In re the Matter of: N.G., L.G., K.G., and D.G. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services; L.G. (Father) and E.G. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Kids Voice of Indiana
Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-JC-2857
Court of Appeals of Indiana
July 9, 2027
May, Judge; Mathias and Felix, JJ., concur.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court; The Honorable Tara Y. Melton, Judge; Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D15-2505-JC-5043, 49D15-2505-JC-5044, 49D15-2505-JC-5045, 49D15-2505-JC-5046
Christopher Taylor-Price, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Appellate Division, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for L.G. (Father).
Theodore E. Rokita, Indiana Attorney General; Samuel J. Dayton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Indiana Department of Child Services.
Judges Mathias and Felix concur.
May, Judge.
[1] E.G. (“Mother“) and L.G. (“Father“) (collectively, “Parents“) separately appeal the trial court‘s adjudication of their children as children in need of services (“CHINS“). Parents rаise, between them, the following combined issues:
- Whether the evidence supports the trial court‘s adjudication of Children as CHINS under
Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 , where Mother and Father each challenge as clearly erroneous several of the findings underlying that conclusion; and - Whether the trial court violated Mother‘s and Father‘s rights under
Indiana Code sections 31-32-2-3 and31-34-9-7 to present evidence at the dispositional hearing.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother are the parents of four children: N.G., born in 2012; L.G. III, born in 2016; K.G., born in 2017; and D.G., born in 2024 (hereinafter collectively, “Children“). Indiana‘s Department of Child Services (“DCS“)
[3] Two days later, DCS Family Case Manager Sydney Session (“FCM Session“) interviewed three of the four children at school. D.G., then one year old, was not interviewed. K.G. told FCM Session that he had observed domestic violence between his parents and disclosed that L.G. III had touched him inappropriately under his clothes. When interviewed, N.G. and L.G. III both told FCM Session that they had not witnessed domestic violence or any inappropriate contact between the siblings.
[4] DCS filed its CHINS petitions on May 20, 2025. At the initial hearing on May 21, 2025, the magistrate removed K.G. from the home without a request from DCS.2 The court placed K.G. with his maternal grandparents. K.G. took part
The Fact-Finding Hearing and Adjudication
[5] The fact-finding hearing was held July 9, 2025. DCS presented testimony from FCM Session, FCM Amudalat Ross, and the family preservation therapist; the parents presented testimony from K.G.‘s maternal grandfather, Mother, and the two Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL“) volunteers assigned to the children. The trial court denied Parents’ motion for involuntary dismissal under Trial Rule 41(B) after reviewing Exhibit 1, which was the video of the forensic interview of K.G.
[6] FCM Session testified that Parents were “not fully understanding how big of concern domestic violence can be, especially in the presence of young children.” (Tr. Vol. II at 97.) Law enforcement had been called to Parents’ home for domestic disturbances at least twice in the month before DCS‘s involvement. Of the three сhildren FCM Session interviewed at school, K.G. reported observing domestic violence between his parents. Mother and Father had separately sent FCM Ross messages asking about divorce, which she characterized as an indication “that there‘s obviously something going on in the home.” (Id. at 109.)
[7] DCS referred Mother for mental health services with a local provider. Mother testified she instead enrolled in individual therapy through BetterHelp, as well as couples counseling through BetterHelp and an anger management program. On cross-examination, DCS established that Mother had communicated
[8] On August 26, 2025, the trial court entered its Order on Fact Finding adjudicating all four children CHINS. The court found that Parents minimized the domestic violence in the home and did not understand its impact on young children and that police had responded to the home on multiple occasions. The court also found that Mother was unwilling to pursue services for her children without court compulsion and that the absence of documentation of the parents’ therapy reflected non-compliance. Based on these and other findings, the court concluded Children were endangered and that their needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court.
The Dispositional Hearing
[9] The dispositional hearing was scheduled for September 24, 2025, at 11:30 a.m. The scheduling entry, which was made by the trial court on the same day as the fact-finding order, reads only: “Dispositional Hearing scheduled for 09/24/2025 at 11:30 AM.” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 8.) The trial court‘s chronological case summary does not indicate that any party filed a witness list, a notice of intent to present evidence, or a request for a contested evidentiary hearing in the period between the fact-finding order and the dispositional hearing.
[10] At the hearing, before any witness was sworn, the trial court stated:
I want to get to what‘s recommended because I feel like our time would be better spent hearing testimony. . . . I think . . . there‘s a rational basis for [for] services in this case. . . . What we‘re doing is putting services in place based upon what I felt I heard at the hearing and what I- at the fact finding and what I feel like the family- is rational and reasonable for the family to complete. . . . Now that said, we‘ll get to the recommendations then we‘ll get to sworn testimony.
(Tr. Vol. II at 173.)
[11] The court heard brief testimony from Mother on Mother‘s motion to ensure compliance due to an alleged difficulty communicating with DCS. The court then permitted DCS to call FCM Ross, who testified regarding the predispositional reports and DCS‘s recommended services. During Father‘s cross-examination of FCM Ross, the court interjected:
[T]he only thing that I consider to be rationally related is the home-based therapy individual and family. I do think that it‘s needed. I do think a DV assessment is needed and any recommendations. If they don‘t recommend anything, nothing will be done. . . . So, what I‘d rather hear [from Parents] is why you think those two services, those services, the home-based therapy and the DV assessment are not rationally related and should not be ordered because eliciting testimony from Ms. Ross is just really long and drawn out and really won‘t get you where you need to be honestly. . . . I‘d rather just hear from you why you don‘t agree with these services because I do think that they are reasonable. . . . So, [Father‘s counsel], you go first.
(Id. at 184-85.)
[12] Rather than present argument about why those two services would not be rationally related to the CHINS disposition, Father‘s counsel continued cross-examining FCM Ross, as did Mother‘s counsel, followed by DCS‘s redirect. After this testimony concluded, the court asked Father‘s counsel:
Isn‘t the proper way to do this, were you all suрposed to file and ask for a contested dispositional hearing? Because I would‘ve [set] this for a different hour had I had a request for a contested disposition. . . . I had no indication that this was going to be a contested evidentiary hearing. And I do believe everyone is supposed to have notice of that. . . . how many witnesses do you have, [Father‘s counsel]?
(Id. at 196-97.) Father‘s counsel responded that she had two witnesses; Mother‘s counsel stated he had two as well. The court responded: “Okay. So, we‘re not going to do this. We‘re not doing this. We‘re going to reset it for a contested evidentiary hearing because we don‘t do trial by ambush.” (Id. at 197.)
[13] Father‘s counsel reminded the trial court that disposition had to be completed within thirty days of the fact-finding order, and the court reversed course:
All right, well then if that‘s the case, then we‘re going to go forward because you all didn‘t give me notice of an evidentiary hearing. . . . [This] is set for a 15 minute dispositional hearing because typically that‘s what we do. If you‘re going to want a [sic] evidentiary hearing, you have to request that. And that has not happened. So, you can give me a summary and we can, we can review it again and we can set it for another hearing, but today I‘m going to issue a dispositional order and then you guys, if you want to ask for a contested dispositional hearing set for
later, we will do that. So right now, I need your summary argument from [Father‘s counsel] and [Mother‘s counsel].
(Id. at 197-98.)
[14] Father‘s counsel immediately objected on the record: “I would object to issuing an оrder, a dispositional order absent having a full evidentiary hearing on the evidence for whether or not there‘s a rational basis.” (Id. at 198.) Mother‘s counsel joined: “I would echo all of [Father‘s counsel‘s] sentiments in her closing. . . . I would also join her in her objection.” (Id. at 199.) The court proceeded to disposition without hearing from either parent‘s witnesses. In explaining its ruling, the court stated: “Everybody had an opportunity to supply, to admit evidence at the trial. So, evidence could have come from anyone about services completed, about service providers being put on the stand, they could have been subpoenaed, all of those things.” (Id. at 201.)
[15] The trial court entered its Dispositional Order on October 15, 2025, ordering both parents to pаrticipate in home-based therapy, home-based case management, and a domestic violence assessment, and to comply with all provider recommendations.
Discussion and Decision
1. The CHINS Adjudication
[16] No statute expressly requires formal findings of fact in a CHINS fact-finding order, In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), and neither party requested findings under
[17] A CHINS adjudication under
[18] Father challenges thirteen of the trial court‘s findings, targeting both the domestic violence evidence underlying the determination of endangerment and the findings bearing on whether coercive intervention was necessary. Mother challenges four findings focused on the investigation timeline and her willingness to pursue services. We address first the finding both parents challenge, then Mother‘s remaining challenges and Father‘s remaining challenges grouped by subject matter, before considering whether the supported findings sustain the adjudication.
A. Finding 24 – Both Parents Challenge
[19] Finding 24 states that “Mother testified that, if not for DCS involvement, she would end K.G.‘s involvement in therapy” and “refused to answer whether she would take L.G. III to his [scheduled mental health evaluation] if the matter closed.” (App. Vol. II at 164.)
[20] Mother contends this finding mischaracterizes her testimony because she testified she “would not be in objection to taking my son to get evaluated.” (Tr. Vol. II at 137.) That statement, considered in isolation, supports her position. However, we consider the evidence supporting the trial court‘s decision, not isolated passages that favor the appellant. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (stating standard of review). Before making that statement, Mother declined three
[21] Father contends Finding 24 rests in part on stricken testimony. The record does not support that reading. DCS moved to strike “the hearsay statement of the therapist.” (Tr. Vol. II at 135.) The trial court granted that motion, striking only what Mother conveyed the therapist had said, not Mother‘s own statement that she would end K.G.‘s therapy. (Id.) Father does not identify any testimony that was actually stricken that appears in Finding 24. We accordingly hold Finding 24 is supported by the record.
C. Mother‘s Remaining Challenged Findings – Findings 5, 6, & 7
[22] Mother challenges three findings describing the sequence and basis of FCM Session‘s initial assessment. She argues Finding 5 incorreсtly states the assessment was triggered by the touching allegation when it was triggered by
[23] FCM Session testified that she received a referral, went to the family‘s home and briefly spoke to Mother, went to the school to interview the children, and then met with Mother again at a Wendy‘s parking lot to discuss what she had learned. Findings 6 and 7 track that sequence accurately.
[24] As to Finding 7‘s characterization of Mother‘s reaction, Session testified that Mother was upset and found the school visit “embarrassing.” (Tr. Vol. II at 84.) The finding states that Mother‘s reaction “resulted in Ms. Session having some additional concerns.” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 162.) That characterization is supрorted by FCM Session‘s testimony. The trial court did not have to credit Mother‘s description of her own reaction.
[25] The error in Finding 5 – which does misstate the nature of the report that triggered the initial assessment by DCS – is harmless as it does not impact a determination whether Children were CHINS at the time of the adjudication. We need not reverse for errors in superfluous findings. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
C. Father‘s Challenged Findings
1. The Touching Findings – Findings 8, 23, & 25
[26] Finding 8 states: “Mother confirmed that this is not the first time that [K.G.] disclosed inappropriate touching by his brother. [K.G.] told his parents about
[27] Finding 23 states that neither parent sought therapeutic or remedial services for K.G. or L.G. III before DCS involvement, despite “multiple incidents of inappropriate touching.” (E.G. App. Vol. II аt 164.) Father correctly argues that “multiple incidents” overstates what the record demonstrates. The forensic interview – Petitioner‘s Exhibit 1, which was admitted by stipulation – establishes one incident of inappropriate touching. Mother‘s statement to FCM Session about a body safety conversation a year prior supports at most a reasonable inference of one prior incident. Thus, the “multiple incidents” language in Finding 23 is not supported by the record.
[28] That error does not require reversal, however. The remainder of Finding 23 – that neither parent sought therapeutic or remedial services for either child
[29] Finding 25 states that K.G.‘s disclosure “indicates he did not approve of thе touching, he does not feel safe when it happens, and he wants the adults in his life to stop [it].” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 164.) Father argues the phrase “when it happens” implies ongoing conduct the record does not support – because the record establishes one incident, not a continuing pattern – and that there is no direct evidence of K.G.‘s emotional state. Father is correct that “when it happens” is imprecise; the record establishes one incident in the forensic interview and one prior incident by inference. We will not reverse on this basis, however. A factfinder may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The act of disclosing what happened to an FCM at school and to a forensic interviеwer supports the inference that K.G.
2. The Domestic Violence Findings – Findings 13, 15, 30, & 31
[30] Father challenges four findings concerning domestic violence in the home. We consider each in turn.
[31] Finding 31 states that when FCM Session spoke with K.G. at school, K.G. “disclosed that he had observed domestic violence between the parents . . . .” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 164.) This tracks FCM Session‘s testimony, as she stated on cross-examination that K.G. “had disclosed that he had observed domestic violence between the parents . . . .” (Tr. Vol. II at 103.) Father‘s counsel objected and moved to strike; the trial court overruled the objection because Mother‘s counsel had elicited the testimony. (Id.) Unobjected-to hearsay – and here the objection was overruled – “may be considered for substantive purposes and is sufficient to establish a material fact at issue.” Banks, 567 N.E.2d at 1129. Finding 31 is supported by FCM Session‘s admitted testimony.3
[33] Finding 13 states that “[r]emoval occurred after [K.G.] disclosed inappropriate touching by his older brother and domestic violence in the family home.” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 162-163.) This is a description of the sequence of events leading to K.G.‘s removal, which is supported by FCM Sessiоn‘s testimony. (Tr. Vol. II at 103 (“he had disclosed that he had observed domestic violence between the parents and also made a disclosure of inappropriate touching“)). The sequence is accurate: K.G. made both disclosures to FCM Session during
[34] Finding 15 states that during the forensic interview K.G. “disclosed one incident of inappropriate touching by his older brother when he was 7 years old. [K.G.] also disclosed witnessing domestic violence in their home.” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 163.) DCS concedes that the second sentence is inaccurate because K.G. said nothing about domestic violence during the forensic interview. Nevertheless, the error in Finding 15 is harmless. K.G.‘s dоmestic violence disclosure is established in the record through FCM Session‘s school interview testimony, as we held above regarding Finding 31, and an erroneous finding is harmless when it does not constitute the “sole support for any conclusion of law necessary to sustain the judgment.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20. K.G.‘s disclosure rests independently on FCM Session‘s admitted testimony regardless of Finding 15‘s misattribution.
3. The Remediation and Services Findings – Findings 27, 35, 36, 41, & 42
[35] Finding 27 states that DCS referred Mother for mental health services through a local provider, that Mother did not engage in that referred service, that she obtained therapy through BetterHelp instead, and that neither DCS nor her provider verified her consistent engagement. (E.G. App. Vol. II at 164.) Father argues this finding is misleading because DCS never provided Mother a release of informаtion form to allow verification of her BetterHelp services. However, DCS did not need to provide a release of information form for Mother to call
[36] Finding 35 states: “To the extent that parents have taken remedial efforts, those have not been sufficient to remedy safety concerns for the children in their family home.” (E.G. App. Vol. II at 165.) Father points to the testimony of both GALs, who testified they had no current safety concerns and would not object to case closure. (Tr. Vol. II at 160-63.) The trial court heard that testimony from the GALs, which focused on the home being physically appropriate with cameras and a room divider in place to prevent inappropriate touching between children. Their testimony did not speak to whether the therapeutic concerns identified by the fact-finding – K.G.‘s disclosure of touching and his witnessing of domestic conflict – had been professionally addressed. On that question, the record shows neither parent sought any professional evaluation or therapy for K.G. or L.G. III before or during the proceedings. FCM Yates recommended that L.G. III receive a mental health assessment and that Mother receive at least a mental health evaluation. (Tr. Vol. II at 68.) However, the trial court heard all of the testimony and was not required to read the GALs’ testimony as a complete resolution of the safety concern. We hold Finding 35 is supported by the record.
[37] Finding 36 states that Mother indicated she was involved in anger management, therapy, and couples counseling, but failed to provide evidence of
[38] Findings 41 and 42 state that Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation they are not receiving and arе unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court and that the family would not engage in needed services without court intervention. (E.G. App. Vol. II at 165.) Father argues the trial court did not specify what care the children were not receiving. However, no statute requires that degree of specificity in a CHINS fact-finding order, In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287, and neither party requested findings under Trial Rule 52(A). Nevertheless, another of the trial court‘s findings – Finding 10, which was unchallenged by Parents and therefore is presumed correct, In re To.R., 177 N.E.3d at 485 (unchallenged findings accepted as correct) – indicated DCS‘s safety concerns were Parents’ minimization of domestic violence in the home, Parents’ failure to understand the impact of domestic violence on young children, and the inappropriate touching between siblings.
[39] Finding 41 – which indicates Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are not receiving and are unlikely to receive – is supported by the court‘s other Findings demonstrating that law enforcement was called to the home at least twice in the month before DCS involvement for domestic disturbances, that K.G. had observed domestic violence between his parents, that K.G. had been touched inappropriately by L.G. III, and that neither parent
D. The Supported Findings Sustain the CHINS Adjudication
[40] Parents argue the findings did not support that Children are endangered. However, a child‘s exposure to domestic violence can support a CHINS finding, and that exposure need not be repetitive to be serious. K.A.H. v. Ind. Dep‘t of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). A trial court need not “wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be determined to bе a CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is endangered.” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). K.G.‘s disclosure that he witnessed domestic violence between his parents, in a home to which police had been called for domestic disturbances at least twice in the preceding month, and in which both parents consistently minimized those concerns to FCM Session, supports the trial court‘s conclusion that the children‘s condition was seriously endangered.
[41] Father further argues the record contains little evidence specific to D.G. or N.G. individually. However, many of the trial court‘s findings are about the conditions of the household in which all four children lived, not about incidents involving particular children. Father does not contend that D.G. and N.G. lived elsewhere or that the household conditions did not apply to them. Accordingly, we find no error in this regard.
[42] Parents also argue coercive intervention is not necessary. However, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had not sought any professional services for K.G. or L.G. III. She testified she did not believe the children needed services, she stated she would end K.G.‘s therapy if the case closed, and she would not directly commit to taking L.G. III to his scheduled mental health evaluation. FCM Yates recommended at minimum that L.G. III receive a mental health assessment and that Mother receive a mental health evaluation. The trial court‘s conclusion that Children would not receive needed care without the coercive intervention of the court is supported by the evidence.
[43] We aсcordingly affirm the trial court‘s adjudication of Children as CHINS.
2. The Dispositional Hearing
[44] We next address whether the trial court denied Parents their statutory right to present evidence at the dispositional hearing. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1033 (Ind. 2024).
[45]
[46] The trial court told counsel before any dispositional witness was sworn that it had already determined services were “rational and reasonable” based on the fact-finding hearing. (Tr. Vol. II at 173.) While FCM Ross was still testifying, the court told both parents’ counsel that presenting further testimony “really won‘t get you where you need to be,” (id. at 184-85), and invited argument instead. Counsel continued examining the witness rather than shifting to argument. Only after DCS‘s redirect concluded did the court ask whether anyone had requested a “contested dispositional hearing.”4 (Id. at 196-97.) When Parents indicated they each had two witnesses, the court‘s initial response was to reset the matter: “We‘re going to reset it for a contested evidentiary hearing because we don‘t do trial by ambush.” (Id. at 197.)
[47] The trial court‘s stated rationale – that the parties had failed to request a “contested dispositional hearing” and that the matter was “set for a 15 minute dispositional hearing,” (Tr. Vol. II at 197) – is not supported in the record. The CCS reflects only that thе hearing was scheduled for 11:30 a.m.; no party, including DCS, filed any notice of witnesses, time estimate, or request for an evidentiary hearing before September 24, 2025. (E.G. App. Vol. II at 8.) Whatever practice the trial court believed governed scheduling of dispositional hearings, that practice does not appear to have been disclosed to the parties in advance and was not applied to DCS, which was permitted to present a full witness without any such notice having been given. Nor did DCS object to Mother and Father each presenting witnesses.
[48] By the time the court raised the contested hearing requirement, DCS had already presented its case, and the court had already stated its view of the appropriate outcomе. The parents were denied the opportunity to present any evidence at all.
[49] DCS does not dispute that
[50] DCS argues that Father‘s counsel waived Parents’ evidentiary claim by raising the thirty-day statutory deadline immediately after the trial court offered to reset the matter for a contested hearing, causing the court to withdraw that offer. Waiver requires the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” In re N.C., 83 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013)). The thirty-day requirement of
[51] DCS‘s second argument is that Parents’ failure to make an offer of proof describing what their witnesses would have said forfeited any claim of error. DCS is correct that Indiana law ordinarily requires a party to make an offer of proof to preserve a claim that the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, see Ind. Evid. Rule 103(a), so that a reviewing court can assess what was excluded and whether its exclusion mattered. However, that requirement presupposes a setting in which counsel has the opportunity to identify the evidence at issue. A party traditionally makes an offer to prove after the trial court has sustained an objection to the admission of the party‘s evidence. Harman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 209, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Nothing of that kind occurred here. The trial court did not rule on any witness or any item of evidence. When the court learned that each parent had witnesses to call, it declined to hear from any of them and proceeded directly to its ruling. Counsel were never in a position to make an offer of proof because the court foreclosed the presentation of evidence before identifying what that evidence would be. We will not treat the absence of an offer of proof as forfeiting a claim where the trial court‘s own ruling made an offer of proof impossible to make.
[52] Because Father did not waive his argument and the trial court denied Parents their statutory right to present evidence at the dispositional hearing, we reverse the Dispositional Order entered October 15, 2025, and remand for a new dispositional hearing.5 At that hearing, Parents shall be permitted to present evidence, including but not limited to the witnesses they were prepared to call on September 24, 2025, and any evidence of services completed or engaged in since that date. DCS may likewise present any updated information. The trial court shall enter a new disрositional order based on the evidence presented at that hearing.
Conclusion
[53] Parents arguments regarding the validity of the findings and conclusions supporting the CHINS adjudication fail, and we accordingly affirm the adjudication of Children as CHINS. However, the trial court denied Parents their statutory right to present evidence prior the entry of a dispositional decree, and we accordingly reverse the trial court‘s dispositional order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
[54] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.
Don R. Hostetler
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR L.G. (FATHER)
Christopher Taylor-Price
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana