*1 348 governing of the the factual determinations review
of Workmen’s by governed Compensation is Court (Reissue § Rev. Stat. 48-185 Neb. relevant findings by provides: 1978), “The of fact made Compensation Court after Workmen’s the Nebraska rehearing effect as a the same force and have shall jury That statute also limits case.” verdict a civil “(3) grounds which include: reversal to four the [Tjhere record warrant or award competent evidence in the is not sufficient judgment, making order,
. . . .” findings applying statute, we have held the Compensation by Court on the Workmen’s made fact clearly appeal rehearing wrong. unless will set aside on not be Community Stores, 205 v. American Wolfe 195 by compensation finding court of fact employee plaintiff at the time of the not an competent supported sufficient evi- accident judgment dence, must affirmed. be and the
Affirmed. appellant, Chrisp, I. Ruth appellee. Dean E. Chrisp, N.W.2d [162] 1, 1980. No. 42901. December Filed *2 Schaper Schaper Wolfe, & and James B. Luers of appellant. Hurd & Rierden for appellee. Huston, P.C.,
Tedd C. Krivosha, C.J., Heard Boslaugh, McCown, before Clinton, Brodkey, White, Hastings, JJ.
White, J. appeal
This is an in a dissolution case. marriage, The District Court dissolved the awarded appellant custody parties’ 17-year-old son, of the party property awarded each own appellant. titled in his or her name, pay $13,789 ordered to to appeal, appellant assigns On the as error property being the District Court’s division of as patently presented unfair on the basis of the evidence appellant and the District Court’s to failure restore to compensate her inherited or otherwise any way for her substantial contribution to the mar- riage. part, and, We affirm in reverse and remand. parties party
The were married in 1950. Neither brought any money marriage. or into the years, parties For 3 the lived on and farmed by appellant’s parties pur- owned 1953, father. In the quarter chased a section of land on which lived years appellant later, and farmed. Several in- in- approximately herited 520 acres of land. The gave heritance rise to marital difficulties. In appellee conveyed appellant to his interest in their jointly acquired quarter section of land and quitclaimed her entire interest in 360 These trans- had inherited.
acres land she marriage. attempt to reconcile the fers were done an From that until of this action time the date maintained his or her own separate sold their accounts. jointly equipment and di- owned farm and livestock proceeds. Appellant purchased a house and vided appellant, invested the remainder of her share. The the purchased Appellee appellee, in the house and their minor child lived
by appellant until the date of the divorce. purchased his share of 600 acres of land with proceeds during period. in each The division of in 1970 resulted party owning approximately one-half of the up acquired parties agreement that time. between their was not unconscion- divide parties agreed time, At the division able. that the equitable reason, and, fair for that *3 adopted equitable, it. it court Because the division was appeal. property will not be disturbed on The titled parties’ in each remain name as of will a result that division separate property the of each is not con- and by property in this sidered the division of marital quarter, The to as the court. and 160 acres referred Bartak property the 160 of acres inherited not transferred separate appellee to were to as her awarded by appellee property. The 360 acres transferred to appellant separate property. in 1969 was to as his awarded
That court’s deci- property in his sion that each retain titled or own name is affirmed. only subject upon property is The to division divorce by property acquired parties these after 1970. The in trial court the marital the division of excluded therefore, is, and its in estate decision part, reversed. though parties
Even
the
had divided their
they
managed
separately,
and
their financial affairs
to each
con-
remained married
other
the
appellant’s
tinned to
live
home until 1977. We have
by
held that there is no
mathematical formula
precisely
determined,
awards can
but
be
are to be determined
lock v.
facts in each case. Mat
the
(1980).
Matlock,
205 Neb.
spouse providing consideration support. supra. Matlock, form of domestic v. Matlock property acquired by parties between 1970 and 1977 constitutes the to be considered the marital estate in this This includes the resi case. Arnold, Nebraska, dence $34,500, valued at acquired by appellee 600 acres in 1971and 1972valued purchased by appellee $257,330, at 1.84 acres $17,500. valued at The total value of the marital estate $309,330. to be divided is determining percentage
In
what
marital
person
receive,
estate each
is to
the court is to consider
pertinent
reaching
just
all
facts in
an award
is
equitable.
supra;
Matlock,
Matlock v.
v.
Pfeiffer
(1979).
Pfeiffer,
203 Neb.
into consideration the circumstances of the
marriage,
duration of the
riage by
mar-
contributions to the
party,
including
contributions
interruption
children,
care and education of the
*4
personal
opportunities.
of
careers or educational
supra;
Campbell,
Campbell
Matlock,
Matlock v.
v.
(1979).
575,
202 Neb.
services to the 352 years did lasted 27 and
the contribute estate, of the of the District Court substantially acquisition of a marital party the value to one-half of entitled in estate. The decision included that part, is, remanded in reversed and listed the marital with that as directions equally between as listed be divided estate the valued parties. party to retain the Each is entitled pos- in her in his or own name his or titled session and appellant pay $120,165 to is ordered $12,016.50. in 10 annual installments of represents be- This amount one-half the difference possession appellant’s in and that tween the in appellee’s possession. part, in reversed
Affirmed WITH AND DIRECTIONS. REMANDED concurring, part, part, and, in KRIVOSHA, C.J., dissenting. part, part, and, I concur, from the
I
dissent
portion
majority
majority.
of
I
in that
concur
opinion
the trial court’s decision
which affirmed
property titled in his or her
retain
that each
name.
own
majority
however,
dissent,
from that
of
I
pay
appel-
opinion
to the
orders
frequently
$120,165.
have
de-
an additonal
We
lant
clared
division
patently
this court is not inclined to disturb
court unless it is
v.
the record. Rinderknecht Rinder-
unfair on
(1979);
knecht,
569
284 N.W.2d
Blome
204 Neb.
(1978).
Blome,
201
Neither the the record pa- how the court’s case indicates trial decision tently unfair on the record. While the retained they appearance of the formal after divided they practical purposes for their longer no married their fi- were and conducted both private and their nancial affairs separate. lives as if were upon us, Based what record we have before justification penalizing I find no diligence with that of the which he his estate voluntary parties’ division received reason I in 1970. would have affirmed the trial court’s action second-guess entirety attempted its not opportunity court, who had the to see and observe
and hear the various witnesses.
Clinton, J., joins in this dissent. concurrence Moackler, Jr., appellant,
John R. Phillip Finley, appellee, D. garnishee. Co., Inc., Great Plains Insurance Filed December 1980. No. 42962.