43 W. Va. 356 | W. Va. | 1897
On the 18th day of Alay, 1898, Chrislip Bros, sold John Teter their stock of merchandise at Peck’s Run, Upshur county, by the following written agreement: “This article of agreement, made and entered into this the 38th day of May, 3898, between Chrislip Bros., of the first part, and John Teter, of the second part, all of Beck’s Run, Upshur County, AYest AUrginia. ¡Said party of the lirst part agree
The defendant Catherine Teter, guardian, made her answer, denying all fraud or knowledge of fraud or attempted fraud upon the creditors of JohnTeter. Alleging that the sale was fair and bona fide. Denying the insolvency of John, or that he was attempting to avoid the payment of his just debts. Alleging that he was the owner of a valuable farm, in Roane county, fully paid for; that a valuable consideration was paid for the lands, upon the terms agreed; and that she consented to the purchase, believing it to be for the best interest of the parties interested. The infant-defendants, in their own name, filed their answer, denying all allegations of fraud, or any knowledge of fraud. Alleging that it was a bona fide sale to them; that the money had been paid, and showing that the whole purchase money due to John Teter was paid, down to about, one’ thousand three and seventy dollars. Averring that they had agreed to pay a full and valuable consideration for the land, — more than the same could have been sold for to others, — and expressly denying every allegation of fraud, or imputation of fraud, in respect to the purchase by them of said land, and allegations charging them with fraud in the payment for said laud. Alleging that at the time of the sale they knew John was in easy circumstances, abundantly able to pay all his debts and liabilities, and have a large surplus left. . Charging that plaintiffs well knew and advised and urged John to make the sale of the tract of land to them, and stated to him that it was the best thing he could do; that the price offered for the land was the full value of it, and, after the sale was made, informed John that he had*made an excellent sale to them, and got more for it than any other person would have given. Denying the insolvency of John. Alleging that he was living in Roane county, where he had purchased a valuable farm, paid for with funds received from them for the land he sold them, on which lie had plenty of farming implements and personal property; that John sold his stock of goods to Ira Ward for much less than their true value, and that they were advised that said sale was procured by the false scheming of plaintiffs with said Ira Ward; that
To this answer (ffirislip Bros, and Ira Ward filed their special replications, and, in so far as it charged new matter and sought affirmative relief, denied eaffii and every charge as to fraud on their part, and on the part of each of them, to cheat and wrong said Teter, and especially denying that there was between them, or either of them, and Ira Ward, any interest by partnership in the purchase by Ira Ward of the stock of goods from Teter, and denying
The first assignment is that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to plaintilf’s bill. Fraud is sufficiently alleged, with proper parties to the bill, to give jurisdic
The second nsignment of appellants is that it. was error for the court not to finally adjudicate the. E. 'E. Tutt account, as between the parties to the suit. Appellees also claim that this is an error to their prejudice. 1 Pom. Ecp Jur. § 18.1, says that: “When a court of equity has jurisdiction over a cause for any purpose, it may retain the cause for all purposes, and proceed to a final determination of the matters at issue, for this reason : If the controversy contains any equitable features, or requires any purely equitable relief which would belong to the exclusive jurisdiction, or involves any matter pertaining to the concurrent jurisdiction, by means of which a court of equity would acquire, as it were, a partial cognizance of it, the court may go on to a complete adjudication, and may thus establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies, which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.” In Hanly v. Watterson, 39 W. Va. 214 (19 S. E. 536) : “When a court of equity takes jurisdiction of a cause for one purpose, it will go on and dispose of the questions involved, to avoid a multiplicity of suits.”
Appellants’ third assignment is that the court erred in decreeing that the deed of November 28,1898, was fraudulent and void, and made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of appellants, and holding that the same was taken by Lloyd A. and Burton I. Teter and their guardian, Catherine Teter, with notice of such fraudulent intent. Appellees claim that it was error not to make a decree setting aside, as fraudulent and void as to their debt and the debt of the assignee, Ward, the said deed of November 28d of John Teter to his brothers. A large mass of testimony was taken touching the question of fraud in the sale and conveyance by John Teter to his infant brothers, Lloyd and Burton, as well as to the sale of the stock of goods by John Teter to Ward, and concerning all other transactions between plaintills and defendants John Teter and Ira Ward, and the fraudulent disposition of his personal property by John Teter with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors. I have carefully read and considered all the depositions taken in the case, and find a great conflict in the evidence. There can be little doubt,
Apellants’ fourth assignment of error is in decreeing the conveyance of the Roane county land to be fraudulent and void for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding appellants’ creditors, and especially decreeing a
The fifth error assigned is that the court below refused to adjudicate and determine the rights of the parties alleged in the affirmative relief prayed for in the answer of John Teter to plaintiffs’ bill. The court not having passed upon the questions arising upon the allegations contained in the answer of defendant John Teter in the nature of a cross bill, and praying for affirmative relief, there is nothing of which this Court can take jurisdiction touching this point, in advance of such action. The decree of the circuit court complained of must be reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings to be had therein according to the principals therein laid down.
Reversed.