23 Fla. 206 | Fla. | 1887
delivered the opinion of the court:
I. In Bowen vs. Hall, 6 Law Reports, Q. B. Div., 333, decided in 1881, the English Court of Appeal held that an action lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract to give exclusive personal service for a time certain provided damage accrues, and that to sustain such an action it is not necessary that the employer and employe should stand in the strict relation of master and servant. The person induced to break his contract had agreed to manufacture glazed brick and baths and not to engage himself to any one else for a term of five years. This decision is founded upon one of the chains of reasoning in Lumley vs. Gye, decided by the Queen’s Bench in 1853, (2 E. and B., 2, 18,), though it repudiates the other. The chain of reasoning adopted is set forth, in Bowen vs. Hall, substantially as follows: Wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie. That if these conditions are satisfied the action does not the less lie because the natural and probable consequence of the act complained of is an act done by a third person, or because such act so done by a third person is a breach of duty or contract by him, or an act illegal on his part, or an act otherwise imposing an actionable liability on him. That though it has been said the law implies that the act of the third party, being one which he has free will and power to do or not to do, is his own willful .-act and therefore is not the natural or probable result of the defendant’s act, and though this may be so in many cases, yet if the law were so to imply in every caso it would be an implication contrary to manifest truth and
In Lumley vs. Gye a count in the declaration was for maliciously procuring an actress to break her contract (which was executory) to sing at plaintiff’s theatre and nowhere else, and it was held by a majority of the court that an action would lie for the malicious procurement of a breach of contract, though not for personal services, if by the procurement damage was intended to result and did result to the plaintiff. See Haskins vs. Royster, 70 N. C., 60.
In Walker et al. vs. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555, the count was that plaintiff was a manufacturer of shoes, and for the prosecution of his business it was necessary for him to employ many shoemakers ; that defendant well knowing this did unlawfully and without justifiable cause molest him in ■carrying on said business, with the unlawful purpose of pre
Erom the authorities referred to in the last preceding paragraph, and upon principle, it is apparent that neither the fact that the term of service interrupted is not for a fixed period nor the fact that there is not a right of action against the person who is induced or influenced to terminate
II. The defendant, appellant, excepted to the following paragraph of the Judge’s charge to the jury : “ If the Pensacola & Atlantic R. R. Company had a contract with Kehoe & Walker to furnish a side track to their brickyard, and the defendant refused to perform that contract, intending thereby to injure the plaintiff by having him discharged, then the defendant would be liable to plaintiff for damages according to the law and evidence.”
This instruction does not embody as an essential either the idea of an actual discharge of the plaintiff by Kehoe & Walker, or of such a discharge maliciously and wrongfully procured by defendant, or of any actual damage sustained therefrom by the plaintiff ; but asserts that a refusal by Chipley to perform a contract of the railroad company with Kehoe & Walker, with the intent to have plaiiítiff
III. The Judge also charged the jury that “ If the plaintiff entered into the employment of Kehoe & Walker upon the understanding that he was afterwards to be admitted into co-partnership with them he was an employe, and the defendant would be liable for procuring his discharge, even though there was no contract between plaintiff and Kehoe & Walker for a definite term of service or for stipulated wages.” The defendant excepted. The case made by the declaration is that the employment was under an agreement by which it was to be continued for a long period of time. An agreement between the plaintiff and Kehoe & Walker for the continuance of the employment for a long period of time cannot be ignored as a feature of the case. This allegation means that the agreement entered into by them entitled the plaintiff, either expressly or by implication, to employment not only for a period of time b.ut for a long period. It means that a period of time was agreed upon by them, and means that the period thus agreed on was, whether limited by months or years or otherwise, it is to be proved. The language implies that there was at least some point of time in the future, ascertainable from the terms of the agreement, up to which the employment was to extend. That the continuation of the employment for
The absence from the agreement of a clause fixing the wages at a certain or stipulated amount would not defeat a recovery. If the compensation, wages or benefit to be derived by the employe is such that its value can be ascertained, it is sufficient to sustain even compensatory damages.
IY. The jury were also instructed, “ That if the plaintiff voluntarily left the service of Kehoe & Walker because of the conduct of the defendant in endeavoring to procure his discharge it would be equivalent to a discharge, and the defendant would be liable to the plaintiff as for procuring the discharge ; but if the plaintiff voluntarily left the ser
Y. The defendant’s attorney requested that the following instructions should be given to the jury :
1st. “In order that the plaintiff may recover under the first count he must prove that the defendant unlawfully
2d. “ Even if there was a contract, if such contract was terminable at the will of Kehoe & Walker, then the procurement by the defendant of the dissolution of such contract does not constitute a ground of action.”
They were refused.
In view 'of the declaration in this case, we think the first of the above instructions was proper. The declaration shows a contract employment as general superintendent of a brick yard. Under an agreement, the same to continue for a long period of time, and one by which he earned the support of himself and his family. The second instruction is, for reasons stated in a former part of this opinion, erroneous.
YI. Defendant also requested the Judge to charge the jury as follows : “ In order that the plaintiff may recover any damages for the procurement by the defendant that Kehoe & Walker should, not take plaintiff into copartnership, there must have existed at the time of such procurement a legal contract by which Kehoe & Walker were-bound to enter into a copartnership. If you find that there was merely an understanding that upon certain contingencies Kehoe & Walker and plaintiff were to enter into-a copartnership, a procurement by the defendant of a withdrawal by Kehoe & Walker from such understanding will not entitle the plaintiff to recover for any damages resulting therefrom.”
In regard to this instruction we may, in view of the fact that the case has to go back for a new trial, as well say that any actual damage probable to result to the plaintiff from a
YII. The following instruction was also requested by defendant and refused by the Circuit Judge: “ So far as the plaintiff is concerned it was lawful for the defendant as Yice-President and General Manager of the Pensacola and Atlantic Eailroad Company to refuse to furnish a side track gratuitously to Kehoe & Walker, if they retained plaintiff in their employ, or with an interest in their business, even though there was a contract by which the railroad company were to furnish such side track gratuitously, and such refusal does not furnish any ground of action for the plaintiff, if you find that he was not party to the contract.” If A. acting in his own behalf, or in that of his principal, simply withhold a gratuity from B. because B. retains C. in his employ, or with an interest in his business, neither the employer nor the employe has any right of action, and in such case where there is a contract between the first person and the employer to furnish the latter any certain thing, and the first person refuses to perform or break his contract for the reason that the third person is employed by the second, the third person or employe has no right of action for such refusal or breach of contract; in neither case has any legal right of C. been violated, nor has 0. any privity with
The instruction requested should, we think, have been given as it does not imply any such purpose of procuring a discharge of the plaintiff.
The judgment is reversed and a new trial granted.