436 Pa. 101 | Pa. | 1969
Opinion by
This is an appeal from a Decree of the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County directing the Provident National Bank, as guardian of the Estate of Helen L. Christie, an incompetent, to deliver certain property to Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, as executor of the Estate of Robert A. Christie, deceased.
This case involves the troublesome question of the ownership of the stock and other contents of two safe deposit boxes leased jointly by a husband and wife.
At the time of his death on April 5, 1967, Robert A. Christie and his wife, Helen L. Christie, were the lessees of two safe deposit boxes—one at the G-lenside office of the Continental Bank & Trust Company
Shortly after Robert’s death, Helen was adjudged an incompetent and her guardian took possession of all of the contents of the aforesaid two safe deposit boxes.
The case was presented to the Orphans’ Court on a stipulation of facts to which was appended the safe deposit lease or contract agreement with each of the two banks.
Continental
The printed contract covering the Continental safe deposit box pertinently provides:
“The undersigned hereby agree with Bank and with each other that all rights of access to and control or surrender or exchange of the said Box and its contents
It will be noted that this contract makes no reference at all to the ownership of the contents of the box, but deals solely with access, control, surrender and exchange of the box and its contents. This Court has held that a mere joint lease of a safe deposit box is not of itself sufficient to establish joint ownership of securities found therein which originally belonged to one of the lessees alone, even though the joint lessees were husband and wife. Martella Estate, 390 Pa. 255, 260, 135 A. 2d 372; Grossman Estate, 386 Pa. 647, 650, 126 A. 2d 468; Tomayko v. Carson, 368 Pa. 379, 385, 83 A. 2d 907; Wohleber’s Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 86, 181 Atl. 479. The Decree in Continental must be affirmed.
Industrial
The contract (or lease) with the Industrial contained a printed so-called joint-tenancy agreement, which reads as follows:
“The Jenkintown Bank & Trust Company
We must determine the effect of the language of the aforesaid joint-tenancy agreement on the ownership of the stock certificates registered in Robert’s name which were found (after his death) in the Industrial safe deposit box. In King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 126 A. 2d 463, where the contract provided that the property in the box “is the joint property of both Lessees and, upon the death of either, passes to the survivor,” we said (page 122) : “To constitute a valid gift inter vivos of the contents of a safe deposit box, two essential elements are requisite: An intention to make an immediate gift, and such an actual or constructive delivery to the donee (a) as to divest the donor of all dominion and control, or (b) if a joint tenancy is created as to invest in the donee so much dominion and control of the subject matter of the gift as is consonant with a joint ownership or interest therein. . . . Where an owner of a safe deposit box and his donee execute a contract or lease which recites that the property therein is the joint property of the lessees, with right of survivorship, and that the lessees acknowledge the receipt of two keys to said box—this creates a prima facie case of a valid inter vivos gift of a joint interest (with right of survivorship) in said property.”
Appellant (Helen’s guardian) vigorously contends that the mere production of the aforesaid foint-tena/ncy agreement and the absence of any testimony or facts showing a contrary intent by Robert establishes the creation of a tenancy by the entireties in the disputed stock certificates, and, therefore, the Orphans’ Court erred in awarding the stock certificates in the Industrial box to Robert’s executor. The fallacy in appellant’s argument lies in its assumption that this safe deposit lease (which is almost always a contract prepared by a bank to protect itself in the event of disputed right of access and withdrawal, or controversial claims between and among lessees) stated not only that each lessee may have a right of access and withdrawal, but that “each” (instead of “each or either”) is the owner of the present and future contents of the box. This language—“each or either”—is not sufficient or legally adequate to create and constitute a gift by Robert to Helen, his wife.
We have not overlooked the fact that the stipulation submitted by the parties contains, in addition to the safe deposit box contracts and a description of the contents, the statement that “Mrs. Christie had keys to both boxes and had occasionally availed herself of access to them.” We do not consider this evidence of keys and access sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to support the claim of Mrs. Christie’s guardian to her ownership of those stock certificates which were registered in Robert’s name. Cf. Tomayko v. Carson, 368 Pa., supra, and numerous cases cited therein.
Hereinafter called Continental.
Hereinafter called Industrial.
The record does not disclose when or by whom the stocks were deposited in the safe deposit box.
Italics throughout, ours.
The Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Company is successor to the Jenkintown Bank & Trust Company by merger.
We note parenthetically that the oral evidence presented in King Estate, 387 Pa., supra, substantially supported the said contract and a completed inter vivos gift to the donee, but this was merely a makeweight. Cf. also, Secary Estate, 407 Pa. 162, 180 A. 2d 572; and Chadrow, Exr. v. Kellman, 378 Pa. 237, 106 A. 2d 594.