259 P. 687 | Kan. | 1927
The opinion of the court was delivered by
These are two actions for damages for libel. Harry Chisler is plaintiff in one and Wilbur E. Stone in the other. The pleadings are identical except the names of the plaintiffs. The defendants are H. E. Randall, George E. Gano and F. S. Macy. The cases were consolidated and tried to a jury in the court below. Each of the plaintiffs recovered a judgment for $17,043.75 against all of the defendants. The defendant Gano alone appeals.
The material facts disclosed by the record are substantially as follows: George E. Gano is a resident of Hutchinson. He has been engaged in the grain business for many years and has other financial interests. He and his associates had oil and gas leases on certain lands in Reno county. They made a contract with one Haines to drill an oil well on what is known as the O’Halloran lease, near Cast-leton. Haines began the work, but became involved in financial difficulties and discontinued it. Gano and his associates then made a contract with D. E. L. Byers to complete the drilling of the well to a depth of 3,500 feet. Among other things, Byers was to furnish the casing to be used in the drilling. The plaintiffs in these cases, Harry Chisler and Wilbur E. Stone, reside at El Dorado. Stone was engaged in the banking business and Chisler in the oil business, but together and as partners they, for several years, handled casing for oil wells, leasing or selling the same to parties throughout the mid-continent oil field. Byers made a written agreement with Chisler and Stone by which he leased from them (with an option to buy) 3,000 feet of 6%-inch casing, which he used in drilling the well on the O’Halloran lease. When Byers had drilled' the well to a depth of about 3,150 feet some difficulty arose and he had a settlement with Gano and his associates by which he quit drilling, and the well was taken over by Gano and C. W. Huffines. At that time about 2,300 feet of the casing Byers had leased from Chisler and Stone was in the well, and about 700 feet on the racks near the well. Chisler and Stone learned of this situation and went to Gano to get pay for the lease on the casing which Byers had agreed to pay. Gano declined to pay this. Chisler and Stone then wanted to get the
The publication of this article in the Hutchinson News is the libel complained of in this case. The petition alleges in substance that Randall, Gano and Macy, conspiring together for the purpose of
These actions were filed in Sedgwick county, where service of summons was had upon Randall, who resided in Wichita, and summons was sent to and served by the sheriff of Reno county on Gano and Macy, who resided in Hutchinson.
It- is first argued on behalf of Gano that the action was not the proper forum as to him. We do not regard it necessary to analyze and decide this question, in view of the conclusion wé have reached upon another point raised.
Appellant contends that his demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, that there was no evidence in the record that he had anything to do with the publication of the libelous article, or that he talked with or conspired with anyone concerning it, and no evidence that Macy was his agent with reference to such publication. This contention must be sustained, and it is decisive of this appeal.
Randall, it appears, is a man who has no regard for his word or even for his oath. All of the statements about Chisler and Stone having any part in moving the casing from the O'Halloran lease, or Ford being the agent of Chisler and Stone, made by Randall to Gano and incorporated in the affidavit dictated by Macy on the statements of Randall, and suggested and prompted by Randall, and sworn to by Randall before the justice of the peace after being then read to him, proved to be false. In this case Randall testified they were false, and other evidence at this trial thoroughly establishes that they were false. But there is nothing in the record tending to show that Gano prompted or had anything to do with making these false statements, or that he had any intimation at the time that they were false. Gano was then defendant in an action for the value of this casing, predicated on the theory that he had converted it to his own use. When the casing mysteriously disappeared it was natural and proper for him to make inquiry as to what became of it, who took it and by what authority. When he learned that Randall had
It is argued on behalf of appellees that Mr. Welsh, having talked to Macy and from him learned something of the facts included in the libelous article, and Macy thereby learning that an article would likely be published in the newspapers concerning the matter, together with the fact that Macy was attorney for Gano in the action brought against him for conversion of the casing and in the search-warrant
Appellees argue that a conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, that from the nature of a conspiracy it is often difficult to get direct evidence. This is true, but that fact does not dispense with evidence. If a conspiracy, or any other essential matter in a case, is established by circumstantial evidence, there must be substantial evidence of circumstances from which it necessarily follows, or at least is reasonable to infer, that such conspiracy or material matter existed. There is no such substantial evidence here. The real proof is that Gano knew nothing about any publication concerning the matter until after it was made. It was argued that Gano should have suspected that if the Randall affidavits were filed with the justice of the peace a newspaper reporter might see it and write a story concerning it. Perhaps it is a complete answer to that to say the question of what was done with that statement, whether it was filed in the justice of the peace court, Gano left to his attorney, as any client leaves such matters to his attorney. But a more forceful answer to it is that we do not render damages on theories of that character. When a substantial sum — here about $35,000 — is to be taken from the property of one man and given to others, there must be a substantial reason for it. It cannot be predicated on suspicion, theories and conjecture.
The result is that there is no substantial evidence on behalf of
The judgment of the court below is reversed with directions to enter judgment for defendant Gano.