20 Cal. 130 | Cal. | 1862
The property of the plaintiff was sold under execution to satisfy a judgment recovered against the plaintiff and the defendants, and this action is brought to enforce payment from the defendants of their proportionate share. The questions for determination arise upon the pleadings. The papers read on the motion for new trial we cannot look into, as there is no appeal from the order denying the motion. The complaint sets forth that in December, 1853, the plaintiff and the defendants purchased certain real estate situated in Alameda county, and gave to the vendor in part payment for the same them joint promissory note for $11,666, secured by a mortgage upon the property; that the plaintiff by the purchase became the owner of one undivided half of the premises, and each of the defendants became the owner of one undivided fourth; that the note was not paid, and that suit was commenced for the foreclosure of the mortgage, in which judgment was recovered against the plaintiff and the defendants for $11,666, and a decree entered directing the sale of the premises for the satisfaction of the judgment; that under the decree the mortgaged premises were sold, and after the application of the proceeds to the payment of the amount due upon the judgment, there remained a deficiency of $8,040; that for this deficiency, and the per centage, interest and costs, an execution was issued on the first of-July, 1856, and under it, on the thirtieth of the same month, property of the plaintiff was sold for the sum of $12,000, and the amount applied to the satisfaction of the deficiency and interest, per centage and costs; that
To this complaint the defendant, Webster, demurred on various grounds, and among others, on the ground that there was a misjoinder of parties, because the cause of action was several against each of the defendants; and on the ground that it appeared that more than two years had elapsed from the time the cause of action accrued before the suit was commenced. The Court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiff declining to amend his complaint, final judgment was entered thereon.
The defendant, Morrill, answered, denying, to use the language of his answer, “ the greater part of the allegations of the complaint,” without stating what those allegations were, and setting up, or rather attempting to do so, the Statute of Limitations and a discharge under the insolvent law of the State. The plaintiff, instead of demurring to the defective answer, filed a replication to it, denying the bar of the statute and the discharge in insolvency. The case was then submitted upon the pleadings. Upon them the Court gave judgment for the defendant. It is from these two judgments —one in favor of the defendant, Webster, on the demurrer, and the other in favor of the defendant, Morrill, on the pleadings, that the appeal is taken.
The appellant in his argument of the appeal takes two positions: first, that the action is one in equity to enforce a contribution from two of three obligors, to which the statute does not create a bar until after the lapse of four years (Act of April 22d, 1850, defining the time for commencing Civil Actions, sec. 19); and second, that if the action be regarded as depending upon contract, that such contract is founded upon an instrument of writing, and to the action the statute in consequence fixes a like limitation of four years.
It is also true, that the doctrine of contribution applies equally between those who are original cocontractors: that is, between those who are jointly bound on them own account, (not being copartners) as it does between those who are cosureties: that is, jointly bound ti> answer for the debt or default of another. Thus, if a note were given for the cost of a partition wall by the owners of the adjoining premises, between which the wall was constructed, and one of the parties should pay the entire amount of the note, or more than his proportionate part, he could claim a contribution from the other. (Campbell v. Mesier, 4 John’s. Ch. 335.)
2. The action being upon the implied assumpsit, the question is, whether the contract is to be regarded as “ founded upon an instrument of writing.” The statute provides that “ an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument of writing,” except in certain designated cases, shall be commenced within four years, and an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not thus founded, with certain exceptions, shall be commenced within two years. The question is, whether the present action is, in the meaning of the statute, “ founded upon an instrument of writing.” Our conclusion is, that it is not thus founded; that the statute
Judgment affirmed.