Chin Kee v. CommonwealthChin Kee v. Commonwealth
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kirk
This petition for writ of error was reserved and reported without decision by the single justice on the petition, the answer, the assignment of error, the .return, and an amended stipulation of facts.
- The record shows that on September 13, 1932, Chin Kee was indicted for murder. The then department of mental diseases was given notice as required by
The case proceeded to trial on October 31, 1932. On November 4 Chin Kee was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal to this court, judgment was ordered to be entered on the verdict. Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 283 Mass. 248. The sentence of death was commuted by the Governor to a sentence of imprisonment for fife. Some years later the latter sentence was commuted to a sentence of imprisonment from sixty-five years to life.
The major premise of Chin Kee’s argument for reversal is the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52. The consequences of a plea at arraignment under the special features of Alabama law were discussed. The Supreme Court determined that arraignment in Alabama was a “critical stage” at which the advice of counsel was needed to preserve rights which under Alabama law might be forever lost. In the Hamilton case, the court did not decide that counsel at arraignments was indispensable in every State. This was made clear in Stovall *158 v. Denno, Warden, 388 U. S. 293, where reference was made to the constitutional right to counsel “at some forms of arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama” (emphasis supplied).
It is important, therefore, that consideration be given to the features of arraignment under Alabama law which led the Supreme Court to characterize the arraignment as a “critical stage,” and that these features then be compared with arraignment under the law of this Commonwealth. The court pointed out first and foremost that in Alabama [1] “[[I]t is . . . [[at arraignment] that the defense of insanity must be ‘pleaded . . . or the opportunity is lost. . . . Thereafter that plea may not be made except in the discretion of the trial judge, and his refusal to accept it is ‘not revisable’ on appeal. . . . [[2] Pleas in abatement must also be made at the time of arraignment. [3] It is then that motions to quash based on systematic exclusion of one race from grand juries . . . or on the ground that the grand jury was otherwise improperly drawn . . . must be made” (citations only omitted).
1. We recognize fully the gravity of a stage in criminal procedure that thereafter precludes the defence of insanity which reaches the very heart of criminal responsibility. The fact is, however, that the law of this Commonwealth is diametrically opposite to that of Alabama in that the defence of insanity is not precluded by any plea on arraignment but, on the contrary, is open to the defendant throughout the trial. Insanity is not matter for a special plea. The defence of insanity is open on a plea of not guilty. Under that plea, the sanity of the defendant is placed in issue whenever evidence is offered at the trial tending to show insanity. And in every case where sanity is in issue, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable’ doubt that the defendant is sane. Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415. Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 613.
Furthermore, under the Briggs Law, so called, in capital cases and in the case of certain other persons held for trial, the law itself initiates an inquiry into the mental condition *159 of the accused. 1 The law in all essential particulars reads now as it did at the time of Chin Kee’s indictment (as amended through St. 1929, c. 105) and at the time of its first enactment (St. 1921, c. 415). The record shows compliance with the statute before Chin Kee’s trial. The report signed by two psychiatrists in the department concluded with the statement that Chin Kee “has no mental disease or defect.” Feature [1] of an Alabama arraignment, therefore, has no parallel in Massachusetts. Chin Kee lost no rights on this aspect of the case at arraignment.
2. Much of the discussion which follows relative to features [2] and [33 will not be applicable to indictments returned or complaints issued after the effective date of
A comparison of features
[2]
and [3] under Alabama law with corresponding features in Massachusetts law involves differences in nomenclature. It would appear that the roles of a plea in abatement and a motion to quash are respectively reversed in the two jurisdictions. (Feature |T53 in quotation above from
Hamilton
v.
Alabama.)
It is of course the substance and not the name of a pleading that controls and we look at the problem in that light. “A motion to quash is confined to taking objection to an indictment ‘for a formal defect apparent on the face thereof.’
Were it not for certain cases cited by Chin Kee,
2
we would leave the subject of motions to quash at this point with the conclusion that Chin Kee by his plea in the absence of counsel at arraignment was not deprived of the right to file such a motion thereafter under
*162
We pursue briefly the matter of the motion to quash under
From the foregoing discussion, we think it may fairly be said at this juncture that as to (1) the defence of insanity and (2) motions to quash (as that term is applied in Massachusetts) there is no basis to characterize arraignment in Massachusetts as a “critical stage.”
3. Adhering to the terminology of our jurisdiction, pleas in abatement remain” to be considered. In Alabama they are called “motions^ to quash.” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 53-54. Pleas in abatement reach matter outside the scope of a motion to quash. They attack, not the recitals in an indictment returned by the grand jury but the “genuineness” or “validity” of the procedure by which the indictment was returned by the grand jury. The issue of lack of genuineness or validity could be raised by a plea in abatement properly alleging irregularities, such as the presence of unauthorized persons, Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 463, Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 586, Lebowitch, petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 362, or the fact that no witnesses appeared before the grand jury, Commonwealth v. Clune, 162 Mass. 206, 207.
It was early held and became the general rule that a plea
*163
of not guilty was a waiver of matters in abatement, and that thereafter pleas in abatement could be filed in the discretion of the court and not as matter of right.
Commonwealth
v.
Blake,
12 Allen, 188.
Commonwealth
v.
Wakelin,
230 Mass. 567.
Lebowitch, petitioner,
235 Mass. 357, 362-363.
Commonwealth
v.
Greenberg,
339 Mass. 557, 564. Moreover, a decision in the Superior Court on a plea in abatement was final,
4. The question is whether in light of what we have said the holding in Hamilton v. Alabama compels a reversal of the judgment against Chin Kee. It would appear to be Chin Kee’s position that Hamilton v. Alabama imposes a rule of thumb which we must apply despite the demonstrated differences between the consequences of arraignment in Alabama and Massachusetts. We do not agree. It seems to us that the appropriate procedure is not automatic reversal, but the procedure set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 268, both capital cases and both involving constitutional error. These cases modify, we think, the “automatic reversal” rule in the Hamilton case. See 386 U. S. at 22. In the Chapman case the court declined to rule that no constitutional error could be harmless, but instead ruled that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [State] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U. S. at 24. The burden of proof was placed on the State, the “beneficiary of the error.” *164 Out of an abundance of caution we adopt that procedure here. 4
The issue whether there was harmless error may be resolved by a thorough examination of the record. It shows that Chin Kee’s court appointed counsel acted diligently and competently before, during and after trial. Some of his pretrial and post trial efforts are set out in the footnote. 5 He sought and obtained executive clemency for Chin Kee. He did not file a motion to quash but, for reasons heretofore stated, there was no reason for him to do so. With respect to matters of abatement the fact that counsel did not ask for leave to file such a plea in light of all the circumstances, points to the conclusion that he had no grounds to do so. In his argument before us, Chin Kee suggests no grounds for a plea in abatement. There can be no question of “systematic exclusion of one race from grand juries” in Middlesex County in 1932. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 54. We take notice that save for a few one man or family business operations scattered through the county persons of Oriental heritage were mainly in the academic community at Cambridge.
After consideration of the entire record, we are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chin Kee suffered no prejudice from the absence of counsel at his arraignment. We hold, as we did in Macey v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 519, 522-523, that there was no harmful constitutional error. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The same cases were relied upon by the petitioner (Macey) in Macey v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 519, 521.
See now
In Chapman v. California, the court said at page 24: “While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar standard to all courts, and _we believe its adoption will provide a more workable standard . . . [than in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85].”
The retrun shows nine major motions filed by defence counsel, including a motion for particulars, a motion that he be furnished with a copy of the autopsy and report thereon, a motion that the scene of killing be ordered kept in its then condition, a motion for transcript“‘of statements made by the petitioner, a motion for a transcript of evidence before the grand jury and a list of witnesses relied upon by the Commonwealth, and a motion for inspection of exhibits of the Commonwealth. Counsel also filed and had hearmgs on a motion for new trial, a first supplementary motion for new trial, and a second supplementary motion for new trial.