreement essentially this case ney’s fees because allows an “[i]t award “fair, determined it whether was reason judicially there is no where sanctioned able, adequate” merely and was an change legal relationship in the par 23(e). compliance exercise in with Rule 605, at Id. S.Ct. ties.” 1835. The This to impose necessary review fails determined that a legal Court change, ” “imprimatur the agreement. on voluntary than a change, rather in the settlement, A class agree- like an relationship of the parties is required. Id. claim, any ment resolving legal other voluntary defendant’s “A change in con private negotiated contract between duct, although perhaps accomplishing what 23(e) parties. Nevertheless, Rule plaintiff sought to achieve by the law requires court to intrude on that suit, necessary judicial lacks the imprima private agreement consensual to ensure change.” on the tur Id. that the agreement product is not the Supreme' specified Court that a that, fraud or collusion and taken as a judgment the merits or a “settlement fair, whole, adequate, it is and reason- agreement!] through enforced a consent able to all concerned. decree” sufficient to meet this standard. (3d 604, § at Moore’s Federal Practice 23.82[1] S.Ct. 1835. ed.2000) added). debate is Although over the Rule status of the 23(e) agreement requires approve the court’s court to role in enforcing it. The Court agreement, Buckhannon the class action it does not agree "We Hillard, with guage.” Cody our sister circuits that 773 n. applies broadly Buckhannon to fee-shifting (8th Cir.2002). that employ prevailing party’ statutes lan- Buck the merits a consent decree.4 establish the terms the court to require Therefore, hannon, the district U.S. agree- is not approval private of the settlement A not, itself, authority create a consent has enough.5 judge does While a decree, decree, not be- and the inmate consent to enforce terms under Buckhan- prevailing party “noncompliance come a consent decree is with trial court. by this action of the non contempt enforceable citation for Local Int’l Ass’n Fire court.” No. that the settle- appellants concede Cleveland, City fighters v. “something case is (1986).6 518, 106 92 L.Ed.2d 405 agree- than a more” has This court held consent decrees court retained ment because However, distinguishable from settle jurisdiction to it. enforce jurisdiction by the of court’s enforcement ments means enforcement. “[Cjonsent judicial establish a enough is not to ... are enforceable alone decrees ” on the settlement contract. “imprimatur through supervising court’s exercise that, although court indicated The district contempt powers, and settle its was not a formal аgreement only through a ments enforceable [are] decree, to “to read Buckhannon consent action for breach of contract.” Hazen new resolving a particular one form for require 697, Reagen, rel. LeGear ex prevailing in order to become a dispute (8th Cir.2000) Benjamin (citing v. Ja 699 opinion narrowly.” read too party is to (2d Cir.1999)). cobson, 172 157 Bloomberg, F.Supp.2d A. v. 167 Christina that the court’s dismiss We convinced (D.S.D.2001). 1098 court went 13, 2000, would not al order December say agreement on that the settlement contempt. a citation for As earli support as a essentially рurpose the same served noted, specifically no enumerated con er it changed consent since formal decree incorporated into the tract terms were parties legal relationship between party, order. think that We either specific to make requiring appellants aggrieved, if could institute a breach training and improvements to the school and, perhaps, action in the district contract allowing the appellees enforce assuming, deciding, the con without court at court. Id. 1099.3 We agreement jurisdiction for tinuation of federal court disagree with this conclusion. voluntary with a case. “A dismissal such 41(a)(2) indicated, here] Rule prejudice [as it under makes out as nullity a proceedings party prevails only if it re renders clear that parties if the action had as judgment either an enforceable leaves ceives judicial opinion subject not enforcement district court's 3. We do read the holding agreement pro- falls short as an than the reinstatement the civil other requirements essential of a consent ceeding agreement 18 settled.” court decree is sufficient. We believe that the § 3626(g)(6). In this U.S.C. indeed, is, agreement approved finds that the jurisdiction purported over to retain form of consent decree. some provisions agreement in to enforce its against appellants. defined "[a] 4. A consent decree is as parties agree Law decree that all to.” Black’s question can that courts have 6.“There be no ed.1999) Dictionary 419 add- power compliance with inherent to enforce ed). through contempt.” lawful orders civil their States, 364, 370, Shillitani United "private as The PLRA defines a settlement” (1966). L.Ed.2d among parties into "an entered brought.” “prisоner” never 8 Moore’s nition provision. been Federal in this (3d ed.1997). A., So, § it F.Supp.2d 41.40[9][b] Practice Christina possible determination, that the class could seek rein reaching this the court statement of the dismissed under found that definition “institution” district court’s retained enforcement § found in 42 U.S.C. section that But, jurisdiction. availability of either applies pre-dates section 1997e non-contempt potential these remedies PLRA, the appropriate was definition to fails to the conclusion that support “in- consider. Section 1997 defines an essentially serves jail, prison, stitution” to include “a or оther consent decree. See 18 U.S.C. facility” facility juve- correctional for § 3626(g)(6); Kokkonen v. Guardian “adjudicated delinquent” niles or “in need Life Ins., 375, 381, U.S. 1997(l)(B)(ii), supervision.” § 42 U.S.C. (1994). L.Ed.2d 391 (iv)(III). The district court reasoned that Congress must have intended section Litigation B. Prison Reform Act apply only 1997e to to adult be- facilities governs “Abuse discretion re cause 1997 explicitly juve- section refers to awards, however, view of questions fee of nile facilities and 1997e not. section does law are reviewed de novo.” Lane v. Unit A., Christina 167 F.Supp.2d at 1099. We Agric., 1001, ed 294 Dep’t States F.3d disagree. The statutory construction used of (8th Cir.2002) (citing 1003 v. Jenkins Mis by the distriсt court fails to take into souri, 709, Cir.1997)). 127 F.3d 713 plain account the of language the statute. Since our of the applicability examination “Although Congress did define the law, question of the PLRA ais of we hold phrase ‘jail, prison, or other correctional fee-limiting provisions that of the the Act facility’ plain ... the meaning of the statute, apply in this case. This codified in phrase undoubtedly encompasses juvenile 1997e(d), § 42 part places at U.S.C. limits detention facilities.” Alexander v. S. attorney’s the of amount fees that a (4th Cir.1997). Boyd, 1383 may plaintiff court prisoner. award 3626(g)(5) Section of Title 18 of thе provision following: at states issue the Code, United States provision another of any brought prisoner [i]n PLRA, the explicitly “prison” ‍‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‍defines as who any jail, prison, is confined to or a “facility ju- or incarcerates detains other in facility, correctional which at- veniles or adults.” Under this of definition torney’s are fees authorized under sec- a “prison,” provision the fee-limiting found title, tion this 1988 of such fees shall not 1997e(d)(l) § in 42 clearly U.S.C. would awarded, be except to the extent that encompass Training State School. ... directly the fee was and reasonably S., Alexander a casе with facts similar to proving incurred in an actual violation of the Fourth Circuit deter- plaintiffs rights protected by a stat- “jail, mined prison, definition pursuant ute to may which a fee other facility” ju- correctional covered the awarded section under 1988 this title. facility venile at issue in that 113 case. 1997e(d)(l)(A) § U.S.C. add- F.3d at 1383-84. The court stated that ed). § since 3626(g)(5) 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(l) §

The district court were at held that enacted the same State PLRA, Training time part School not fall within as definitions “jail, same, prison, “prison” definition of a or other correc- based on the tional facility” juvenile even though “cardinal rule of statutory construction ... inmate class members fall originally part within defi- statutes which are equiva- serve togeth- functional Act construed same should be I Therefore, “jail, prison, Accordingly, or other lent of a consent decree. er.” to pre- in hold the class be a facility” U.S.C. would correctional 1997e(d)(l) juvenile facili- standard forth encompassés vailing party under the set § Home, Inc., 3626(g)(5) § defines Bd. & Care v. ties since U.S.C. Buckhannon juvenile facilities. Health Human prisons Virginia Dep’t include West & Res., 604-05, (2001). This 149 L.Ed.2d 855 conclusion rejected this reason- The district court based, underlying part, in on аn determi- PLRA were ing the sections because enjoys explic- that the nation in sections the United codified various jurisdiction un- itly retained enforcement panel problem with the Code. “The States in the standard set forth Kokkonen der S. its failure opinion Alexander Am., 511 U.S. Guardian Ins. Co. into the structure of Life take account 375, 379, 114 L.Ed.2d 391 makes This structure it unsafe PLRA. (1994), jurisdiction and that enables term defined one section assume or- to issue enforcement necessarily same PLRA has the regarding ders A., another.” Christina definition Monsanto, See Gilbert reasoning find this F.Supp.2d 1100. We (8th Cir.2000) (affirming a district 699-700 agree with the unpersuasive, and we ability jurisdic- retain expressly juvenile facilities are Fourth Circuit that of a settle- tion and the enforcement fee-limiting provisions of covered agreement). PLRA. majority opposite con- reaches ju- that the Because we concluded have First, majori- clusion for two reasons. attor- inmate is not entitled to venile adopts a of Buckhannon that ty reading fees, we not whether ney’s need address the use of term emphasizes Court’s the compensa- a fully class was to the entitled minimizes on consent decree and reliance or the tory awаrd whether generally stated the Court’s concerns in not and ex- reducing costs erred judicial ‍‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‍oversight, approval, and enforce- duplicative travel penses awarded for Second, majority jurisdiction. counsel. class ex- acknowledge Kokkonen fails II. CONCLUSION use of district court pressly sanctioned the to enforce settlement orders vehicles reverse the district court’s award

We in where agreements cases expenses, attorney’s fees and costs and jurisdiction to en- explicitly retain courts entry of con- judgment for and we remand I ad- agreements. force opinion. with sistent this these in turn. dress issues MELLOY, Judge, Dissenting. Circuit I training I the state school concur that rejected the the Court facility as a under the qualifies correctional catalyst theory prevailing party status However, Act. I Litigation Reform Prison a prevailing that for there to be and held majority’s from portion dissent “ a altera party, there be ‘material must which holds the opinion relationship par of the legal of the tion ap- District court prevailing party. a ” 604-05, Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at ties.’ agreement and dis- of a settlement proval (citing 1835 Texas St. Teachers jurisdic- 121 S.Ct. with retentiоn of explicit missal Dist., 489 Indep. v. Garland Sch. enforcing the Ass’n purpose for tion 996 792-93, 1486, 782, wholly non-judicial 109 103 ing

U.S. S.Ct. relief. The Court (1989)). private L.Ed.2d 866 further not face a purely Court agreement, stated that material alteration of the a with legal relationship carry judicial jurisdiction, must a im retained enforcement aor 605, primatur judicial or sanction. Id. decree. consent (“We think, however, 121 S.Ct. 1835 Court Buckhannon did not limit “catalyst theory” falls the other side of availability of prevailing party status the line examples. from these It allows an only those resolved through cases judicially award there is sanс where no decree judgment consent or final on the tioned change legal relationship 604-05, Id. at 121 merits. S.Ct. 1835. parties.”). Rather, the Court forth set criteria guide analysis whether As there is examples type of action that judicially sanctioned, material change convey necessary judicial impri- would legal sanction, relationship parties. of the Id. matur or the Court referred to above, noted As of these one issues settlement agreements through enforced finality interlocutory on an consent and judgments decrees on the —success or survival following a motion to dismiss 604, merits. Id. at 1835. As S.Ct. empha- are insufficient. The Court also examples type of of the actions that would judicial judicial approval, sized oversight, not convey necessary imprimatur, 7, jurisdiction. and enforcement Id. at n. Court referred non-final victories such 1835. In distinguishing judicial- as surviving a motion to for lack of dismiss ly change change sanctioned from that is jurisdiction or for failure to a claim state merely reflected in a upon which relief could granted re- agreement, the Court stated: ceiving interlocutory an ruling re- Private do not settlements entail verses a for dismissal failure to state a judicial approval oversight 604-05, involved claim. (citing S.Ct. 1835 in consent And Helms, juris- decrees. federal Hewitt v. 482 U.S. diction to (1987) enforce a contractual L.Ed.2d lacking settlement will often be 754, 760, unless Hampton, Hanrahan v. terms (1980) incorpo- 100 S.Ct. {per L.Ed.2d 670 curiam)). rated into the order of dismissal. rejected argu- The Court prevailing party status could Kokkonen, (citing 511 U.S. at exist where successful the result was ob- ‍‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‍1673) added). (emphasis S.Ct. private

tained through agree- a settlement Importantly, the case does not ment. Id. at 604 and n. 121 S.Ct. 1835. involve a mere settlement agree- Rather, The provide facts of Buckhаnnon the ment. it a involves settlement clearest example judi- the a agreement absence of with equitable remedies re- Buckhannon, imprimatur. cial In legisla- garding confinement conditions and treat- tive provided options its desired training at the The school. relief and underlying legal mooted the approved district court this settlement claims. at 121 agreement U.S. hearing after a fairness and Accordingly, 1835. explicitly the Court faced a jurisdiction retained to enforce simple based on dismissal mootness follow- agreement.7 the settlement This retention agreemеnt dismissal, provides settlement that its a violation the order and the incorporated terms ancillary jurisdiction would be into court's court would have to en- order approving agreement, agreement. settlement force the settlement See Adden- agreement breach Appellant’s of the settlement would be to at dum 26-27. The Brief order, ancillary a violation of the and jurisdiction, properly if be of enforcement power, guaran- jurisdiction court’s to enforce order would the district within judicial oversight required exist. tees therefore below, re- explained As Buckhannon. added). empha- Court jurisdiction was of enforcement tention not re- sized district had power. Accord- the district court’s within authority agreement, “[t]he tained over the finality, approval, over- required ingly, jur- did not Stipulation Order reserve I jurisdiction present, and sight in the District Court to enforce isdiction distin- upon which to find no material basis indeed, it did agreement; present case from the situation guish much as to the not so refer settlement had if the district court would face we Kokkonen, agreement.” U.S. decree” to use the words “consent elected Accordingly, Kokkonen achieve the identical result. to prohibition not be as a broad should read ' juris- against a district court’s retention of II agreement diction to enforce a settlement status, party denying prevailing In Rather, order. should via court Kokkonen agree- majority distinguishes settlement holding limited to courts be its —district decrees. ments from consent Critical authority lack inherent to enforce settle- majority’s analysis is the conclusion there is incor- agreements where no powerless to en- that the district court is poration of the order of an en- via force jur- or retention of enforcement dismissal only poten- and that the forcement order isdiction. remedies are an action for breach tial Kokkonen, Eighth has Citing Circuit original contract reinstatement repeatedly recognized possibility un- concluding, majority so suit. jurisdiction federal enforcement over set authority of the enforcement derestimates agreement where tlement accompanies court that the ex- jur approves, expressly retains jurisdiction. retention of press See, enforce, agreement. isdiction Ins. Co. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Inc., Assoc., Haydеn Bldg. v. ATY e.g., Am., 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. U.S. Inc., 530, 532-33 Sys., Cir. (1994), the held 128 L.Ed.2d 391 Court 2002) for the (citing proposition Kokkonen only that a district court lacked inherent made agreement may that a settlement authority an order to enforce issue a district order of dismissal part of The Court jurisdiction over a provision retaining by a stated: agreement, holding specifi but quite have been dif- The situation would court was without cally obligation comply parties’ if the ferent jurisdiction explicitly had not because it agree- the terms of with jurisdiction financing over a retained part of the order of ment had been made ancillary to settlе that the agreement was by separate provision dismissal—either Labs., Sheng Starkey agreement); ment provision “retaining jurisdic- aas {such (8th Cir.1995) Inc., (citing 53 F.3d agreement) or tion” over the settlement Kokkonen, holding but a district the terms the settle- by incorporating jurisdiction “sixty reservation of for agreement in the order. In (60) permit party move to event, agreement days any a breach of the would approve entire agreement did the approving did not order of dismissal but agreement. agreement explicitly settlement incorporate the into action, Rather, good private for cause shown” agreement. settlement th[e] reopen satisfy general retention approved not the district court did settlement jurisdiction requirement jurisdiction agreement enforcement set and retained for Kokkonen)-, forth in Miener Missouri purpose agreement. enforcing Health, F.3d Dept. Mental jurisdictional ‍‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‍Accordingly, requirement (8th Cir.1995) Kokkonen, (citing find Here, but set forth in Kokkonen satisfied. jurisdiction ing no federal enforcement be Hayden in unlike issue agreement cause settlement did not “[t]he jurisdiction financing does not to a relate any having jurisdiction court designatе agreement ancillary that is to the settle- proceedings.”). of future enforcement agreement. Hayden, 289 F.3d present 532-33. Sheng, Unlike case instance, Eighth In at one least Cir scope involved no limitation on the jurisdiction cuit on the relied retained jurisdiction. Sheng, retained enforcement prong of Kokkonen to affirm a district Miener, 195. Finally, F.3d at unlike enforcing court-approved court in present district case ex- agreement. settlement Gilbert v. Mon , pressly designate acted to itself as the 699-700 Cir. santo jurisdiction court to hold over future en- 2000). Gilbert, parties reached а Miener, forcement. 62 F.3d at 1127. Be- agreement stipulated, settlement jurisdictional requirement cause the is met ‘confidential Agreement “[t]he Settlement because case does not parties and Release’ executed between merely involve agree- settlement incorporated herein reference. Fur ment, I can find no material basis thermore, upon stipulated it is parties that the distinguish which to the present scenario agree jurisdic that this Court shall retain from involving one a consent decree. tion to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Release.” Id. at 699. The majority relies on Hazen ex rel. court Gilbert then dismissed the Reagen, LeGear v. 698-99 prejudice subject to an express case with (8th Cir.2000) distinguish settlement jurisdiction retention enforce the agreements from consent decrees. While agreement. Upon plaintiffs subse it is true that the court in Hazen distin- quent agreement, motion to enforce the guished between federal consent decrees the district court learned the defen and “private agreements,” sign dant failed to agree the referenced question Hazen did not involve a of dis- Nevertheless, ment. the district court de authority jurisdiction trict court to retain parties termined that the had reached an over a agreement for pur- that, oral under pose Rather, of enforcement. at 699. stipulation, terms of the there was Hazen held a federal consent decree jurisdiction retained to enforce the oral under PLRA could enforced appeal On affirmed state court where the consent decree the district court’s enforcement order and failed to conform to the standards mandat- stated, “We hold on the record before us ed Regarding the PLRA. Id. that the district court not clearly err authority, court enforcement the Court in concluding ... jurisdic that it retained clearly Buckhannon stated that a tion over the enforcement the settle is distinct from a ment agreement, regardless its form.” consent decree. 532 U.S. at added). 604 n. 121 S.Ct. This conclusion is

In Gilbert, in undisputed. goes as Hazen no further than not merely was a Buckhannon on this issue should not Rather, (emphasis original)). ment.” authority assess as extended be examples agree- those to show a settlement the Court used between similarities jur- ‘catalyst theory’ on subject enforcement “the the other to retained ment falls were cases and a decree. Such the line” in which consent side isdiction from “prevail- facts of Hazen. be considered plaintiffs not the should ing parties.” plaintiff that the Finally, finding a Indeed, 604-05, ... a split avoids circuit prevailing party was a a observing judgment that either while American Eleventh Circuit. See with the on the merits or a consent decree clear- Chmielarz, Inc., Ass’n, Disability ly plaintiff are sufficient to make a Cir.2002) (herein- (11th F.3d 1318-20 party,” the essential test es- “prevailing “ADA, Inc”) (synthesizing Buckhan- after Court requires tablished plaintiff hold that a and Kokkonen tо non “judicially a sanc- plaintiff achieve district prevailing party a where the was change legal relationship in the tioned approved a settlement court parties.” of the jurisdiction solely for and “retained enforcing purpose Settlement opinion, In a well-reasoned

Agreement”). Inc., 289 at 1319. F.3d ADA rejected first Eleventh Circuit Next, the noted that Eleventh Circuit interpretation Buckhannon bright-line dispelled any lingering concerns Kokkonen today: majority adopts fine con- regarding distinctions between prevail- a saying party that “a not on hand sent decrees the one and settle- the ADA ing party purposes for the agreements coupled with retained (1) they judg- a obtain either unless jurisdiction on the other. Id. enforcement (2) or- merits or a court at 1320. decree,” dered consent that, Thus, it is even clear absent interpreted to stand Buckhannon decree, a if the entry of formal consent plaintiff that a could proposition for the incorporates either only if it “prevailing party” be into its terms of final those results. achieved one of two juris- expressly retains of dismissal Buckhannon, however, reading That settlement, may to enfоrce a it diction Indeed, overly the Court narrow. par- the terms thereafter enforce of the say those two resolutions so authority Its to do ties’ only upon are the sufficient bases which “judicially sanc- clearly establishes prevail- can found be a change legal relationship in the tioned Rivero, Smyth v. ing party. See parties,” required Buckhan- as Cir.2002) (“We doubt non, may plaintiff thereafter because the guidance the Supreme Court’s to court to have return intended inter- Buckhannon was to be A consent decree is enforced. formal restrictively require so prеted unnecessary in these circumstances be- used that the words ‘consent decree’ be explicit jurisdic- cause the retention Stu- explicitly.”); Nat’l Coalition for specifically ap- tion or the court’s order Bush, dents with Disabilities are, proving terms (N.D.Fla.2001) F.Supp.2d purposes, equiv- the functional for these (“The Supreme Court’s discussion a consent decree. entry alent of the consent decrees and settlements original). holding may fell short of a fees above, agree forth I only if a con- For the reasons set not be recovered there is decree, the Eleventh Circuit. Because sent not a mere settle- with possessed case jurisdiction to enforce order,

agreement via court and because requisite exercised the

approval oversight, I would hold the prevailing party. class to be a America,

UNITED STATES of

Appellee, WOODARD, Appellant.

Clarence W.

No. 02-1244. of Appeals,

United States Court

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec.

Filed: Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: Christina A. Ex Rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 13, 2003

Citation: 315 F.3d 990

Docket Number: 01-3698

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.