*1 being as hav- in this case as regarded substantially the claimants limited in their abili- ty work, impairment. they such an but because determined prudent expose not wise or these recently rejected supreme has physical claimants to strenuous labor. this current expansive interpretation an “disability.” by In definition of State Coo- Further, per- claimants were not per Hennepin County, v. community ceived as “disabled.” (Minn.1989), county rejected an in- expressed purposes One of the of the Hu- employment dep- as a detention dividual Rights man Act persons is to “secure for in physical uty pre-employment based on a state, freedom from discrimination.” examination that disclosed he had uncor- 363.12, (1990). Minn.Stat. subd. 1 “Dis- § rected vision excess of 20/100 crimination,” turn, suggests prejudice, eyes high hearing tone loss one ear. bias, holding or the of unreasonable and granted county’s An AU motion for preconceived judgments or convictions. summary judgment ground on the that the Heritage Dictionary See American qualify individual did not as “disabled (2d 1985). Thus, College and 977 ed. ab- 363.01, person” under Minn.Stat. bias, prejudice sent evidence of or do not (Supp.1983). 25a legislature believe the intended to extend decision, protections affirming Rights In of the Human AU’s the su- Act to claimants, preme court concluded the individual these failed whose low back anomalies substantially to meet the limited only by X-ray. standard are detectable he rejected because had been for a such, As I would also reverse the AU’s single position county. with the Id. at 112. determination that these claimants are dis- The court further concluded the individual meaning abled within the of the Human regarded having impairment was not as Rights Act. county. Similarly, the claimants in this case have they substantially
not shown are limited
merely they rejected have been
employment general laborers with Hib- Taconite,
bing position that has been strenuous, heavy physical characterized as CHRISTENSEN, Respondent, Pearl any findings labor. The AU did not make point, merely on this and its memorandum INSURANCE, GENERAL ACCIDENT states: “At time northeastern Appellant. Minnesota, being perform able work required physical which strenuous labor No. C8-91-1876. would have been substantial limitation on Appeals Court of of Minnesota. each of the claimants.” there is support little or no evidence to this state- March 1992. ment. May Review Denied addition, it cannot be concluded that Hibbing regarded perceived Taconite being Hibbing
claimants as disabled. Taco- experts,
nite’s the doctors from the Mesaba performed pre-employment
Clinic who examinations, they both testified
did not consider the claimants in this case disabled,
to be because all could still func- normally. Hibbing
tion Taconite deter- disqual-
mined these claimants should be employment general
ified from laborers they perceived
not because the claimants
OPINION HUSPENI, Judge.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s de- respondent termination that injured and is entitled from a vehicle when benefits. We re- to No-Fault insurance verse.
FACTS was in- Respondent Pearl Christensen icy slipped and fell on an jured after she leaving shortly after her automobile. street No-Fault Respondent attempted to collect insurance benefits from insurance Accident Insur- appellant carrier General pro- refused to Company. ance benefits, and vide No-Fault brought compel payment. this suit to dispute the facts as parties do not day by court. On the found the trial accident, drove respondent’s brother-in-law He the house of a relative. respondent to street, parked the car on the passenger side from the rear dent exited icy, The streets were door. steady her- hand on the car to
placed her the front of the as she walked toward self on the car kept her hand Respondent of the car. As rounded the front as she the front of approached the middle of slipped and fell. The trial court found car at the time alighting from the judgment summary and awarded coverage under issue of her on the Insurance Act. No-Fault Minnesota’s (1988). Minn.Stat. § entry judgment for stipulated to parties remaining $20,000 of trial on in lieu issues, appeal followed. and this fact ISSUE insur- entitled to No-Fault Is LaFleur, Fuller, Gary T. Bab- Randall J. benefits? ance Mannella, Anoka, Locher, cock, Neilson & respondent. ANALYSIS Jr., Priesz, Priesz & Jeffer- this case parties Arthur W.
son, appellant. Wayzata, for conclu- the district court’s dispute only coverage and its scope of
sions about
Accordingly, this
the law.
HUSPENI,
application of
and decided
Considered
court
the district
need not defer to
court
P.J.,
SHORT,
RANDALL and
JJ.
caused
misstep
on
terrain will be
whether
may
determine
motoring.”
law allocated
to the
We
interpreted
applied
“properly
disagree only with the trial court’s ultimate
presented.”
to the facts
was,
fact,
appellant
determination that
Co., 421
Huynh v. Illinois Farmers
*3
“alighting
a
from”
vehicle when she was
390,
(quoting
(Minn.App.1988)
N.W.2d
391
injured.
Dealers,
v. Mutual
Indep.
Inc.
Associated
179, 183-84,
Cos.,
229
meaning
Minn.
Serv. Ins.
304
This court first addressed the
of
(1975)),pet.
“alighting
rev. de-
the term
from” in
N.W.2d
519
State Farm
for
Levinson,
(Minn.
18, 1988).
Mut. Auto.
438
May
Ins. Co.
nied
(Minn.App.1989):
114
pro-
Act
Minnesota’s No-Fault Insurance
person
determination of whether a
[T]he.
vides:
“alighting
ques-
from”
vehicle
a
a
is
causing injury
If
occurs in
the accident
degree
tion of
to be determined based on
state,
suffering
every person
loss
all the evidence.
injury arising
from
out of maintenance
*
* *
Levinson,
approval
In
this court cited
has a
or use
a motor
Appeals
Florida
Court
which held
right
loss
to basic economic
benefits.
that:
(1988)
65B.46,
(empha-
subd. 1
Minn.Stat. §
activity
rational
limit to the
that
[A]
added). The term “maintenance or use
sis
may
encompassed
be said to be
within
of a motor vehicle” is defined as
“alighting
the term
from” is the time and
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as
place at which the insured shows an in-
vehicle, including,
incident to its main-
tention,
evidenced
an overt act based
vehicle, occupying,
as a
tenance or use
intention,
on that
to undertake a new
into,
entering
it.
from
activity.
direction or
(1988)(empha-
Minn.Stat.
subd. 3
Garcia,
Fidelity
Casualty
&
Co. v.
368
added).
sis
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979),
So.2d
The trial court found that
denied,
(Fla.
pet.
rev.
So.2d
alighting from the vehicle at the time
1979),
Levinson,
cited in
438 N.W.2d at
incorporat-
of her fall.
In a memorandum
order,
reasoned,
ed into
the trial court
in
its
Levinson,
rejected
this court
the no-
part:
“physical
operative
tion that
contact” is the
really only
There is
one live issue
rejec-
test for
at 113.
Id.
While
presented under these facts. Was the
tion of this test would often result
in a
plaintiff
“alight-
still in the
coverage despite
determination of
there be-
ing”
automo-
from her brother-in-law’s
vehicle,
physical
no
contact with the
bile at the moment she fell? Or were
possible
rejection
equally
her actions too attenuated from the ve-
“physical contact” test could result
space
justify
hicle
and time
coverage despite
determination of no
there
characterization ?
being physical contact with the vehicle.
Therefore,
the fact that
was in
legislature’s
decision
extend no- physical contact with the vehicle at the
fault
accidents
Rather,
dispositive.
time of her fall is not
inju-
means that sometimes the costs of
at 114.
it is
intent which controls.
by misstep
caused
on
ries
terrain
car,
clearly
Upon exiting
be allocated to the
of motor-
will
proceed
the car and
to-
intended
leave
ing.
appropriate
That allocation seems
destination.
It was
ward her ultimate
under the facts of this ease.
the car was
the direction of her
The issue before us is whether
chose to use the car
destination that she
from” the ve
Had her destination been
support.
injured.
hicle at the time she was
We
from the
across the street
away
with the trial court’s
from the car im-
observation
walked
would have
exiting.
conclude that
injuries mediately
that “sometimes the costs of
We
after
injured,
prevent-
fell,
com-
the time he was
the court
respondent had
the time
poli-
payment
Her in-
of benefits from a second
the car.
ed
“alighting from”
pleted
cy
the time
which Neuville was an insured.
exiting
and at
under
upon
tent
This
“the
her desti-
court noted that
was to move toward
Supreme
exhibited
nation;
her relative. Minnesota
Court has
toward
home of
presence
reluctance
allow
recov-
considerable
fortuitous that the
It was
uninsured ve-
ery by
aid to her
uninsured drivers or
served as an
the vehicle
wall,
fence,
A
hicles.” Id.
reaching her destination.
object
have served
stationary
other
appellant attempts
extent that
To the
efficiently.
analysis of
forth
rely on an
the factors set
Klug, 415
distinguishable from Horace
W. Ins. Co. v.
This case is
Continental
*4
(Minn.1987),
Neuville,
N.W.2d
876
we
that
v.
465
N.W.2d
believe
Mann Ins. Co.
misplaced.
(Minn.App.1991),
attempt
Klug,
rev. de-
this court
pet.
435
27, 1991).
dis-
(Minn.
legal
Neuville’s
issue of wheth-
Mar.
addressed
nied
“[t]he
use or
struck
anoth-
er an accident
out of the
car was
from behind
abled
[arose]
automobile,”
acci-
of an
at
at
Prior to the
maintenance
id.
er motorist.
Id.
433.
down,
dent,
injured party
was
car had broken
and not whether
Neuville’s
“alighting
where
from” a
pushed it to an intersection
vehicle.1
he had
help.
Id.
outside the car for
he waited
Supreme
Minnesota
has
The
Court
court’s conclu-
This court affirmed the trial
explained that No-Fault
are to be
benefits
his
“alighting”
Neuville
from
sion that
was
policy
risks
was in
limited to “those
the
occurred, and con-
injury
when the
vehicle
is,
against,
to insure
that
tended
”
cluded:
‘motoring.’
risks associated with
Classi
relationship
appellant and
The
between
Vodinelich,
Corp. v.
368 N.W.2d
Ins.
fied
it, steering
driving
it when
his car
(Minn.1985).
time of her
923
At the
disabled,
help
by until
staying
close
fall,
the
exposed
was
to
not
uninterrupt-
came was
continuous
a ve
alighting
associated with
from
risks
relationship.
ed
Rather,
premis
her fall
to a
hicle.
was due
associat
hazard unrelated
the “risks
es
”
‘motoring.’
ed
with
Neuville, respondent here
In contrast to
clearly did not intend to remain with
DECISION
during
It was
her new
not
Because
was
to her
that
proceeding
destination
at
time of her
from” her vehicle
injured.
was
dent
insurance
she is not entitled
No-Fault
distinguishable
is also
Neuville
benefits.
overriding policy concerns which
Reversed.
in that case.
supported this court’s decision
injured party
had failed
Neuville
RANDALL, Judge, dissenting.
vehicle,
collect No-
insure his
and could
affirm
respectfully
dissent and would
only if found
be
Fault insurance benefits
that
occupying his
the trial court’s conclusion
from nor
neither
injured
alighting from a
injury. Id. at 433.
vehicle
at the time of his
was
was,
fact,
to no-fault insurance bene-
finding that
and is entitled
By
Neuville
at
“alighting from”
uninsured vehicle
fits.
his
slipping
(plaintiff injured
Similarly,
476
after
Bureau Mut. Ins.
N.W.2d at
Marklund v. Farm
washing
Co.,
(Minn. 1987)
at
windows
on ice while
his truck’s
Both
frame
conclusion that at the
1)
text of two issues:
time of her fall
was not ex-
“alighting”
posed
somewhere
to risks associated with alighting
ice,
slipped on
rather,
from the vehicle when she
from a
but
had her fall due to a
2)
fell,
prop-
injured;
and was
premise’s hazard unrelated to “risks associ-
present
her conduct and
er nexus
between
motoring.”
majority
ated with
cites
ve-
“the use and maintenance of a motor
Vodinelich,
Corp. v.
Classified
hicle,” enabling respondent to have cover-
(Minn.1985).
N.W.2d 921
facts
policy.
age under a motor vehicle insurance
holding
are not similar and its
Classified
pertinent
case. In Classified,
with the trial court and the ma-
by running
woman committed suicide
a car
resolution,
jority
needs
only one issue
garage;
in a closed
car exhaust accidental-
respondent was “somewhere in
whether
ly seeped into the attached house and killed
alighting”
from the automo-
two infants. The basic conclusion the su-
The “use and
bile when she fell.
mainte-
preme court drew from that fact situation
nance of
issue
a motor vehicle”
needs no
deny
motor vehicle
was that
analysis to resolve.
admits the
being
vehicle was not
used “for trans-
from a
defini-
portation purposes” at the time of the su-
*5
tion, is,
enough,
integral
logically
part
an
Here,
icide.
at
we do not have a
of use of a car. Minn.Stat.
transportation purposes”
“for
or “use or
(1988). Appellant agrees
respondent
if
only
maintenance” issue. We have
the
alighting
was in the
of
from a car
question
encompassed
“alight-
of what is
injured,
coverage.
when
there is
ing
Questions
from a car.”
transporta-
of
pertinent
dispute.
are not in
facts
tion, use, and maintenance are resolved for
accepts the facts set out
the
against respondent
or
when the issue of
trial court in its Order and Memorandum:
alighting
is
resolved for or
12, 1989,
January
plaintiff,
the
On
seven-
dent.
Christensen,
ty-seven year old Pearl
her
I
respondent’s
find that
sister,
undisputed-
Virginia,
brother-in-law,
and her
ly
due
Paul,
conditions on the street where
drove to the LaBelle Park condo-
parked,
she
is a direct risk associated
complex
Heights,
minium
in Columbia
motoring
with
in the
Minnesota,
State Minnesota.
plaintiffs nephew
to visit the
of
interpretation
or conclusion to be
date,
at his home there. On that
the
drawn from facts needs to have a
basis
streets
and
of
sidewalks
Columbia
during
common sense.
In Minnesota
the
Heights
plain-
were slick with ice. The
months,
winter
it is the rule rather than the
tiff exited the automobile from the rear
(unless
exception
indoors)
parked
you
passenger door on the driver’s side.
your footing
you get
must watch
as
out of
Keeping
body
one hand on the
of the car
Always
possibility,
times,
a car.
herself,
the
and at
steady
picked
way
she
strong probability,
a
exists that some accu-
over the ice toward the front of the ve-
slipper-
mulation of ice and snow will cause
plaintiff
hicle. The
rounded the front
your
iness in the area of
car.
bumper,
left
bracing
still
herself on the
Midway
across the automobile’s
any given time, only
At
a small fraction
end,
footing
front
she lost her
on the ice of cars out and about our streets in the
fell, sustaining
and
fractures of her arm
option
parking only
winter have the
in-
hip.
subsequently required
and
She was
fully
side
enclosed facilities. The hundreds
undergo
hip replacement.
a
parking spaces
of thousands of
on resi-
interpret
We must
these facts to deter- dential
and commercial streets in
re-
respondent
mine whether
gion
simple
was still
the
in the state attest to the
fact
alighting
injured
that,
get
when
or had
you
out of a
car
the
completed alighting
gone
Minnesota,
she
you
and
on to
winter
have to watch
pedestrian walking
become a mere
place your
down a
you
where
feet because of the
all,
slippery
disagree
street.
I
falling
First of
possibility
injuring yourself.
then,
feeling
enough
Re-
not
of her
sure
foot-
here.
exactly
happened
what
That is
own,
ing
walking
she
carefully
start
on her
continued
where
spondent watched
along
car
the
support;
how
moved
to use the
find
trial
placed
feet and
properly
respondent
herself.
slipped
injured
concluded
had
the
but still
completed
passenger
the
a
not
transition of
77. Per-
respondent’s age of
We note
walking
mere
alighting
pedestrian
to a
the
could
haps
more athletic woman
younger,
a
street.
is immaterial
the fall. That
have avoided
“take their
analysis.
Defendants
dry
the street been
Had
plaintiffs
they
find them.”
footing,
slammed
of her
had she
sure
majority,
briskly
Unlike the
find
shut and
taken a half
car door
directly ex-
directly
the time she left the car was
steps
away from
car
dozen
risk
posed to a standard Minnesota winter
falling,
strong argument
a
before
alighting
made,
from a vehicle.
associated
completed
could be
coverage question
reason
thus no
Had
fallen
wheth-
honestly
is that it is
debatable
close
inside
one on the
with one foot
the car and
exposed
er
risk
street,
both feet on the street but
or with
on a
by getting out of a car
herself to
clinging
hands
the door handle on
If it had con-
street had concluded.
winter
door,
open
strong case for
cluded,
merely
walk-
pedestrian
she was
case
made. This
falls between
cracks.
slippery public street who
along a
way around to
Had
worked her
That
cov-
preclude
and fell.
would
slipped
then turned and
the front
if she had
finished the
erage. But
house,
walking
and then
started
toward
enti-
alighting,
she is
complete
negotiating
walking
fell while
curb
coverage and the benefits.
tled to insurance
street,
limits
push
down
*6
cover-
due
mandate insurance
agree
single
I
fact is
majority and
no
case, agreed
age. But on the facts of this
coverage
in favor of
dispositive
parties,
with the trial
upon
Mut.
coverage. We both find
Farm
State
ongoing
court the
Levinson,
N.W.2d 110
Auto.
Co.
passenger’s
respondent fell. This
Casualty
(Minn.App.1989)
Fidelity &
completed.
alighting from
car was
(Fla.Dist.Ct.
Garcia,
port coverage rather than and unin I find her continued the car
terrupted physical contact with seat, through of the out back moved door, along and then the side car conclusion supports the trial court’s in the
she was still fell.
when she facts, including that
Looking at all of the at the location of the
respondent arrived
injury by a exited from