The defendant, Donald Duane Choate, was convicted of receiving stolen property, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(b) (Burns 1983 Supp.), and was found to be a habitual offender, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1983 Supp.). The defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty-two years imprisonment. In this direct appeal the following nine issues have been raised:
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving certain of the state’s instructions and in failing to give certain of the defendant’s;
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain physical evidence;
3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence;
*1041 4. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the jury to take evidence into the jury room;
5. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the state to amend the information shortly before trial;
6. Whether the trial court erred in not admonishing the jury when they separated after the felony portion of the trial;
7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial or a continuance when a juror became ill;
8. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for receiving stolen goods; and
9. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the finding that the defendant was a habitual offender.
The facts most favorable to the state reveal that in March of 1980, a Leo Merk-ley told the defendant that he needed a trailer to use in hauling Merkley’s bulldozer. The defendant indicated that he could probably find one. On March 18, 1980, a trailer was stolen from a construction site near Patoka. The defendant had worked for the construction company that owned the trailer. On March 19, the defendant sold a trailer to Merkley for $1,250. Merk-ley later received a bill of sale dated March 19, 1980, and signed by William Thrash as the seller and notarized by Joseph Akers. The police were unable to confirm that either Thrash or Akers existed. An employee of the construction company later spotted the trailer and notified the State Police. Subsequent investigation established that the serial number on the trailer was the same as the number on the trailer stolen from the construction site.
I.
The defendant claims several errors in respect to the final instructions given to the jury. The first of these stems from an instruction which stated in part that:
“A ‘reasonable doubt’ is a fair, actual and logical doubt that arises in your mind after an impartial consideration of all the evidence and circumstances in the case. It should be a doubt based on reason and common sense and not a doubt based on imagination or speculation.”
The defendant contends that the words “or lack of evidence” should have been inserted after the word “evidence” in the above instruction. The defendant asserts that the failure to modify the instruction gave the impression to the jury that he bore the burden of proving his own innocence and of proving reasonable doubt. We note, however, that another instruction given to the jury stated that “if from the whole evidence or lack of evidence any material fact essential to conviction has not been established to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, you should acquit the Defendant.” Further instructions clearly stated that the state was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Instructions to the jury should be read as a whole and are to be construed together.
Davidson v. State,
(1982) Ind.,
The defendant also claims the trial court erred in reading state’s instruction number 6 to the jury. This instruction, which dealt with reasonable doubt, contained language that the “bare possibility that the defendant may be innocent does not raise a reasonable doubt.” The defendant contends that the word' “mere” should have replaced the word “bare” and that the failure to make the change once again left the impression with the jury that the defendant had to prove his innocence. We have previously found that similar language in an instruction did not prejudice the defendant when the instruction was juxtaposed with an instruction charging the jury not to act upon speculation.
Harrison v. State,
(1978)
The next allegation of error concerning instructions stems from state’s instruction number 5, which stated:
“You are instructed that the exclusive possession of stolen goods as well as a knowledge that the goods were stolen may be proved by circumstantial evidence.”
The defendant asserts that this instruction was essentially the “exclusive possession rule,” which does not apply to the offense of receiving stolen property.
Strode v. State,
(1980) Ind.App.,
“It has long been held that mere possession of stolen goods shortly after a theft has occurred is not sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction for knowingly receiving or possessing stolen property.”
The defendant next alleges that the trial court improperly refused his tendered instruction number 2, which stated that the terms “innocent” and “not guilty” were not synonymous. While the terms do not necessarily mean the same thing, the trial judge did not exceed his discretion in refusing to give this instruction. The trial judge may well have determined that defendant’s tendered instruction number 2 would confuse and mislead the jury, especially since it stated that “you do not have to believe the defendant is innocent in order to return a verdict of not guilty.” There was no error in refusing to give this instruction.
In addition to alleged errors in the instruction for the underlying felony portion of the trial, the defendant claims error in the instructions given at the conclusion of the habitual offender portion of trial. The defendant contends that the jury was improperly informed as to its role in the habitual offender phase since the trial judge refused three of the defendant’s tendered instructions, numbers 4, 5, and 6. Defendant’s tendered instruction number 4 dealt with Indiana’s constitutional prohibition against vindictive justice, stating in part that:
“If after considering all of the evidence presented in this case, you find that the habitual offender statute, as applied to the defendant, is not founded on principles of reformation, then you may take that finding into consideration in rendering your verdict.”
Defendant’s tendered instruction number 5 stated:
“The Constitution of the State of Indiana provides that you are the judges of the law as well as the facts. You can take the law as given and explained to you by the court, but, if you see fit, you have the legal and constitutional right to reject the same, and construe it for yourselves. Although you have the legal right to disagree with the court as to what the law is, still, you should weigh the instructions given to you in this case as you weigh the evidence, and disregard neither without proper reason.”
Finally, defendant’s instruction number 6 dealt with the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We find that the refusal to give these instructions is not reversible error. To begin with, we agree with the state that neither instruction number 4 nor number 6 was applicable to this case. But even if they somehow were, the trial judge was quite correct in refusing these instructions. We have previously held that an instruction based on Article 1, § 18 of the Indiana Constitution is improper, since the reformation of convicted felons is a matter to be
*1043
considered by the legislature, not the jury.
Erikson v. State,
(1982) Ind.,
The defendant lastly contends that the trial court improperly gave state’s instruction number 3, since the defendant believes it contained an incomplete statement of the law. This instruction stated:
“A felony conviction means a conviction, in any jurisdiction at any time, with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year.”
The defendant contends that the instruction should have been followed by the words “but it does not include a conviction with respect to which the person has been pardoned, or a conviction of a class A misdemeanor under section 7(b) of this chapter.” See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). We do not believe the omission of these words in any way prejudiced the defendant, especially in light of the fact that no evidence was presented to show that the crimes used to support the habitual offender charge were misdemeanors or were crimes for which the defendant was pardoned.
Therefore, we find the jury was properly instructed in both phases of the trial.
II.
The defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted certain exhibits, both in the felony portion and the habitual offender phase of trial. The first items of evidence that were allegedly improperly admitted were state’s exhibits 10, 11, and 12. These three exhibits were photographs of an identification number hidden under the paint of the trailer. The defendant contends that the pictures were inadmissible because they did not accurately depict the condition of the trailer either at the time it was stolen or when it was discovered by police, since paint had to be removed by the police to reveal the number.
There was no error in the admission of these photographs. The exhibits were offered during the examination of Carl Shaw, a detective with the Indiana State Police. Shaw testified that he scratched off some paint on the trailer to reveal the secret number. The photographs were introduced to show the condition of the trailer as it existed when Shaw investigated it. They were not intended to show the trailer at the time it was stolen or discovered. The exhibits were merely cumulative of the witness’s testimony. As such, we cannot say that the trial judge exceeded his discretion in admitting these photographs.
The defendant further contends the trial judge erred in allowing state’s exhibits 13, 14, 15, and 16 to be admitted. These exhibits were also photographs of the trailer. The defendant’s only objection to these photographs is that the word “Or-angeville” was written on the back of each one. Carl Shaw testified after the exhibits were admitted that “Orangeville” referred to the place where the photographs were taken. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the exhibits were properly identified. Once again, we cannot say that the trial judge exceeded his discretion in admitting these exhibits.
The defendant next asserts the trial court erred in admitting state’s exhibit number 27, which consisted of a series of documents from the Indiana Department of Correction and which was offered during the habitual offender portion of the trial. Initially, the defendant asserts that the exhibit was not properly authenticated. Under Ind.R.Tr.P. 44, official records such as *1044 those at issue here are admissible only “by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.” Id. Here, the exhibit contained a sheet signed by Samuel E. Molter, the keeper of the records for the Department of Correction. This sheet certified that the documents comprising state’s exhibit number 27 were true and correct copies of the record of the defendant. State’s exhibit number 27 was properly authenticated under Ind.R. Tr.P. 44.
The defendant also argues that two of the documents in this exhibit were not documents of which Samuel Molter was the keeper, since they were from the Indiana Parole Board rather than the Department of Correction. The defendant has overlooked the fact that the Parole Board is a division of the Department of Correction. Ind.Code § 11-9-1-1 (Burns 1981 Repl.). Since Molter was the official keeper of the records of the entire Department, he would also be the keeper of records of one of the Department’s divisions. Furthermore, even if we were to determine that Molter was not the keeper of records for the Parole Board, the admission of these two documents did not prejudice the defendant. Each simply stated that the defendant was no longer on probation. The crimes for which the defendant had been serving parole had been established by other properly authenticated documents in the exhibit. We find no error.
The defendant lastly contends that state’s exhibit number 27 was improperly admitted because one of the documents contains an admission of guilt, which was given by the defendant upon his admission to the Indiana Department of Correction in 1965. The defendant alleges that the admission of the document violated his right against self-incrimination. We find no such violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled self-incrimination.
Estelle v. Smith,
(1981)
III.
The defendant next argues that certain testimony by Carl Shaw was hearsay and that the trial judge therefore erred in overruling his objections to the testimony. The first alleged error stems from the following testimony:
Q. “Okay. And what did you do after determining what the serial number was on this trailer?”
A. “I recorded that number on a scratch piece of paper and returned to my State Police vehicle and called that number in to the Jasper Indiana State Police Post to be entered as an inquiry as stolen into the National Crime Information Computer.”
Q. “What response did you get?”
A. “I got...”
The defendant then objected on hearsay grounds. After the objection was overruled, Shaw testified that a trailer with that serial number had been stolen.
Hearsay is defined in our state as an extrajudicial declaration of another offered in court to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein, and thus resting on the credibility of a declarant who is not in court and not available for cross-examination.
Roberts v. State,
(1978)
The defendant also points to two other instances in which hearsay evidence was allegedly admitted, both occurring during the examination of Carl Shaw. Shaw testified as to his efforts to locate William Thrash and Joseph Akers, the two men named on the bill of sale. The defendant twice objected that certain testimony was hearsay. The record, however, shows that each time Shaw was asked whether
he
was able to locate Thrash or Akers. Shaw was merely testifying as to his own course of investigation and was not relying on an out-of-court statement.
See Morris v. State,
(1980)
IV.
The defendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take evidence into the jury room during the habitual offender portion of trial. The exhibits consisted of state’s exhibit number 27, discussed in Issue II, number 28, which consisted of court records from Clay County relating to a prior felony, and number 29, which consisted of court records from Pike County relating to another prior felony. The defendant contends allowing the jury to take these exhibits into the jury room increased the likelihood that the jury would return of verdict of guilty on the habitual offender count.
The applicable standards concerning the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to take exhibits into the jury room are contained in
Thomas v. State,
(1972)
“ ‘(1) whether the material will aid the jury in a proper consideration of the case;
“ ‘(ii) whether any party will be unduly prejudiced by submission of the material; and
“ ‘(iii) whether the material may be subjected to improper use by the jury.’ ”259 Ind. at 540 ,289 N.E.2d at 509 .
Unlike the result in
Thomas,
we cannot say the trial judge exceeded his discretion in allowing the jury to view these exhibits after retiring for deliberation. As in
Jackson v. State,
(1980) Ind.,
V.
On the day the habitual offender hearing began, the trial judge allowed the state to amend the information. The amendment reflected that the defendant had been previously convicted of second-degree burglary; the original information stated that the defendant had been convicted of burglary. The trial court refused to grant the defendant a continuance. The defendant now con *1046 tends the trial judge exceeded his discretion by allowing the amendment and in not allowing the continuance.
Under the statute in effect at the time of this trial, an information could be amended at any time before, during, or after trial as long as the amendment did not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Ind.Code § 35-3.1-1-5 (Burns 1979 Repl.) (repealed, Acts 1981, P.L. 298);
Barnett v. State,
(1981) Ind.,
Nor did the trial judge err in not allowing a continuance. The decision to grant or not grant a continuance is one best left to the discretion of the trial judge. See Ind.Code § 35-3.1-1-5 (Burns 1979 Repl.) (repealed, Acts. 1981, P.L. 298). While the defendant claims the refusal to allow the continuance left him unable to prepare himself, the record shows that well before trial the defendant was provided copies of the documents showing prior convictions for second-degree burglary. We find no abuse of discretion here.
Therefore, the defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the trial judge’s allowance of the amendment or by the denial of the continuance motion.
VI.
The defendant next contends the trial court erred when it failed to admonish the jury upon separation between the felony and habitual offender portions of the trial. Because of the failure to admonish, the defendant moved for a mistrial at the beginning of the habitual offender portion of trial.
To begin with, the defendant did not object to the failure to admonish until the jury returned for the habitual offender portion of the trial, which was several days after the jury was dismissed on the felony portion. Generally, a timely objection must be made to the failure to admonish the jury.
Brown v. State,
(1964)
VII.
The defendant next contends the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial or grant a continuance when a juror became ill during the habitual offender portion of trial. The juror continued to serve for the duration of the trial.
Both the decision to declare a mistrial and the decision to grant a continuance are left to the discretion of the trial judge, reversible only upon a showing that the trial judge exceeded this discretion.
Sidener v. State,
(1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d
*1047
965;
Chambers v. State,
(1981) Ind.,
VIII.
The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for receiving stolen property. Specifically, the defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew the property was stolen.
Under our standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence issues we may consider only that evidence most favorable to the state, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there exists substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be overturned.
McAfee v. State,
(1984) Ind.,
The statute here requires that a person knowingly or intentionally receive, retain, or dispose of property of another that has been subject of a theft in order to be found guilty of receiving stolen property. Ind.Code § 35-4S-4-2(b) (Burns 1983 Supp.). The defendant has cited a number of cases that hold that the knowledge required under this statute cannot be inferred
solely
from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property.
Johnson v. State,
(1982) Ind.App.,
IX.
The defendant lastly contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was a habitual offender. The argument presumes that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction on the underlying charge. Since we have already decided that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, there is no merit to the defendant’s argument here.
For all the foregoing reasons, there was no reversible error and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.